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ABSTRACT
This Article proposes a “modular” conception of environmental
regulation and natural resource management as an alternative to
traditional approaches. Under traditional approaches, agencies tend
to operate independently, and often at cross-purposes, using relatively
inflexible regulatory tools, without significant stakeholder input, and
without institutional mechanisms capable of adapting to changing
conditions over time. Modularity, by contrast, is characterized by a
high degree of flexible coordination across government agencies as
well as between public agencies and private actors; governance
structures in which form follows function; a problem-solving
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orientation that requires flexibility; and reliance on a mix of formal
and informal tools of implementation, including both traditional
regulation and contract-like agreements. The Article frames the
enterprise of environmental regulation and resource management as
an exercise in designing governance institutions capable of managing
multiple and seemingly incompatible demands over the long term.
This approach departs from the traditional legal framing of such
environmental conflicts as shorter-term and zero-sum questions of
jurisdiction, authority, entitlement, and prohibition.
To illustrate modularity, the Article presents a detailed case study
of the CalFed Bay-Delta Program, a multiagency effort to address
competing demands on the water resources in the San Francisco Bay
Delta. The story of CalFed illustrates many features of the modular
ideal identified in the Article, and shows concretely how such an
approach can achieve both procedural and substantive policy
innovation while also producing measurable environmental
improvements on the ground. The case study anchors the elaboration
of the modular conception and its constituent elements presented in
the latter part of the Article. Finally, the Article analyzes why the
modular ideal is so hard to achieve in practice, yet it concludes that
there is no alternative to moving toward modularity given the complex
nature of the environmental and natural resource problems that we
face.
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INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, debates about reforming environmental regulation
and natural resource management have focused largely on two
important normative questions: First, which level of government
ought to regulate or manage? And, second, using which tools?1 In its
simplest form, the first question presents a choice between federal
versus state dominance of environmental regulation and
management; the second presents a choice between command and
control or market instruments. But of course, it is not, nor has it ever
been, that simple.
Regulating environmental harms and managing fragile
environmental resources require much more than assigning authority
to a federal or state agency, and then choosing between, for example,
a trading scheme and a technology-based standard. There is rarely a
single tool, or a lone agency at either the federal or state level, that is
capable of producing the desired environmental benefit by itself,
especially now that the most easily captured environmental gains
have been obtained through the first wave of regulation. It seems

1. Although each of these questions implicates the other, they are indeed distinct:
conceivably, one can favor a strong federal role together with market mechanisms, or greater
state autonomy coupled with prescriptive regulation.
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increasingly indisputable, after decades of environmental regulation
and management, that success with every environmental problem,
including habitat conservation, air pollution control, water allocation,
hazardous waste remediation, and wetlands restoration, requires not
only a suite of complementary regulatory tools and the coordination
of multiple levels of government, but also a wide variety of informal
implementation mechanisms and the ongoing participation of key
stakeholders.2 This is a tall order, and it calls for a new way of
thinking.
As one step in that direction, we propose a “modular”
conception3 of regulation and resource management. We use
modularity to convey the idea of provisional and functional
rearrangement of units. We find it useful to imagine pollution
regulation and resource management, like furniture, computer
systems, and Lego, as alternative configurations of tools, structures,
and relationships. We identify six central constituents of modularity.
First, a modular approach seeks to overcome regulatory fracture
through flexible coordination within and across government, and
between public agencies and private actors. Second, modularity
involves government structures in which form follows function, such
that institutional design can be consciously tailored to policy goals.
Third, modularity encourages “agreement based” decision making in
addition to, and sometimes instead of, strict adherence to more
traditional regulatory or managerial practices. Fourth, modular
regulation facilitates “social learning” through its collaborative
processes. Fifth, modularity encourages and depends upon an
adaptive process, which in turn depends heavily on generating
2. We mean to include a variety of tools: traditional permitting schemes that implement
government-established limits on the emission of effluents; tradable permit schemes, in which
the regulator’s role is limited to capping emissions and making the initial allotment of permits;
quasi-contractual systems like Project XL (in which the EPA negotiates project agreements that
afford firms regulatory flexibility in exchange for improvements over the regulatory baseline),
or habitat conservation plans in which the “regulation” takes the form of an agreement between
a firm, an agency, and (perhaps) other stakeholders; and informational systems, in which an
agency demands information disclosures, which then lead to third-party responses that affect
firm behavior. See Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 193–94
(2000) (describing quasi-contractual systems of environmental regulation).
3. Throughout this Article we describe our modular idea as a “conception” or “approach”
rather than a “model.” We are not trying to build a model capable of predicting future events.
And our approach is not, in an empirical sense, falsifiable. We are seeking instead to describe a
normative ideal, and to offer examples of existing arrangements that, to some extent, illustrate
it. We use the modular conception to frame and give meaning to developments that might
otherwise seem disconnected or idiosyncratic.
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relevant information and integrating it into decision making. Sixth
and finally, a modular approach promotes accountability by
supplementing traditional procedural checks with a variety of
informal controls and broad stakeholder participation. We think of
modularity as both a descriptive and a normative concept. It describes
how some environmental initiatives actually work, and it suggests
how many more might be improved.
In its most idealized formulation, modularity supposes that both
the tools and the governance structures with which we approach
environmental regulation and resource management can be built,
unbuilt, and rebuilt—an optimistic but, we hope, compelling
normative view. Modularity entails configuring and reconfiguring the
component parts of the regulatory system, and deploying the actors
operating within it, without necessarily replacing existing structures
with something wholly new. This is pragmatic, because it leaves a
relatively small institutional footprint and disrupts existing
institutions as little as possible in the quest to solve evolving
problems.
Framing the challenge of environmental regulation and
management in this way—as, essentially, a matter of conscious
design—is quite different from the traditional legal approach, which
focuses on questions of jurisdiction and authority, entitlement and
prohibition. This is not to suggest that the formal legal structure and
its assignment of background entitlements are irrelevant. Indeed, as
we will show, that structure constrains behavior in important ways,
establishes crucial minimum floors, and provides a backdrop against
which modularity can arise. Yet, the traditional legal framing of
environmental regulation and resource management offers a limited
and limiting perspective: it focuses mostly on abstract questions of
who has the authority to do what to whom and on peak-level
moments like the initial legislative delegation of regulatory authority
to an agency, and the subsequent standard setting in agency
rulemakings. Mostly, the traditional legal perspective ignores the
messy business of implementation and the complicated world of
interagency interaction. From a traditional perspective, the goal is not
to rethink the component parts of this regulatory terrain. Rather, one
takes that terrain as one finds it, merely trying to game the system to
maximum advantage.
Conversely, the goal of modularity is to let the solutions to
environmental problems determine institutional arrangements as
much as possible. It requires focusing, first, on defining the problem
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that gives rise to conflict; second, on identifying the range of plausible
solutions; and third, on implementing those solutions against the
background of the existing legal regime. Existing legal rules and
institutions can both help and impede these tasks. They may provide
the authority necessary to take action, and their limitations may
generate the impetus for developing new approaches. Yet the existing
rules and institutions may need to change to accommodate these new
approaches, and the kind of change imagined here—to laws, rules,
habits, and cultures—can be costly and painful. Nevertheless, the
benefits of modularity are worth the price.
Imagine an important watershed that provides habitat for
endangered species of salmon and also supplies water to both
agricultural and urban consumers. Most opportunities for modularity
arise in contexts like this one in which there are multiple demands on
a resource and the need for effective long-term management is
4
intense. The conflicting demands on the resource will likely result in
battles over water allocation and water quality issues. A traditional
legal perspective might ask, “How much water are the salmon, as
opposed to the farmers and urban residents, entitled to under
applicable laws and regulations?” Then agencies with jurisdiction
over fish and wildlife would battle agencies with authority over water
supply and water quality standards, while interest groups would
strategically launch lawsuits challenging the decisions of them all.
From a modular perspective, by contrast, the relevant question
is, “What do we need this watershed to do?,” and to provide an
answer, we would bring the competing agencies and warring
stakeholders, with their divergent perspectives and varied expertise,
together. Then, against the background of the existing legal regime
and the entitlements it has already established, this group would try
to strike agreements and configure institutions to implement a range
of mutually agreeable solutions. We expect that this would be an
iterative process, evolving over time and adjusting to new
information.
In conjuring this attractive image, we are not suggesting that
deep and enduring value conflicts over precious resources—which

4. We do not limit our concept of modularity to the context of resource management
alone. For our purposes, the traditional distinction between natural resources law and
environmental law (i.e., resource management versus pollution control) is not especially useful.
We are concerned about situations in which pollution issues (e.g., water quality) and traditional
resource management issues (e.g., water allocation) arise together.
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implicate not only economic interests but also ways of life—can be
transformed into jolly cooperative exercises free of all rancor. We are,
however, proposing that parties who are used to oppositional tactics
can cooperate for specific purposes when the incentives for doing so
are great enough and when the alternatives to cooperation are deeply
unsatisfying. And we are suggesting that when structured properly,
this cooperation can lead to substantive policy innovation and
generate novel institutional forms. These efforts can be fragile, but
they can also be surprisingly successful when measured against the
limitations of traditional approaches.
Some of the features we include in our concept of modularity
have been recommended already, by ourselves and others, as
normatively desirable aspects of a superior approach to natural
5
resource management. For example, we build on arguments that call,
in various contexts, for collaborative problem solving, adaptive
management, greater interagency coordination, and increased
stakeholder participation.6 We build as well on arguments for, and
5. These include interagency and intergovernmental coordination; dynamic and flexible
decision making; and collaborative problem solving among diverse parties.
6. See, e.g., PHILIP BRICK ET AL., ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE, EXPLORATIONS IN
COLLABORATIVE CONSERVATION AND THE AMERICAN WEST 160–235 (2001) (describing a
“collaborative” approach to resource management as local place-based politics, focusing on the
western watershed movement); DANIEL KEMMIS, COMMUNITY AND THE POLITICS OF PLACE
123–36 (1992) (proposing local participatory processes for resolving traditional conflicts over
resources in the west); JULIA M. WONDOLLECK & STEVEN L. YAFFEE, MAKING
COLLABORATION WORK: LESSONS FROM INNOVATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT 47 (2000) (providing case studies of collaborative resource management efforts
and analyzing what makes them successful); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem
Governance: Scale, Complexity and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 193–94 (2002) (defining
the characteristics of “collaborative ecosystem governance”); see also Charles Sabel et al.,
Beyond Backyard Environmentalism, in BEYOND BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM 3, 6–7
(Joshua Cohen & Joel Rodgers eds., 2000) (describing a “rolling rule regime” whereby local
units of interested stakeholders replace central command regulation by collaboratively setting
their own environmental targets and the means to achieve them, while providing regulatory
agencies with periodic reports and updates so the agencies may benefit from any lessons learned
on the ground). As the proponents of, respectively, “collaborative governance” and
“ecopragmatism,” we ourselves have elsewhere argued for elements of a modular approach. See
DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM 182–83, 187–88 (1999) (advocating innovative
regulatory contracts between state and federal regulators and dynamic rather than static
regulation); Daniel A. Farber, Triangulating the Future of Reinvention: Three Emerging Models
of Environmental Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 68–81 (2000) (examining the selfregulation model, the governance model, and the bargain model); Jody Freeman, Collaborative
Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 21–33 (1997) (proposing a
normative model of collaborative governance). For example, Freeman thinks of collaboration—
with its emphasis on negotiation, multilateralism, adaptation, and provisionalism—as something
of a precursor to a more expansive concept of modularity. Yet her theory of collaborative
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experiments with, a more negotiated and consensus based approach
7
to traditional regulations and permits. Yet despite over fifteen years
of experimentation, these trends remain undertheorized.8 The
modularity concept offers a comprehensive normative framework
into which ongoing watershed and ecosystem management initiatives
might fit, and against which their success might be measured.
Modularity is partly a matter of attitude and disposition.
Modular thinking changes the questions one asks. For example, legal
scholars and lawyers typically approach environmental and natural
resource conflicts with questions about authority, jurisdiction,
standards, and rules. But modularity requires more than knowing
about background entitlements. A modular approach enlists lawyers

governance did not sufficiently address the need for interagency cooperation within
governments, and coordination across multiple levels of government, both of which modularity
requires. Her early theory of collaboration focused primarily on negotiated approaches to
environmental standard setting and permitting (processes dominated typically by a single
agency or by a federal and state agency working together) and relatively less on resource
management involving many agencies and multiple claims on an environmental resource. See
Freeman, supra, at 33–66 (providing examples of negotiated standard setting and permitting).
Collaboration seems to be a prerequisite to modularity, but it is not the same thing. Nor did this
earlier work explore in sufficient depth how new institutional structures might evolve out of,
and be layered onto, existing arrangements without supplanting them.
For his part, Farber has taken a favorable view of what he has called the “bargaining
model” of environmental regulation, arguing that bargaining among interested stakeholders
could both open room for creative cooperation and also reserve enough of the adversarial
procedure of government regulation to keep negotiated agreements within the bounds of
acceptable protections. FARBER, supra, at 76–79. The concept of modularity builds on the
bargaining approach because it makes negotiation among stakeholders a core feature. Yet it
goes further in elaborating a complex institutional system in which governments play a strong
and indispensable role, potentially satisfying Farber’s demand for cabining “deals” to ensure
accountability. See id. at 77–79 (expressing concern for the lack of accountability present in
“deals with individual sources”).
7. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the
Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 60, 75–121 (2000) (reviewing empirical research on
negotiated rulemaking); Freeman, supra note 6, at 33–40 (describing the process of consensusbased regulatory decision making).
8. See, e.g., WONDOLLECK & YAFFEE, supra note 6, at 23–66 (offering a number of case
studies as a means of judging the effectiveness of collaborative management). In 1995, the
Council on Environmental Quality published a report arguing for an “Ecosystem Approach”
characterized by federal agency coordination, partnerships with nonfederal stakeholders,
flexibility for adaptive management, regional science planning bodies, and coordinated
ecosystem budgets, among other things. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY INTERAGENCY
ECOSYSTEM MGMT. TASK FORCE, THE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH: HEALTHY ECOSYSTEMS &
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES 6–7 (1995) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). This Report might
have served as an impetus to developing a more comprehensive theory of ecosystem
management and a spur to federal experimentation with concrete initiatives, but by all accounts
it appears not to have had much of an impact.
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in the delicate, context-sensitive and intensely value-laden project of
institutional design. How do we solve these conflicting problems?
How do we satisfy this collection of stakeholders? What mechanisms
do we need to implement this strategy? Whose expertise and support
do we need? And how do we build in accountability? Answering
these questions is as much a political exercise as a legal one. It is
simultaneously substantive and procedural.
In Part I, we describe some of the dominant debates in
environmental law and natural resource management. The underlying
assumptions that inform them, and the sheer amount of intellectual
space they occupy, makes it hard to recognize modularity when it
arises, let alone to pursue it as a normative goal. Nevertheless, there
are trends within these debates that point toward modularity. For
example, the traditional environmental federalism debate has
centered on whether federal or state governments should play the
lead role in environmental regulation. Yet the debate seems to have
lost its “either-or” quality in recent years, and is yielding to a richer
discussion about how different levels of government, including local
governments and regional bodies, can best share responsibility for
9
regulation and management. In addition, the list of potential
“regulators” and “managers” seems to have expanded beyond
government actors. Depending on the context, nonprofit and forprofit private actors might play important roles. This is a crucial step
in the direction of modularity because it expands the universe of
players that might be enlisted in decision making about resource
conflicts. Similarly, the debate over regulatory tools contains the
seeds of modularity. In its simplest formulation, this debate focuses
on whether market mechanisms are superior to prescriptive
techniques. Yet it seems increasingly clear that this either-or choice is
too narrow. The real question is how best to mix these various
measures, and how to adapt them optimally in different contexts. This
kind of context-based attention to tool choice and regulatory design is
characteristic of modular thinking.

9. We note, however, that the federal versus state focus may return in the near future.
States are increasingly taking the lead in environmental regulation as the federal government
enjoys a period of relative repose, and this inversion appears to be attracting scholarly attention.
Consider, for example, California’s efforts to regulate greenhouse gases against the wishes of
the Bush administration. See Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 282–85 (2003) (describing California’s greenhouse gas
legislation and its implications for federalism).
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In Part II, we illustrate modularity with an example: the CalFed
Bay-Delta Program in California, which is a long-term plan to
improve water management and to restore the ecological health of
the Bay-Delta water system near San Francisco. CalFed is a
multistakeholder, multiagency, regionally focused approach that
depends for its success on the kind of flexibility and provisionalism
that we think of as modular. Though CalFed is not a perfect
illustration of the normative modular ideal, it serves as a compelling
and suggestive example of modularity principles.
Having provided a concrete illustration, we go on in Part III to
elaborate the theory of modularity and to distill its essential features.
We argue that modularity involves engaging multiple agencies and
stakeholders in an ongoing problem-solving exercise. It allows
regulation and management to increase in scale and scope without the
encumbrance of bloated administrative agencies. At the same time, it
is less utopian than proposals to replace the regulatory state with
volunteerism or with a network of local environmental bodies.
Finally, in Part IV, we discuss a host of obstacles to the development
and diffusion of modularity. These obstacles are organizational, legal,
cultural, financial, and political.
We view modularity as an important development in addressing
environmental and natural resource problems, but we do not wish to
romanticize it or present it as a panacea.10 Nevertheless, modularity
has both a theoretical and practical payoff. From a theoretical
perspective, it captures a moment of maturation in both
administrative law and environmental law,11 which has yet to be

10. We recognize that many environmental problems and natural resource conflicts are
intractable and likely to be enduring. Modularity cannot guarantee success in their resolution,
but it can increase the chances of doing better. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Building Bridges
over Troubled Waters: Eco-pragmatism and the Environmental Prospect, 87 MINN. L. REV. 851
(2003) (discussing the obstacles encountered by movements for environmental protection).
11. In general, scholarly thinking about environmental regulation and natural resource
management depends heavily on administrative law conceptions of what regulation consists of
and what agencies may legitimately do. Environmental statutes are implemented, after all, by
administrative agencies, and subject to administrative law constraints. See ROGER W. FINDLEY,
DANIEL A. FARBER AND JODY FREEMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
79 (6th ed. 2003) (introducing the administrative law boundaries for federal agencies when they
are implementing environmental statutes). That is, we take for granted in environmental law
many of the foundational assumptions of administrative law. But traditional administrative law
assumptions, and traditional governance procedures and structures, make it difficult for
modular structures to emerge. So thinking in a modular way requires not only thinking about
environmental conflicts differently, it also requires a willingness to think “outside of the box”
when it comes to the administrative process.
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named and fully described. In this moment, traditional forms of action
and institutional structures12 are giving way to a “problem focus” that
calls for new arrangements, new strategies and new capacities.13 We
believe, in addition, that modularity can produce concrete results.
That is, modular systems offer the potential for real, measurable
improvements in environmental regulation and management,
including healthier resources that can better withstand the stresses
imposed on them by human activity. Modular institutions can also, we
believe, generate better-informed, more adaptive, and sufficiently
accountable decisions that wind up satisfying more stakeholders more
of the time. Modularity may not be perfect, but it has the potential to
be better than the traditional approach.
I. CURRENT DEBATES
As noted earlier, two of the most keenly debated issues in both
environmental law and natural resource management are the
appropriate locale of regulatory authority and the optimum choice of
regulatory tools. The debates play out differently in the two fields,
and pollution agencies differ from resource agencies in important
ways, but the basic issues are common to both. These debates are
important, but the way they are framed can be limiting. Among other
things, their framing tends to take for granted a certain type of
regulatory structure, in which a designated agency makes discrete
choices from some preexisting menu of regulatory tools to deal with a
previously identified problem. Even “regulatory reform” measures
like cost-benefit analysis often presume the existence of such a
discrete, centralized process; they want to modify the terms of
engagement but not the structure of decision making. In contrast,
modularity focuses on coordinated action both among multiple
agencies and across levels of government. One goal of that
coordination is to combine expertise and to enlist more perspectives
in the design and deployment of regulatory instruments. In short, the

12. Of course, existing structures and frameworks perform a crucial function as the default
against which novel arrangements emerge. On occasion, the default regulatory regime can
create crisislike conditions in order to trigger the kind of cooperation on which modularity
depends. See infra notes 171 and 317 and accompanying text.
13. We are trying to articulate what that moment looks like, even as it is happening. See
Karkkainen, supra note 6, at 225–26 (arguing that ecosystem governance should not be so easily
dismissed by legal scholars); Freeman, supra note 6, at 31–34 (making a similar argument about
the need to recognize the emergence of collaborative experiments).
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existing debate begins by assuming a certain type of structural rigidity
that we wish to challenge.
A. Who Should Regulate?
There is a lively debate in both environmental law and natural
resource management over the relative efficiency and comparative
effectiveness of federal versus state regulation. The most visible
scholarly discussion of this issue in the pollution context has taken the
form of an ongoing disagreement between Professors Revesz and
Engel, with the former offering a theoretical account of why state
regulation will not necessarily lead to a much feared “race to the
bottom,” and the latter insisting, based on empirical evidence, that
such a race is inevitable.14 Scholars have long debated this issue,
drawing typically on evidence and arguments about the relative
expertise, institutional capacity, and vulnerability to interest group
pressure of the federal and state governments.15
In the field of natural resource management, the state-versusfederal conflict is even more acute. Disputes between levels of
government over who should control land and water use planning are
frequently even more volatile and visible than those between, for
example, state regulatory agencies and the Environmental Protection

14. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-theBottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1211–27
(1992) (arguing that competition among states should not lead to a race to the bottom, and even
if it did, federal environmental responses are misplaced); Kirsten Engel, Reconsidering the
National Market in Solid Waste: Trade-Offs in Equity, Efficiency, Environmental Protection, and
State Autonomy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1481, 1546–61 (1995) (providing evidence that state
competition has resulted in a race to the bottom and arguing for stronger federal regulation);
Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2341, 2341–45 (1996) (distinguishing externalities from a race to the bottom and finding a role
for the federal government to regulate externalities); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental
Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race,” And Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 271–81
(1997) (defending federal standards, as supplemented with region-based, problem-specific, state
or local regulatory decision making); Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal
Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 554–56 (1997)
[hereinafter Race to the Bottom] (responding to Engel and arguing that if federal intervention is
to work, it needs to be broader in scope than current environmental regulation).
15. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1283, 1301 (1997) (discussing the states’ capacity to regulate the environment); Richard L.
Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 553, 578 (2001) (arguing that “plausible public choice theories” do not lend credence to
the superiority of federal regulation); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Quality as a National
Good in a Federal State, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 199, 212–13 (1997) (arguing that conceptualizing
environmental protection as a national good leads to federalization).
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16
Agency (EPA) over air quality. In both contexts, though, many of
the arguments are the same—for example that local control will lead
to higher-quality and more legitimate decision making. Both the
proponents of the “place-based” politics of the western watershed
movement and of local control over pollution standards rely on this
argument.17
Of course, the debate over whether state or federal governments
should take the lead in environmental regulation or resource
management does not turn solely on arguments about their relative
efficiency and effectiveness. It also presents a constitutional question
about which level of government is authorized to regulate. Both
scholars and the governments themselves disagree over this. State and
federal agencies regularly challenge one another’s jurisdiction, both
informally and in lawsuits.18 Although the balance of federal and state
power struck in the environmental arena is frequently called
19
“cooperative federalism,” the relationship between the two levels of
government is often deeply contentious.
In fact, federal and state agencies engage in an ongoing power
struggle over almost every environmental or natural resource
program—air and water pollution, endangered species protection,
wetlands regulation, and water and energy supply, to name a few

16. See generally WILLIAM L. GRAF, WILDERNESS PRESERVATION AND THE SAGEBRUSH
REBELLIONS (1990) (describing the Sagebrush Rebellion and Wise Use movement, which were
precipitated by western frustration with federal control over public lands). Disputes over
resources may be more intense because they tend to involve tradeoffs among competing goals
or multiple uses, whereas the pollution context presents fewer tradeoffs. There, the state and
federal agencies are pursuing the same goal—regulation of air quality. Instead, the debate
concerns which level of government should set the relevant pollution standard and which can
best achieve it.
17. See, e.g., BRICK, supra note 6, at 160–235 (emphasizing local place-based politics as
relating to the western watershed movement); DANIEL KEMMIS, THIS SOVEREIGN LAND: A
NEW VISION FOR GOVERNING THE WEST 177–233 (2001) (proposing to shift authority over
federal public lands to regional entities); Revesz, Race to the Bottom, supra note 14, at 536–37
(arguing for a presumption in favor of decentralized regulations because they better reflect
states’ differing preferences and circumstances).
18. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 144 (1992) (considering the
constitutionality of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 after
New York claimed that its Tenth Amendment rights had been violated).
19. See, e.g., Markus G. Puder & John A. Veil, Overfiling in the Cooperative Federalism
Balance: A Search Forever Incomplete and Incompletable, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 119, 120
(2004) (noting that cooperative federalism envisions “novel collaborative relationships between
the federal government, the states and tribal authorities, and the citizen”).
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20
examples. States often resist federal interference with their
discretion in implementing federal environmental laws.21 The federal
government, in turn, fights hard to retain its preeminent position.22
This is true in both the pollution and natural resource contexts. For
example, states have historically resisted federal efforts to exert
greater control over public lands, and have argued that they, rather
23
than the federal government, “own” wildlife within their boundaries.
Of course, challenges to the authority of each level of
government come not just from each other but also from interest
24
groups seeking to weaken environmental regulation generally.

20. See, e.g., Ala. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 U.S. 461, 469
(2004) (holding that the EPA can override state determinations of technology standards for
purposes of granting permits in Prevention of Significant Deterioration areas).
21. John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV.
1183, 1199–1216 (1995) (detailing California’s resistance to transportation control plans under
the Clean Air Act (CAA) in the 1970s).
22. Federal reluctance to allow California to independently regulate greenhouse gas
emissions is a highly visible recent example of this phenomenon. In 2002, California’s legislature
passed Assembly Bill No. 1493, ch. 200, §§ 2–3, 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. 200 (West) (codified at
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 42823, 43018.5 (2003)), which required the California Air
Resources Board (CARB) to establish emission standards for carbon dioxide (CO2). See Danny
Hakim, California Backs Plan for Big Cut in Car Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2004, at A1
(reporting CARB’s adoption of the new rules, which are to be phased in over eleven years). For
potential challenges to the rules on preemption grounds, see Carlson, supra note 9, at 299–310.
The Bush administration has issued a series of decisions indicating that it disapproves of
California’s decision to regulate CO2 emissions. See Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant,
EPA General Counsel, to Marianne Horinko, EPA Acting Administrator, EPA’s Authority to
Impose Mandatory Controls to Address Global Climate Change under the Clean Air Act 1
(Aug. 28, 2003) (claiming that CO2 is not a “pollutant” under the CAA, which California is
entitled to regulate under the exception in section 209 of the Act), available at
http://www.epa.gov/airlinks/co2_general_counsel_ opinion.pdf; see also Carlson, supra note 9, at
292–93 (2003) (explaining that the administration may refuse to grant the state a waiver under
the CAA, which is required for California to set air pollution standards that differ from federal
standards).
23. Until the late nineteenth century, natural resources were subject to state law. This
changed when the federal government began to exert its authority over public lands pursuant to
the Property Clause of the Constitution. JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
AND POLICY 145–46 (2004). In the 1970s, the Western states reacted to the expansion of federal
control by mounting the “Sagebrush Rebellion,” a political and legal movement that sought to
transfer federal lands to state control. Id. at 154–55. On federal efforts to intrude upon state
control of wildlife, see id. at 329.
24. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 171–72 (2001) (involving a local government agency challenge to an Army
Corps regulation exerting jurisdiction over an isolated pond under its authority to issue permits
to fill wetlands and holding that the regulation was beyond the agency’s authority under the
Clean Water Act); Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 901–02 (8th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the EPA overstepped its authority under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act when it overfiled the state agency’s enforcement efforts).
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Indeed, both levels of government are vulnerable to constitutional
25
challenges when they regulate. In recent years, as the federal
government’s Commerce Clause power has come under greater
26
scrutiny by the Supreme Court, a variety of environmental statutes
and agency regulations have been challenged as beyond the federal
government’s legitimate reach.27 Likewise, state efforts to take the
lead in some areas have been thwarted by interest group challenges
28
asserting, among other things, federal preemption. In the end, the
“who ought to regulate” question in environmental law consists of a
theoretical debate about the relative effectiveness and efficiency of
federal versus state power, and a legal dispute (between levels of
government and between them and private stakeholders) over the
constitutionality of one or the other level of government’s asserted
authority.29
There are costs to this stark “either-or” framing. The federalism
debate overlooks real-world environmental problems that clearly
require interagency coordination, not regulation by one level of
government or the other. The distribution of regulatory authority
over environmental resources is much more diffuse than the
federalism debate reflects. Regulatory power is often divided among
a multiplicity of state and federal agencies, each with their own
narrow statutory mandates, missions, organizational structures, and
30
cultures. Fragmentation, even among agencies at the same level of
25. See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (involving a challenge
to state legislation on takings grounds).
26. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (holding that the Gun Free School
Zones Act exceeded Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause).
27. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171–72 (holding that an Army Corps’ rule that extended the
definition of “navigable waters” under the Clean Water Act to include intrastate waters used as
habitat by migratory birds exceeded authority granted to the Corps under the CWA); Nat’l
Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1046–47 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524
U.S. 927 (1998) (holding that an application of the Endangered Species Act prohibition against
the taking of endangered species was a proper exercise of Commerce Clause power to regulate
channels of interstate commerce).
28. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass’n. v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1107,
1117 (C.D. Cal. 2001), aff’d, 309 F.3d 550 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that state regulations on
purchasing and leasing vehicles by fleet operators were not preempted by the Clean Air Act).
For potential challenges to California’s new carbon dioxide regulations on preemption grounds,
see Carlson, supra note 9, at 299–310.
29. See Hope M. Babcock, Dual Regulation, Collaborative Management, or Layered
Federalism: Can Cooperative Federalism Models from Other Laws Save Our Public Lands?, 3
HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 193, 195 (1996) (questioning whether there are
alternative models of federalism which might enhance the control of public domain lands).
30. See infra note 41.
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31
government, can create enormous coordination problems. For
example, whereas one agency may have primary authority over
wetlands, another will have responsibility for endangered species; a
third will have authority to build water power projects; and still
another will be in charge of pollution standards.32 Even in cases in
which a single agency has centralized authority over related
programs, federal and state regulatory statutes still tend to divide
environmental regulation by media, such as air, water, and solid
waste, which can make it difficult for even a single agency to develop
a comprehensive regulatory or management strategy.33
Although this fragmentation makes environmental regulation
more manageable in some respects, and though it can help to foster
the development of expertise, it also can be counterproductive.
Environmental regulation of one medium frequently creates spillover
effects into others. For example, fuel oxygenates like methyl tertiarybutyl ether (MTBE), which are intended to reduce tailpipe emissions,
have been found to leak from underground storage tanks and
34
contaminate water supplies. In these situations, addressing pollution
in one medium can create new problems in another. And some
environmental statutes address only part of a larger problem. For
example, the Endangered Species Act focuses on species at risk of
extinction. A superior approach would protect the habitat on which
species depend, with biodiversity as the larger goal. Given the
incompleteness of federal statutes, it is no surprise to hear reformers
argue that environmental regulation and resource management must
be more “holistic.”35

31. See CRAIG W. THOMAS, BUREAUCRATIC LANDSCAPES: INTERAGENCY
COOPERATION AND THE PRESERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY 1–26 (2003) (describing fragmented
jurisdictions and the challenges of institutional cooperation).
32. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000) (giving the
Departments of Interior and Commerce authority over protecting listed species); Clean Water
Act of 1977 § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000) (requiring the EPA to establish effluent standards for
discharges of water pollution from point sources); Clean Water Act of 1977 § 401, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (2000) (giving the Army Corps of Engineers authority to issue permits to fill wetlands).
33. In the environmental and natural resource context, Congress typically adopts
legislation on a medium-specific basis. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§
1531–1544 (2000); Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q) (2000).
34. Thomas O. McGarity, MTBE: A Precautionary Tale, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281,
281–82 (2004).
35. See Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrated Environmental Control: The Expanding Matrix,
22 ENVTL. L. 77, 87–88 (1992) (arguing that pollution control should be holistic). The
“multimedia” or “integrated pollution control” strategies popular in the early 1990s emphasized
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Nevertheless, consistent with their statutory mandates, most
environmental agencies are organized to perform specific functions
rather than to deal with cross-cutting issues, or to manage areas like
36
watersheds or ecosystems that contain a variety of problems. In
some instances, federal agencies are officially tasked with ensuring
“multiple use” of the nation’s resources (e.g., forests), which in theory
suggests that they should balance conflicting goals. The historical
practice of these agencies, however, has been to manage primarily for
extraction and exploitation. And the efforts of the environmental and
resource management agencies can be frustrated by the
prodevelopment mission of other agencies. For example, the United
States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) and the Army Corps of
Engineers (COE) have historically competed to dam the nation’s
rivers and serve their respective client stakeholders by providing
flood control and irrigation. They have been slow to modify their
behavior even in light of increasing evidence of devastating
environmental harm.37 These agencies have developed distinct
cultures and attitudes that have proved resistant to change. Not
surprisingly, such historical patterns make it difficult to coordinate
agency action.
Budgeting practices also pose an obstacle to coherence in
environmental policymaking and management. Environmental and
resource management agencies use their budgetary authority to fund
their own priorities (often through different congressional
committees), rather than to support activities that might be in the
interest of a larger, more comprehensive program. This is partly the
fault of a federal budgeting regime that funds individual agencies and
not cross-cutting initiatives of a larger scope. In general, every aspect
of the federal budget process—from how Congress appropriates

the limitations or consequences of fragmented regulatory programs. See generally Peter J.
Fontaine, EPA’s Multimedia Enforcement Strategy: The Struggle to Close the Environmental
Compliance Circle, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31 (1993). For contemporaneous theoretical
perspectives, see generally Integrated Pollution Control: A Symposium, 22 ENVTL. L. 1 (1992).
36. For example, the Endangered Species Act requires the Departments of Interior and
Commerce to take numerous steps to protect listed species but does not directly and
comprehensively enable these agencies to address more complex issues of preserving
biodiversity. Dale D. Goble, The Property Clause: As If Biodiversity Mattered, 75 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1195, 1199 (2004). For an overview of what the ESA does and does not cover, see
RASBAND ET AL., supra note 23, at 342–410.
37. See, e.g., MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT 176–221 (1993) (recounting the history
of competition between the COE and the USBR over federal dollars to build large water
projects for, respectively, flood control and water supply).
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dollars, to how its oversight committees supervise agencies, to how
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) oversees agency
38
spending—is primarily oriented toward single agency projects.
The distribution of regulatory authority over the environment is
further complicated by the disaggregation of power among multiple
levels of government. Here the federalism debate, which focuses on
the state-versus-federal conflict, misses a great deal of complexity.
The federal government may possess the legal authority to regulate
one aspect of a particular medium (e.g., water quality), and the state
may possess legal control over another (e.g., water allocation).39 Yet
when it comes to day-to-day implementation of regulatory
prerogatives (for example, translating regulatory standards into
permits, or putting management plans into operation), the division of
power is even more complicated. Local agencies like municipalities,
counties, and districts may retain practical, if not legal, power to
determine outcomes because they implement programs on the
ground.40 So even though federal agencies theoretically have
38. As required by the Budget and Accounting Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1104(e) (2000), each
agency submits a budget request to the President. These requests are processed by OMB, which
makes budgeting decisions for each agency. THE U.S. FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS: AN
OVERVIEW AND GLOSSARY OF TERMS, 14–15 (G.I. Maltese ed., 2000). These processes result
in a Presidential budget focused on single agency projects. See Office of Management and
Budget, Overview of the President’s 2006 Budget (2005) (listing FY 2006 budget highlights,
which are predominantly single-agency projects), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/pdf/overview-06.pdf. On the congressional side, Congress passes authorizations for specific
agency programs, and appropriations proceed through House and Senate Appropriation
Committee subcommittees, each of which has jurisdiction over specific agencies. THE U.S.
FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS, supra, at 16–17.
39. The Clean Water Act authorizes the federal government to establish effluent
standards, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000), and to administer the National Pollution Elimination
Discharge System, which requires all point sources of water pollution to obtain permits, 33
U.S.C. § 1342 (2000). States generally have control over their water supplies, however. A. DAN
TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 1:1 (2004). For example, California
operates a water conveyance system known as the State Water Project that pumps water to
urban and agricultural users from reservoirs in the Bay Delta near San Francisco. The State
Water Resources Control Board allocates water rights in the state and the state Department of
Water Resources manages the State Water Project. David Nawi & Alf W. Brandt, CalFed BayDelta Program: From Conflict to Collaboration 8 (Dec. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
40. For example, though the Clean Air Act delegates the design of State Implementation
Plans (SIP) to states (pursuant to EPA approval), states often further delegate the task of SIP
planning to local air pollution control districts. See Clean Air Act § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410
(describing SIP requirements); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 40000–41357 (West 1996 &
Supp. 2005) (authorizing and delineating various air pollution control districts that have primary
responsibility for controlling air pollution caused by nonvehicular sources, including stationary
sources). Similarly, implementing the requirements of the Clean Water Act often falls to
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paramount authority under the major federal regulatory schemes,
practical imperatives lead them to negotiate for the cooperation not
only of state but also local governments. And of course none of these
jurisdictions—state, federal, or local—may map well onto the
boundaries of a given environmental problem because, as is well
known, meaningful environmental units from an ecological
41
perspective cut across jurisdictional boundaries.
Thus, the division of responsibility for environmental regulation
and natural resource management by media, among agencies at the
same level of government, and among different levels of government
can be extremely complex. The different mandates, cultures,
management structures, and budgetary priorities of the variety of
agencies involved in environmental regulation and natural resource
management can present, to put it mildly, significant challenges for
42
coordination. Yet the traditional debate in environmental and
natural resource law over whether the federal or state government is
constitutionally entitled to regulate, and which is better situated to do
so, seems so narrowly focused as to elide most of this complexity. The
tendency to cast things in federal-versus-state terms makes it more
difficult to focus on even modest first steps, such as how federal and
state agencies might work together more constructively.43

regional or local bodies. For example, the CWA is implemented in California by a system of
Regional Water Quality Control Boards, which issue and enforce regulations within their
jurisdiction. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 13200–13286.9 (West 1992 & Supp. 2005).
41. See Karkkainen, supra note 6, at 212–17 (arguing that traditional levels of government
are poorly matched to the task of ecosystem-based governance).
42. Agencies have cultures and personalities based on their historical mandates and the
disciplinary training of their staff. See DANIEL A. MAZMANIAN & JEANNE NIENABER, CAN
ORGANIZATIONS CHANGE? ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, AND
THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS 8–62 (1979) (contrasting cultures of the Army Corps of Engineers
and the Fish and Wildlife Service).
43. It is one thing to call for interagency coordination, as many environmental scholars do,
and another to work out the incentives, mechanisms, and instruments necessary for it to happen
both more regularly and more effectively. Agencies tend to defend their statutory turf, protect
their budgets, and advance the interests of their constituencies to enhance their power. But
doing this does not necessarily enhance their effectiveness as regulators or managers. See, e.g.,
Jonathan Wiener, Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management, 9 RISK 39, 56–58 (1998)
(noting that regulatory agency specialization based on congressional mandates and funding
concerns limits the ability of such agencies to address any risks their regulations may create
when such effects fall outside their regulatory scope). There appear to be relatively few formal
mechanisms of interagency coordination in the federal government, although there are many
informal ones. See Jody Freeman & J.R. DeShazo, Public Agencies as Lobbyists 58–59 (2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (providing empirical evidence and
theoretical support for the claim that interagency lobbying can be an effective mechanism of
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B. Prescriptive Regulation vs. Market Mechanisms
Environmental law and natural resource management feature
another important debate over the preferred tools of environmental
regulation—a debate that pits traditional “command and control”
regulation (referred to here as prescriptive regulation) against market
mechanisms, which are thought to be more efficient. Emissions
trading schemes are the most common form of market mechanism in
environmental regulation thus far. The most familiar example is the
acid rain program in the Clean Air Act (CAA).44 Emissions trading
schemes allocate pollution rights within an industrial sector or
geographic region based on the theory that firms that can reduce their
emissions at a lower cost will be encouraged to do so by a market
mechanism in which they can sell their excess allocation to firms for
which such reductions would be more expensive. This presumably
accomplishes the ultimate regulatory goal (which government still
establishes) in the most efficient way.45
In contrast, prescriptive regulation usually requires that all firms
in a given industrial sector reduce emissions equally. Such an
approach is too costly, the argument goes, because it fails to account
46
for the marginal cost of compliance among differently situated firms.
Uniform regulation is widely thought to be intrusive, interfering with
the industrial process by mandating the adoption of particular
technologies regardless of the peculiarities of different industrial
processes. Another related criticism of prescriptive regulation,
especially at the national level, is that it is too “centralized” and
coarse grained to respond adequately to differences in local
conditions, let alone to the diversity of local preferences regarding the

legislative control over agencies). There are numerous obstacles to agency coordination, as we
have seen most graphically in recent years with our national security-related agencies. The
creation of a new Department of Homeland Security was meant to overcome obstacles to
coordination among the FBI, CIA, and NSA, but creating new agencies is only one way to
tackle the problem and often not the best. See Thomas Cmar, Office of Homeland Security, 39
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 455, 464–74 (2002) (questioning the power and effectiveness of the Office of
Homeland Security). We discuss the obstacles to coordination in more detail at infra Part IV.A.
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o (2000).
45. See generally Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy
Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 472
(Robert N. Stavins ed., 2000) (discussing the relative efficiency of prescriptive regulation and
market mechanisms).
46. See generally Tom H. Tietenberg, Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation,
in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 373 (Robert N. Stavins ed., 2000) (reviewing emissions
trading and emissions charge programs that minimize the differential cost of compliance).
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degree of pollution control that is appropriate given its costs.
Centralized top-down regulation is thought to inhibit the kind of
policy and institutional innovations that come only from local
47
knowledge and experience.
Prescriptive regulation is also widely believed to inhibit
technological innovation because firms required to reduce emissions
to the same level have no incentive to develop new technologies that
48
could reduce emissions even further below the agency standard.
Another more practical concern is that much of the information most
relevant to prescriptive regulators is in the hands of industry,
including information about the costs of controlling emissions,
operational details about industrial processes, and rates of
compliance.49 Unless ordered to do so, industry has little incentive to
reveal this kind of information fully.50 Without this information,
agencies will find implementation difficult. And prescriptive
regulation requires procedures, such as rulemaking, that tend to be
slow, cumbersome, conflict ridden, and, therefore, costly.51 The pace
of rulemaking makes it difficult to respond to rapid changes in
technology or new information.
In view of this critique, the standard advice of economists is to
52
move toward a system of market-based incentives. Already, there
are proposals to extend emissions trading to pollutants other than
53
sulfur dioxide, as in the Bush administration’s Clear Skies initiative,
54
as well as to carbon, as recent legislation proposes. Other proposals

47. A thorough discussion of these issues can be found in Richard Stewart, A New
Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 27–38 (2001).
48. David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing
the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289,
290–91 (1998).
49. See id. at 316 (providing an example of one EPA mechanism that allows industry to
make unverifiable claims about compliance).
50. Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory
Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 278–79 (2004).
51. Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 24 (1982).
52. The argument for economic incentives is made in Stewart, supra note 47, at 94–127
(discussing a series of advantages that stem from market-based incentives).
53. Clear Skies Act of 2003, H.R. 999, 108th Cong. (2003) (introduced by Representative
Barton (R-TX)); Clear Skies Act of 2003, S. 485, 108th Cong. (2003) (introduced by Senator
Inhofe (R-OK)). Proposals for mercury trading schemes are found in Title IV, Part A, Sec. 403
of both the House and Senate versions.
54. Climate Stewardship Act of 2003, S. 139, 108th Cong. (2003) (introduced by Senator
Lieberman (D-CT) and Senator McCain (R-AZ)); Climate Stewardship Act of 2004, H.R. 4067,
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go beyond the air context to address different settings and harms.
Examples include watershed-based effluent trading and wetlands
55
mitigation banking. Moving further in the direction of market
approaches would also presumably require making greater use of a
wider range of mechanisms, including effluent taxes, deposit-refund
systems, and user fees such as those levied in “Pay-As-You-Throw”
56
waste collection systems.
Advocates of prescriptive regulation argue two things in
response to the critique just described: first, that many of the
assumptions about the uniformity, inflexibility, and high cost of
prescriptive regulation are either wrong or overstated; and second,
that prescriptive regulation is still necessary as the backbone of the
regulatory system because market mechanisms are risky and
57
frequently do not deliver on their promise. Indeed, although some
market experiments are reputed to be enormous successes (e.g., the
CAA’s Acid Rain program), the empirical record on their
performance is, in fact, mixed.58 Advocates of conventional

108th Cong. (2003) (introduced by Representative Gilchrest (R-MD) and Representative Olver
(D-MA)).
55. See William F. Pedersen, Using Federal Environmental Regulations to Bargain for
Private Land Use Control, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 33–34 (2004) (explaining wetlands mitigation
banking); Envtl. Prot. Agency, WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY 1 (2003) (noting that
“[m]arket-based programs can achieve water quality goals at a substantial economic savings”),
available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/tradingpolicy.html.
56. See James Salzman & J. B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of
Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 609–14 (2000) (reviewing market-based approaches
to environmental regulation); Peter S. Menell, Beyond the Throwaway Society: An Incentive
Approach to Regulating Municipal Solid Waste, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 655, 687–95 (1990)
(explaining the “pay-as-you-throw” approach).
57. See Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los
Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 231, 283–87
(1999) (proposing a series of urban air pollution trading programs); Vivien Foster & Robert W.
Hahn, Designing More Efficient Markets: Lessons from Los Angeles Smog Control, 38 J. L. &
ECON. 19, 21–44 (1995) (discussing how prescriptive regulation relates to environmental
markets and emissions trading in Los Angeles); Gary Polakovic, Innovative Smog Plan Makes
Little Progress, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2001, at B1.
58. The sulfur dioxide trading program has been criticized for, among other things, setting
the initial cap too low, allocating emissions and exemptions to powerful “special interests,” and
failing to anticipate the affordability of low sulfur coal which led to relatively few auction
purchases of sulfur in the early years. For an overview of such criticisms, see FINDLEY, FARBER
& FREEMAN, supra note 11, at 378–79. For criticisms of the Regional Clean Air Incentives
Market (RECLAIM) emissions trading program in Southern California, see Salzman & Ruhl,
supra note 56, at 687 n.236.
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prescriptive regulation argue that despite its imperfections, command
59
and control has delivered significant environmental gains.
Even those favorably disposed to market mechanisms in theory
will concede that significant problems of design and enforcement can
in practice inhibit their ability to deliver environmental benefits. For
example, political considerations tend to dominate the initial
allocation of entitlements in market regimes (as was the case with
allocation of units of sulfur dioxide pollution in the acid rain
60
program), which can undermine their purported efficiency. Markets
can be too narrowly or broadly drawn, and prices can be set
inaccurately. To establish an effluent tax or design an emissions
trading system, the government must establish a shadow price—a
price that reflects the real costs of pollution61—but the unavailability

59. The Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act—both highly prescriptive regulatory
statutes that consist of health and technology based standards—are widely acknowledged to
have produced considerable environmental gains. See, e.g., Frona M. Powell, The Supreme
Court Rejects The New Nondelegation Doctrine: Implications For The Administrative State, 71
MISS. L.J. 729, 738 (2002):
The Clean Air Act is one of the most important environmental statutes and its
successes have been well-documented. In the three decades after its adoption, the
EPA reports that air pollution has been cut by 33% and acid rain by 25%, that cars
are 95% cleaner, that chlorofluorocarbons that were depleting the ozone layer are
being phased out, and that emissions of the six worst air pollutants dropped 33%
from 1970 to 1997 despite a 31% increase in the United States population. The EPA
estimates that the benefits to human health, welfare and the environment have
outweighed its costs forty to one.
(footnotes omitted); see also U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Office of Wastewater Management,
Water Pollution Control: 25 Years of Progress and Challenges for the New Millennium 1–2
(1998) (describing how, because of the Clean Water Act, thousands of cities have received
federal funds to build wastewater treatment facilities to ameliorate pollution in the nation’s
waterways), available at http://www.abuse.com/environment/npdespub/pubs/25PROG.PDF.
60. See Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300,
320–24 (1995) (reviewing the political process that led up to the passage of the 1990
Amendments to the Clean Air Act).
61. This is most obviously true for an effluent tax, where the shadow price determines the
level of the tax. But it is also true for cap-and-trade schemes. To pick the appropriate cap, the
government needs to assign a shadow price to pollution to compare costs and benefits at
different possible cap levels. See Geoffrey Heal et al., Protecting Natural Capital Through
Ecosystem Service Districts, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 353 (2001) (“In general, the optimal
management strategy or set of strategies is the one that maximizes the value of the output of
[environmental] services at shadow prices.”). Justice Breyer has summarized the debate:
“Since the price of product A does not reflect an important social cost that it imposes
(in this case pollution), why,” the economist asks, “not simply raise A’s price through
a tax to reflect the harm?” “But wait,” the classical regulator replies, “no one knows
how much to raise the price. It is no easier to decide the amount of tax than to decide
how much smoke the maker of product A should be allowed to emit. So why not just
tackle the problem through standards?”
STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 271 (1982).
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of a market benchmark makes this a difficult undertaking. This, of
course, is the problem with public goods like the environment: the
ostensible market justification for intervening in environmental
regulation in the first place is that the market is unable to price
environmental harms properly. In addition, the more the system is
tailored to local conditions, whether by adjusting the effluent or
emissions tax to account for variations in harm, or by establishing a
system of “exchange rates” for permits,62 the more cumbersome the
system becomes.63
Trading schemes can falter because of difficulties both in valuing
environmental commodities and ensuring that trades involve
commensurate goods. It may be especially challenging to devise
market approaches to natural resource management rather than
pollution, because natural resources, like ecosystems, perform
functions that may be enormously difficult to value and to trade. As
Professors Salzman and Ruhl put it, trading schemes raise problems
of incommensurability and nonfungibility.64 Markets can also create
“hotspots” of concentrated pollution, which can disproportionately
65
affect subpopulations, leading to claims of distributional inequity.
Again, to the extent that the market regime is tailored to address such
distributional concerns, some efficiencies may be lost.
Finally, market mechanisms generally require some easily
monitored indicator that can be subject to trading or tax. This may be
62. For example, if pollution has different impacts in different locations, the regime cannot
allow permittees to exchange permits based on the amount of discharge. In this instance, the
regime must include some kind of indexing, e.g., allowing a permit for one ton of sulfur dioxide
in Location A (where the impact is high) to be exchanged for two one-ton permits in Location B
(where the impact is lower). Hence the idea of exchange rates.
63. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 56, at 616–38 (examining a number of measures of
exchange and currency design strategies, as they relate to environmental trading markets
(ETMs)).
64. See id. at 634 (“[I]n analyzing the trading of nonfungible commodities one need look no
farther than the cost-benefit and risk debates.”).
65. See Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental
Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 129–30 (1999)
(“[O]lder, heavily polluting industries may find that it is more cost-effective to continue
polluting and to buy pollution rights than to install new technologies to reduce pollution.”);
Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Laws and
“Justice,” 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 269 (1997) (noting distributive justice problems that are
created when hazardous waste disposal facilities are disproportionately located in minority or
poor communities); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional
Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 848–49 (1992) (adding that many
states are beginning to consider distributional factors, including Texas, which now “requires
landfill permit applicants to include socio-economic information concerning the proposed site”).
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feasible for some pollution problems (as with sulfur dioxide, which is
emitted by a fairly small number of power plants) but it is more
difficult to implement in other contexts in which there are large
numbers of sources or in which the emissions rates are hard or
expensive to monitor. This is the case with the pollutants that
contribute to ground level ozone.
And so the debate goes. Framing the debate between
prescriptive versus market based regulation in either-or terms echoes
the dichotomous nature of the federalism debate. In reality, both
environmental law and natural resource management rely on a mix of
mechanisms. Moreover, neither kind of instrument is as “pure” as the
two poles of the debate would suggest: virtually every market
mechanism of environmental regulation depends on some prescribed
government limit, such as setting a cap, in the emissions trading
context, beneath which trades occur. And in all of these regimes, the
government—either Congress through legislation or agencies through
regulation—plays a crucial role in monitoring and adjusting the rules
to respond to new events or information.
Similarly, prescriptive regulations, such as technology-based
standards, are not as uniform and rigid as some would suggest.66 Most
standards are performance standards that firms can achieve in any
way they choose (although admittedly, the easiest assurance of
compliance is to adopt whatever technology the relevant agency used
to set the standard).67 Most importantly, prescriptive regulation
always relies to some extent on adjustments in light of economic
realities—both in the initial phase of level setting, when the
regulatory agency takes account of industrial processes and capacities
in choosing the standard, and later, when agencies negotiate
particular permits.68 There is also considerable flexibility in the
enforcement process, when agencies must determine whether firms

66. See Jason Scott Johnston, Tradeable Pollution Permits and the Regulatory Game, in
MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF
EXPERIENCE (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 12,
on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing the highly negotiated and nonuniform standardsetting process under both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act).
67. See id. at 14 (explaining the system in California that “gives the discretion to local
regulators to approve alternate compliance methods proposed by companies”).
68. See id. at 11 (describing EPA’s process of “securing technical analyses from engineering
and economic consultants who sample actual industry practices and pilot projects”); id. at 12
(explaining that at the permitting stage, “firms have an incentive again to argue against the
application of the general standard to their particular facility”).
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69
are out of compliance and what must be done in response. The socalled “command and control” system is infused with negotiation and
accommodation. To label it “uniform,” “rigid,” and “centralized,”
70
although rhetorically powerful, is somewhat misleading. In practice,
levels established by regulation frequently operate more like targets
than like strict requirements.71 There are market-driven limits, in
other words, to the extent to which government both “commands”
and “controls” firm behavior.
The point is this: twenty years of experience suggests that it is
impossible to declare a clear winner in this debate. Whether an
instrument works optimally depends on a variety of factors, some of
which are easier to predict and control than others. These include: the
sophistication of the market participants; the size and diversity of the
market; the vulnerability of the environmental “good” or “service” to
accurate valuation; the vulnerability of the regime to political rigging
in the allocation process; and the potential for gaming, shirking, and
cheating by the regulated entities, among other things. The challenge
now is to mix and match instruments in a way that is sensitive to the
contexts—political, economic, geographical—in which they are
deployed, and to remember that no matter how well-designed
regulatory or management tools might be in theory, for their success
72
they each require effective implementation and monitoring.

69. See id. at 17 (noting that state and local regulators exercise some discretion in the
enforcement process).
70. A number of commentators have overstated these features of prescriptive regulation.
See Bruce Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1333, 1335 (1985) (describing Best Available Technology regulatory requirements as
“uniform”); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1237–38
(1995) (comparing command-and-control to “a centralized power”); Stewart, supra note 15, at
213 (describing “centralized Federal command-and-control regulation” as suffering from
“excessive rigidity”); Richard B. Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 343
(1990) (comparing the state of the regulatory system in the U.S. to the Soviet attempt at
centralized management of the economy); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems
of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE
L. J. 1196, 1211, 1219 (1977) (arguing that centralized Federal regulation is necessary because
“structural factors” hinder decentralized efforts and observing that Federal regulation is often
uniform).
71. Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance
in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 299 n.10 (1999).
72. James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, “No Net Loss”—Instrument Choice in Wetlands
Protection, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, LESSONS FROM
TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., forthcoming 2005)
(manuscript at 2, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing two kinds of failure: failures of
instrument design and failures of implementation).
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Two other, closely related debates in environmental regulation
consume a great deal of scholarly oxygen and require mention here.
73
The first is a dispute over the role of cost-benefit analysis (CBA);
74
the second is a disagreement over the role of risk assessment.
Advocates of CBA and risk assessment argue that these analytical
tools are indispensable to sound environmental policy in a world of
75
limited resources in which not all risks can be abated. Yet critics
argue that these tools are limited because many environmental risks,
harms, and benefits cannot be meaningfully quantified.76 Both sides of

73. See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981,
1984–2002 (1998) (criticizing Professor Morrall’s cost-benefit analysis methodology for its
treatment of low risk estimates and discounting of future benefits, and for its narrow focus on
singular, rather than multiple, regulatory benefits; Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s
Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341, 2341–44 (2002) (criticizing Professor Sunstein’s reliance on EPA
cost-benefit calculations and peer review by biased experts); McGarity, supra note 34, at 336
(pointing out the EPA’s concern that the costs of requiring double-walled gasoline storage tanks
would outweigh any benefits; therefore, the regulations permit the use of cheaper, less reliable
single walled tanks that result in widespread MTBE groundwater contamination); John F.
Morrall, A Review of the Record, REG., Nov.–Dec. 1986, at 25 (calculating the costs of riskreducing regulations per life saved and finding regulations designed to limit exposure to
hazardous materials the least cost effective); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 165–81 (2001) (responding, in part to Heinzerling and that of other “first
generation” cost-benefit analysis critiques and arguing that cost-benefit analysis is necessary to
expose poor prioritization, excessively costly tools and inattention to the unfortunate side
effects of environmental regulation); Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J.
2255, 2357–61 (2002) (arguing that EPA cost-benefit analysis is an improvement over the
“intuitive toxicology” of ordinary people); Tammy O. Tengs et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving
Interventions and Their Cost-Effectiveness, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 369, 370–72 (1995) (analyzing the
costs of various life-saving interventions, effectively replicating Professor Morrall’s results).
74. See John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End In Itself: The Role of RiskAssessment in Environmental Decision-Making, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1643, 1644–48 (1995)
(providing moderate support for EPA risk assessment, so long as congressional policy principles
are made clear and risk standards are set with consideration of the costs and feasibility of
compliance); Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in
Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1260 (2004) (distinguishing between risk
assessment and risk management); John D. Graham, The Risk Not Reduced, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 382, 398–402 (1995) (supporting the role of risk assessment and comparative risk
measurement in helping to provide a more efficient allocation of scarce government resources
to where they are most effective); Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A
Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 585–94 (1992)
(arguing that risk assessment is a poor vehicle for reforming environmental law because it fails
to provide a meaningful metric with which to compare conflicting types of risk).
75. John Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda For Congress, in RISKS, COSTS, AND
LIVES SAVED 192–93 (R. Hahn ed., 1996); F. Henry Habicht II, EPA’s Vision for Setting
National Environmental Priorities, in WORST THINGS FIRST? THE DEBATE OVER RISK-BASED
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES 37 (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding eds., 1994).
76. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 35–40 (2004) (suggesting that the widespread use
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the debate seem to assume that this is necessarily an either-or choice.
Our own view is that in practice, formalized decision tools like costbenefit analysis and risk assessment can be helpful in some contexts
but difficult to apply, or of limited use, in others. And in all cases,
they are best viewed as sources of information rather than techniques
that ought, in and of themselves, to determine outcomes. Choosing
the level at which to set a standard, or prioritizing some regulatory
targets over others, always requires a delicate weighing of economic
and noneconomic considerations.
From a modular perspective, however, the debate over these
tools has another weakness: it tends to focus attention on peak
moments of centralized decision making when agencies first establish
regulatory priorities or set standards. Yet these instances of agency
action, although important, are only a small part of what agencies do.
By contrast, modularity focuses attention on designing institutions
and tools for implementation. Even if they are useful guides, tools
such as CBA and risk assessment may need to be adapted,
supplemented or, in some cases, foregone, in a modular system.
C. Beyond the Traditional Administrative Process
The tools debate also seems to overlook the complex
relationship between the choice of regulatory instrument and the
design of the process in which that choice is made. By this we mean
that decision makers and decision making processes—the “who and
how” of environmental regulation—can shape the “what” of
environmental policy. Some policy tools seem more likely to emerge
when traditional decision making institutions yield to unconventional
forms. The example we describe in Part II, the Environmental Water
Account (EWA), eluded policy makers for years, and emerged only
in the context of unprecedented interagency coordination and
stakeholder consultation. We think it unlikely that this policy
innovation would have emerged in a traditional administrative
process. Why is that so?
The debate over prescriptive versus market mechanisms in
environmental law has difficulty even posing this question, partly
because both sides seem to take as a given the traditional regulatory
process with the lone administrative agency as its central actor—a

of cost benefit analysis, while appearing value neutral, really adopts and entrenches the
normative perspective of economics).
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perspective that can limit the options for regulatory design. Those
who favor prescriptive regulation may wish to preserve the traditional
functions of the regulatory agency with minor reforms, whereas those
who favor market mechanisms may wish to severely limit or eliminate
these functions. Yet framing the choice in these terms leaves
undeveloped possibilities for reconfiguring the administrative
apparatus.
This third option is modularity’s focus. In other words, although
it is important to choose the right regulatory tools, whether
prescriptive requirements, market mechanisms, or other instruments,
it is equally crucial to design the optimal institutional arrangements
for deploying them. In fact, the two tasks—procedural design and
substantive policy—are intertwined. Modularity invites imaginative
thinking about how to bundle agencies and stakeholders together in
unusual governance structures for particular purposes. Clinging to a
traditional conception of the agency as centralized decision maker
makes this exercise harder.
From a modular perspective, then, tools, procedures, and
governance structures cannot be easily separated. Innovation in one
may spur innovation in the other. As we explain below, interagency
coordination and stakeholder consultation can lead to new policy
ideas. The implementation of those new ideas may call for a new
governance structure, which in turn can help to create an institutional
setting conducive to generating still more policy innovation. This may
not always happen, but it will sometimes. The point, for now, is that
this cyclical, reinforcing relationship among policy instruments,
procedures, and governance structures does not even surface in the
traditional tools debate in environmental law.
This discussion leads squarely to the role of the administrative
agency in environmental regulation and natural resource
management. In much of environmental law scholarship, the vision of
the agency, borrowed from administrative law, is of a hierarchical,
stable bureaucracy exercising delegated power subject to the
elaborate set of accountability devices that has come to be called
administrative law.77 Agencies are imagined to exercise delegated
power in a top-down manner, promulgating rules, making plans, and
pursuing projects from a position of authority and frequently in an

77. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547–48
(2000).
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78
adversarial posture. The expert regulator/manager at the top of this
hierarchy is presumed to be capable of identifying the most important
regulatory and management problems, and of gathering sufficient
information about them (from agency staff and stakeholders) to
prescribe effective solutions. These solutions are presumed,
moreover, to be translatable into legally enforceable commands.79 In
this traditional view, the typical regulatory agency promulgates rules,
issues guidance, monitors compliance, adjudicates violations, and
imposes penalties. The typical resource management agency uses
regulatory and other administrative tools to allocate resources among
client stakeholders and competing uses, often doling out valuable
benefits while trying simultaneously to conserve the underlying
resource. Relationships are bilateral between the agency and the
regulated entity or client stakeholder.80
From this traditional perspective, information is important but
used primarily to justify and defend decisions that must be made in
the short term. Yet this perspective misses the importance of
developing a useful information base to assist implementation over
81
the longer term. In the context of environmental regulation and
resource management, the need to integrate scientific and economic
considerations into bureaucratic decisions over time is acute.
Scientific research, in particular, often occurs over a longer timeline
than agency decision making. And once an agency has promulgated a

78. Professor Freeman has made this point before in the administrative law context. See id.
at 658 (noting, in the administrative law context, the existence of this conception of regulation,
but adding that “agencies across a variety of regulatory contexts need regulated entities and
independent expert organizations to assist them with implementation”). The rules might
concern conventional prescriptive regulations, or they might establish or implement market
mechanisms, but in either case they are created through a similar process.
79. For this view of the expert regulator, see Karkkainen, supra note 6, at 200 (“This
approach assumes, in general, that there are definitive ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ answers to every
question, and the challenge for the regulator is to study the problem until she decides she has
enough information to prescribe a fixed rule, and then to make it stick.”). This presumes too
much certainty given the “chronic information deficit” with which environmental regulators
must operate. Id. at 201.
80. See Babcock, supra note 29, at 83 (commenting on administrative agencies and the
formalistic administrative process). Agencies that rely more heavily on adjudication to create
policy (which is not generally true of environmental agencies, with the exception of some state
level boards that set policy through permitting decisions) operate in an even more bilateral,
hierarchical, and formal way.
81. Wendy Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce
Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1634 (2004) (providing
that economic theory suggests that producing new information will be optimal only if its
expected value is greater than the costs of its production).
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rule or initiated a project or plan, the need for information only
grows. Effective implementation requires information; stale science
or poor data will lead to bad judgments. The traditional
administrative law perspective, however, does not recognize this as a
priority because it focuses inordinately on peak level moments of
highly centralized agency decision making. For example, when
proposing “major” rules, agencies must perform cost-benefit
analyses82 and, in cases where agencies will significantly impact the
environment, they must produce environmental impact statements as
83
well. Both exercises can produce a vast amount of documentation
and consume considerable resources. The information generated can
be used by proponents and critics of the rule or project to argue for or
against it in the kind of dispute familiar to administrative and
environmental lawyers. Equally important, however, is whether
regulators and managers use the information in implementation.
Modularity places a priority on designing structures and processes
that can produce, evaluate, and integrate useful information into an
ongoing decision making process, once the high visibility moments
and disputes have passed.
The traditional constraints on administrative action are
84
embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a variety of
“sunshine” laws,85 and organic statutes that occasionally enhance the
APA’s procedural protections.86 The APA itself reflects a fairly
formal understanding of regulation and management: decisions are
assumed to be made by a single administrative agency and there are
only two primary modes of action, rulemaking or adjudication.
Although informal exchanges occur frequently between stakeholders

82. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993) (requiring cost-benefit analysis
for major agency rules).
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000) (requiring that when federal agencies propose action that
may affect “the quality of the human environment” they must include in the proposal “a
detailed statement by the responsible official on the environmental impact of the proposed
action”).
84. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
85. See 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2000) (requiring openness to the public about the decision making
processes of the federal government); see also 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1511 (2000) (regulating
publication of the Federal Register); id. §§ 2204–2207 (providing rules for access to presidential
records).
86. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2000) (creating a hybrid rulemaking
procedure that enhances the APA’s notice and comment procedure by including a “docketing”
requirement that EPA must observe when it promulgates air regulations).
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and agencies, opportunities for public participation once a formal
decision-making process has begun are limited and highly
87
structured. The affected parties may comment during informal
88
rulemaking or participate more fully in any formal proceedings. And
the primary means of redress if a stakeholder is dissatisfied with
the outcome is a lawsuit seeking judicial review of the agency’s
89
decision.
Although this description of the administrative process is
accurate, it is also superficial. For example, the two primary modes
of agency action—rulemaking and adjudication—fail to capture
the variety of roles that agencies can play and the range of
postures they can assume. The image of the lone agency engaged
in an authoritative and highly formalized decision making process like
standard setting largely misses the mark, at least in the
environmental and natural resource context, within which
agencies often behave in ways that are as collaborative and
negotiated as they are authoritative and directive. Some of the
most intractable environmental problems require agencies with
different missions and orientations to cooperate and coordinate, and
to use instruments that are nowhere referenced in the text of the
APA.
For example, agencies like EPA, the Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS), the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS),
USBR, and COE convene and oversee a variety of complex
processes for implementing environmental regulation and managing
environmental resources. Many of these efforts are regional
ecosystem or watershed management initiatives that require
coordination and cooperation on an unprecedented scale.
90
Examples include the Chesapeake Bay Program, the Great Lakes

87. See APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000) (requiring only “an opportunity to participate in the
rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without
opportunity for oral presentation”).
88. See id. §§ 556–557 (explaining the procedures required for formal adjudications).
89. See Freeman, supra note 2, at 190 (discussing how “judicially imposed reforms opened
the administrative process to public scrutiny and both balanced and structured private
influence”).
90. The Chesapeake Bay Program is a regional partnership that has led and directed the
restoration of the Chesapeake Bay since 1983. The Chesapeake Bay Program partners include
the states of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia; the District of Columbia; the Chesapeake
Bay Commission, a tristate legislative body; the EPA, representing the federal government; and
participating citizen advisory groups. CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, OVERVIEW OF THE BAY
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91
92
Program, the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan, the
93
Long Term Management Strategy (LTMS), Coastal America,94

PROGRAM, at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/overview.htm (last modified Mar. 14, 2001) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
91. EPA’s Great Lakes National Program Office (GLNPO) “brings together federal, state,
tribal, local, and industry partners in an integrated, ecosystem approach to protect, maintain,
and restore the chemical, biological, and physical integrity of the Great Lakes.” U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, GREAT LAKES NATIONAL PROGRAM OFFICE, at http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/
about.html (last updated June 16, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). It operates
through the use of grants, interagency agreements, and contracts. Id.
92.
The Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan provides a framework and guide to
restore, protect, and preserve the water resources of central and southern Florida,
including the Everglades. It covers 16 counties over an 18,000-square-mile area, and
centers on an update of the Central & Southern Florida (C&SF) Project [which]
includes 1,000 miles of canals, 720 miles of levees, and several hundred water control
structures.
THE COMPREHENSIVE EVERGLADES RESTORATION PLAN, at http://www.evergladesplan.org/
about/rest_plan.cfm (updated June 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). “Development
of the Plan . . . was led by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District and the
South Florida Water Management District . . . . Many other federal, state, tribal and local
agencies were active partners in developing the Comprehensive Plan.” THE COMPREHENSIVE
EVERGLADES RESTORATION PLAN, THE DEVELOPMENT TEAM, at http://www.
evergladesplan.org/about/rest_plan.cfm (updated June 2002) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
93.
A new cooperative effort by state and federal agencies, ports, environmental and
fishing groups, and others was launched in January 1990 to develop a Long-Term
Management Strategy (LTMS) for dredging. . . . The LTMS Project is led by an
Executive Committee of the Corps of Engineers’ South Pacific Division Commander,
the EPA’s Regional Administrator, the Chairs of the San Francisco Bay Regional
Water Quality Control Board and the San Francisco Bay Conservation and
Development Commission, and a State Coordinator.
SAN FRANCISCO ESTUARY PROJECT, COMPREHENSIVE CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT
PLAN, at http://www.abag.ca.gov/bayarea/sfep/reports/ccmp/ccmp3dw.html (last updated July
12, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
94.
Coastal America was established [in 1992] as a unique partnership among federal,
state, and local governments and private alliances to collaboratively address sitespecific coastal environmental problems. [Between 1992 and 1994], more than 20
federal agencies and more than 100 non-federal partners have become involved in
Coastal America projects around the U.S. coastline, restoring wetland habitat and
fish passage and protecting critical areas for endangered species and other wildlife.
[As of 1994], more than $30 million had been committed to Coastal America with
over 60 projects in 20 States.
COASTAL AM., TOWARD A WATERSHED APPROACH: A FRAMEWORK FOR AQUATIC
ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION, PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT (Jan. 1994), at
http://www.coastalamerica.gov/text/pubs/consensus/twatoc.html (last updated Oct. 23, 2001) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
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95
96
Partners for the Environment, and our case study, CalFed. Such
initiatives usually require extensive negotiation among and between
levels of government and feature long-term plans or agreements to
take certain actions and fund specific activities. They rely, to a greater
or lesser extent, on stakeholders such as environmental groups,
farmer’s associations, urban organizations, local governments, and
business councils, and they depend on a host of informal agreements
in addition to familiar regulatory tools such as regulations and
permits.
The agencies involved in processes such as these never entirely
shed their skins as authoritative regulatory entities. Indeed, their
specific statutory mandates provide them needed leverage to behave
more informally and to negotiate agreements when parties might
otherwise refuse to come to the table. And, of course, they still set
standards, issue rules, authorize permits, impose penalties, allocate
benefits, and build projects.97 Yet their roles are more varied than the
traditional administrative law conception described above would
suggest: the agencies are significantly involved in planning,
coordination, facilitation, negotiation, and funding. These more
“managerial” functions are relatively informal. They only rarely
require compliance with federal and state Administrative Procedure
Acts, because they rarely produce a promulgated rule or formal
adjudication. As a result, much of this activity is relatively invisible,
difficult to monitor, and invulnerable to judicial review.
The prevailing model of administrative agency action in
environmental law, as in administrative law generally, is too

95. Through Partners for the Environment, the EPA works with more than 11,000
organizations who willingly set voluntary environmental goals and commitments like conserving
water and energy or reducing greenhouse gases, toxic emissions, solid waste, indoor air
pollution, and pesticide risks. Partners include small and large businesses, citizens groups, state
and local governments, universities, and trade associations. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
VOLUNTARY PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS, at http://www.epa.gov/partners (last updated June 8,
2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
96. CalFed is a multi-agency driven comprehensive planning process for addressing a
variety of water management and water quality issues arising in the Bay Delta near San
Francisco. See infra Part II.
97. Nor should they shed this authority. It may be necessary to create a background threat
against which alternatives might arise. We note that in the Bay-Delta process described in Part
II, the existing statutory scheme created a crisis that helped to precipitate a modular approach.
See Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Delta-Bay Accord: A Stride Toward Sustainability, 67 U. COLO.
L. REV. 341, 342–50 (1996) (describing how a protracted Bay-Delta water allocation conflict
over California water quality standards was addressed by an agreement between California and
the EPA).
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formalistic to capture this complexity. Modular thinking, then,
requires something different. In both administrative and
environmental law, the work of reimagining the agency’s role is just
beginning. There are, to our knowledge, two leading proposals for
rethinking the regulatory agency’s role in environmental regulation.
The first suggests that voluntarism and self-regulation could largely
98
replace agency functions. This perspective stresses the potential for
firms and private individuals to take the initiative in controlling
environmental harms instead of grudgingly complying with agency
directives. Firms might do this, for example, by adopting
environmental management systems that require “continuous
improvement” or by committing themselves to private industry
codes.99 This will occur, in theory, because industry faces strong
market incentives to improve their environmental performance.100
98. See Dennis A. Rondinelli, A New Generation of Environmental Policy: GovernmentBusiness Collaboration in Environmental Management, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,891, 10,895 (2001)
(explaining how a reorientation of environmental policy from command-and-control regulation
to a collaborative approach between the government and the private sector will provide
administrative cost savings for the government and more competitive opportunities for the
private sector). Advocates of voluntarism can point to some successes, see, e.g., John R.
Ehrenfeld, Cultural Structure and the Challenge of Sustainability, in BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNMENTS, BUSINESSES, AND COMMUNITIES 234–42 (Ken
Sexton et al. eds., 1999) (reviewing ten environmental codes of practice, from Total Quality
Environmental Management (TQEM) to Design for Environment (DFE), that companies have
implemented to promote sustainability). The voluntarist vision, however, has come under fire
for relying on overly optimistic beliefs about corporate commitments to environmental
performance in the face of high costs and the pressures of the market. See Rena I. Steinzor,
Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Control, 22
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 157–58 (1998) (criticizing academic and professional literature that
“provide[s] anecdotal, unduly cheerful conclusions about what will inspire corporate
participation in reinvention initiatives” and discussing a McKinsey & Company survey that
“rais[ed] intriguing questions about the difference between [corporations’] public expressions of
support and concrete action”).
99. See NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 154–72 (1998) (providing a thorough review of the Chemical Manufacturers
Association’s Responsible Care program and arguing that it can make a contribution to
environmental protection if used as part of an integrated strategy in conjunction with other
programs and actors). The Responsible Care program was adopted in response to Bhopal and
the increased disclosures about toxic releases required by federal law. It stresses pollution
prevention, linked to a program akin to “total quality management” for increasingly rigorous
control of accidents. Although the program is ambitious, the results are as yet unclear. Id.
100. Consumers may favor “green” firms, putting market pressure on firms to avoid
environmental misconduct. See Seema Arora & Timothy N. Cason, An Experiment in Voluntary
Environmental Regulation: Participation in EPA’s 33/50 Program, 28 J. ENV. ECON. & MGMT
271, 272 (1995) (“[R]ecent survey evidence indicates a willingness on the part of consumers to
pay slightly more for environmentally clean products.”). Investors may also disfavor firms with
environmental violations. See James T. Hamilton, Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market
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Indeed, there are a number of examples of industrial self-regulation,
101
many of which are promising.
The second reformist view, advanced by Professors Dorf and
Sabel and called “Deliberative Democratic Polyarchy,” is more

Reactions to the Toxics Release Inventory Data, 38 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 98, 109 (1995)
(“These results indicate that the day the Toxics Release Inventory data were officially released
and articles appeared with information about facility omissions, those companies with TRI
omissions did experience negative, statistically significant abnormal returns.”); Madhu Khanna
et. al., Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool for Environmental Protection, 36 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 243, 244 (1998) (“There is evidence that investors are paying increasing
attention to environmental compliance records of companies.”); Shameek Konar & Mark A.
Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic
Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109, 112 (1997) (“‘Green consumers’ may decide to
boycott products of high polluting firms or otherwise look for alternatives.”). Disclosure
requirements could help catalyze these effects. Konar & Cohen, supra. Firms might also be
motivated by a desire to avoid the potential for future tort liability, or they might attempt to
head off potentially onerous government regulation by creating a favorable environmental
record. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 22–34, 90 (1992); see John W. Maxwell et. al., Self-Regulation and
Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism, 43 J. L. & ECON. 583,
589–90 (2000) (“present[ing] a three-stage model of voluntary pollution control”). Moreover, at
least some of the time, environmental protection will lower production costs because it leads to
more efficient production processes. But cf. Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives: Myths,
Models, and Micromarkets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 531, 592 (2002) (arguing that firms are not black
boxes and “[o]ur current use of incentives fails to recognize that a firm’s internal structure and
processes can affect its response to external regulation in significant and unpredictable ways”).
101. One example is the EPA’s 33/50 program, which is a voluntary scheme to reduce
emission of toxic chemicals by 33 percent in the first phase and 50 percent in the second phase.
Emissions for the chemicals in question fell twice as much as those for other toxics chemicals.
See Arora & Cason, supra note 100, at 275 (“Between 1990 and 1991 the releases and transfers
of 33/50 program chemicals fell by 21% while the releases and transfers of non-33/50 chemicals
fell by only 8%.”). For additional examples of self-regulation programs, see John R. Ehrenfeld,
Cultural Structure and the Challenge of Sustainability, in BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS:
STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNMENTS, BUSINESSES, AND COMMUNITIES 234–42 (Ken Sexton et al.
eds., 1999) (highlighting ten self-regulation programs, such as Eco-Efficiency and The Natural
Step). Perhaps the most successful mechanism to promote industry initiatives has been the
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). The TRI is triggered by a government mandate that firms
report toxic emissions, but it contains no regulatory requirements. Still, information disclosure
appears to have led to substantial voluntary reductions in some pollutants. See Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking,
Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 287–88 (2001) (“Since TRI reporting began in
1988, reported releases of TRI-listed pollutants have dropped by nearly half . . . [and] most
observers, including TRI-reporting firms, credit TRI with playing a central role in driving
improvements in pollution performance.”); see also Archon Fung et. al., After Backyard
Environmentalism: Toward a Performance-Based Regime of Environmental Regulation, 44 AM.
BEHAV. SCI. 692, 697 (2000) (noting that TRI, although only an environmental regulation in the
minimal sense of requiring various disclosures, actually has important disciplinary effects on
private polluters because “TRI data often lead to efforts at informal regulation by community
groups aimed at securing commitments to improve pollution performance”).
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complicated. It suggests that federal and state agency functions might
be all but replaced by networks of local decision-making entities
governed by participatory democracy and directed only marginally by
102
higher levels of government. Deliberative polyarchy contemplates a
“form of democracy that results when a polity makes public choices
by means of tiered governance councils—councils that organize
service provision with the collaboration of local citizens, and pool
their experience to inform their separate decisions.”103
The primary purposes of agencies in deliberative polyarchy are
to assist state and local governments in benchmarking, and
experimentalism generally, especially in connection with activities
carried out under congressional authorizations; to set—again by a
variation of benchmarking—regulatory standards for market actors;
and to undertake such changes in their own activities and
organization as cumulative self-scrutiny indicates will further these
104
purposes.

Some agencies will provide services directly, such as administering
public lands, and these agencies will have to “organize and coordinate
105
local benchmarking evaluation” of their activities. But regulatory
agencies as we know them now would be thing of the past. For
example, rather than setting pollution standards, the EPA would
“coordinate industry, state, and local efforts to establish a rolling
106
best-practice requirement.”
Both reformist ideas just described have something to offer. It
makes sense to foster voluntarism and self-regulation wherever
possible. Sometimes a regulatory agency can and should take a back
seat to industrial initiative. Yet the prospect that voluntarism will

102. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 287–88 (1998). Professors Dorf and Sabel propose
and define “directly deliberative polyarchy” as a model of:
linked systems of local and inter-local or federal pooling of information, each
applying in its sphere the principles of benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and
error correction, so that actors scrutinize their initial understanding of problems and
feasible solutions. . . . The system in which citizens in each locale participate directly
in determining and assessing the utility of services local government provides, given
the possibility of comparing the performance of their jurisdiction to the performance
of similar settings, we will call directly deliberative polyarchy.
Id.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 320.
Id. at 345.
Id.
Id. at 396.
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functionally replace federal and state agency regulation seems slight.
Surveys show that business leaders are proenvironmental in the
abstract, and yet their support for the environment does not
107
necessarily translate into concrete business decisions. And business
leaders often do not view environmental regulations as having the
same legitimacy as laws designed to protect the integrity of the
108
marketplace. Moreover, although firms may try to control their
environmental impact to avoid tort liability or to reap the public
relations benefits of being perceived as “green,” these incentives may
not be enough to ensure compliance.109 None of this means that selfregulatory initiatives that improve environmental performance do not
occur, or that firms are inevitably untrustworthy partners in
110
governance systems. But it seems quixotic to think that voluntary
action by businesses will be enough to eliminate the need for
regulation or government enforcement.
Deliberative polyarchy’s localist deliberation model is both
vaguer and more promising in many regards than the self-regulation
approach. It takes significant steps away from the formalistic view of

107. Steinzor, supra note 98, at 157–58. Professor Steinzor calls attention to a probing study
of corporate culture by Professor Robert Jackall in the 1980s. See generally ROBERT JACKALL,
MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988). The study found that in a
highly stressful environment, middle managers could not afford to take a long-term view, but
focused instead on dealing with more immediate business issues. Steinzor, supra note 98,
at 159–61.
108. PETER C. YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAW: THE PUBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVATE
POLLUTION 8–10 (1991). As studies by Professor Robert Kagan and others have discovered,
there is considerable diversity in the reaction of corporate management to environmental issues,
depending on corporate culture. Robert A. Kagan & John T. Scholz, The “Criminology of the
Corporation” and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies, in ENFORCING REGULATION 67 (Keith
Hawkins & John M Thomas eds., 1984).
109. Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of
Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1195 (1998). This skepticism about selfregulation finds support in two elementary economic principles. The first is that firms are
rational maximizers of profits, rather than charitable institutions. Hence, to the extent that
managers attempt to implement public-spirited impulses, the shareholders will take steps to
bring them back under control. The second is that environmental harms are externalities, which
do not affect the firms’ profitability. This is, in fact, the key economic justification for
environmental regulation. Putting these two principles together, basic economics teaches us that
firms will largely ignore environmental considerations as they seek to maximize their profits.
110. For a recent effort to appraise this approach to regulation, see Cary Coglianese &
David Lazer, Management-Based Regulatory Strategies, in MARKET-BASED GOVERNANCE:
SUPPLY SIDE, DEMAND SIDE, AND DOWNSIDE 201–19 (John D. Donahue & Joseph S. Nye eds.,
2002) (noting the potential of management-based regulation and arguing that government
policies should take into account firms’ incentives so that they take seriously the idea of
managing to reduce social harm).
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the administrative agency in an effort to reflect the reality of
implementation, yet deliberative polyarchy nevertheless runs into
considerable practical difficulties. Among other things, it proposes to
delegate most substantive decision making authority to local units
without an explanation of how those units will overcome collective
action problems that impede cooperation. The theory also lacks an
explanation of how those local units will be made sufficiently
accountable to broader state and national constituencies that
inevitably will be affected by environmental decisions.111

111. A key difficulty with deliberative polyarchy is the impossibility of devising satisfactory
administrative units. Deliberative polyarchy is compatible with the idea that different problems
may have variable scales: “[t]he dimensions of effective government will change according to
the particulars of the problem of governance; ‘local’ actors, whatever their limitations, know
best when ‘local’ is improperly sized.” Dorf & Sabel, supra note 102, at 343. Thus, Congress
would give the states “responsibility for determining the jurisdiction—local, statewide, regional,
or jurisdictions wholly distinct from ordinary political boundaries—to be established to treat the
problem.” Id. But it is unclear how this could work when a single decision has effects at many
different levels. For example, the decision whether to build a new segment of an interstate
involves questions of national transportation policy (Should we be trying to foster other modes
of transportation to decrease dependence on foreign oil?), regional policy (If roads are to be
built, how will they affect air pollution in the region? What areas are most in need of additional
roads?), urban planning (How will the road affect existing neighborhoods?)—plus some issues
whose geographic scale is harder to define, including equitable factors (depending on which
groups will be impacted by the road) and environmental preservation (if the road will cross
environmentally sensitive areas). There is no “right” size for the jurisdiction to address this
problem. The problem affects many different geographical groups, each with its own interests
and values. This is probably typical of most significant environmental issues.
Deliberative polyarchy deals with this problem by delegating it to existing local
governments—essentially states and municipalities. This postpones, but does not solve, the
problem of designing a structure that will be responsive to these various constituencies. In any
event, it assumes that local governments will be willing to cooperate, and this may not be true
except when a problem affects them all similarly. For instance, midwestern states have no
incentive to join a group to solve the problem of acid rain, a problem which largely imposes
costs on Eastern states. Similarly, local communities are likely to regard interstate construction
as a necessity that ought, however, to take place somewhere else. NIMBY (Not In My Back
Yard) presents a familiar difficulty in environmental law. Of course, it is not impossible to
overcome these difficulties: the very existence of the federal Constitution is to some degree
testimony to the contrary. But deliberative polyarchy leaps over a potentially severe collective
action problem in its localistic approach. Even if appropriate nontraditional units can be
formed, accountability remains a problem. It seems unlikely that citizens can be expected to
participate directly and control dozens of overlapping units. It is optimistic enough to hope that
participatory democracy can work even in existing structures of local government, without also
assuming that air pollution authorities, water basin authorities, habitat conservation plans,
interstate water allocators, and others will all be directly responsible to the people at large.
Thus, deliberative polyarchy leaves unanswered the question of how to make these
nontraditional government units accountable. If accountability is to flow from existing bodies of
government, nontraditional entities must be designed to be accountable to them.
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In addition, deliberative polyarchy envisions an idealized form of
participatory democracy that seems somewhat utopian. And it
appears that deliberative polyarchy is based on a model of decision
making in nonpolitical private institutions (that is, firms) that function
quite differently than public sector institutions. Among other things,
firms devoted to profit making have fewer conflicts about
organizational goals than public sector institutions, which must
balance efficiency and fairness in the context of numerous political
and legal constraints. One can imagine a benchmarking and “rolling
rule” regime that functions effectively in for-profit firms simply
because management, facing no internal opposition, orders that it be
so. It seems less likely, however, that such an approach could work
effectively in the public sector (at least without substantial oversight
to ensure that the goals chosen, and the means used for achieving
them, respond adequately to competing political imperatives).112
Finally, deliberative polyarchy seems to rely on a kind of
effortless jet propulsion: local benchmarking and evaluation will be
continuous, resulting in superior outcomes from everyone’s
perspective, with little more than steering by higher levels of
government. But the theory does not account sufficiently for interest
group politics which could result in some fits and starts. Although we
favor benchmarking as a tool, and think that agencies could help to
facilitate more of it, we simply need more assurance that deliberative
polyarchy would be effective in resolving environmental resource
conflicts.
Most important from our perspective is that both voluntarism
and deliberative polyarchy depend, ultimately, on a rather anemic
view of the administrative state. The goal of both proposals is for
federal agencies to disappear, or to perform the mildest of

112. For example, the engineers who design innovative missile systems know that their goal
is to produce a missile with certain qualities; they do not simultaneously have to decide if
building the missile is more important than alternative programs such as health care, or whether
disarmament talks would be better than new weapons programs, or whether designing the best
possible missile is more important than fair treatment of the participating engineers.
Political democracy is quite different. Political decisions are not just about means but also
about ends, and different affected groups will have varying interests and values, resulting in
divergent views about tradeoffs between competing goals even when the goals themselves are
not controversial. Whatever decision is made will not be to the liking of some groups, and,
except in utopian fantasy, not every individual who is affected will be able to directly participate
in the decision. Thus, political democracy is about value choices, accountability, and
representation, and like all other forms of politics, it is about power: the ability to do things that
affect some people in ways they object to.
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coordinating functions, and for state agencies to yield their functions
largely to local institutions. We think this is neither realistic nor
desirable. Local environmental problems have larger implications,
and solutions will often have both economic and environmental
spillovers that must be addressed on a larger geographical scale than
the county.
In proposing modularity, we do not envision agencies operating
solely in their idealized traditional form. Nor do we expect agencies,
as the self-regulation approach would have it, to assume the role of
cheerleader for private self-regulation. And we are skeptical about
the possibility that federal and state agency functions can be replaced
by local deliberative processes. Instead, we imagine federal and state
agencies with statutory mandates as permanent components of the
regulatory system, but components that often act only as parts of
combinations. A combination may be short-term or long-term; it may
include other agencies at the same level of government or agencies
from other levels of government. It may include private firms and
NGOs. Moreover, we imagine agencies using a broad portfolio of
implementing instruments, including a range of informal agreements
(e.g., records of decision; memoranda of understanding; interagency
agreements; annual work plans) in addition to the more familiar and
formal regulatory instruments, such as rules. What we have in mind,
above all, is a sense of institutional provisionalism, flexibility, and
coordination.113
D. The Building Blocks of Modularity
For all their limitations, the debates we describe here can be seen
in a different light: each one, in its own way, seems to be moving in
the direction of a different approach, one that is more capable of
accommodating the complexity of environmental problems. For
example, the recent scholarship on more decentralized resource
management initiatives, including ecosystem-based governance
systems and collaborative multistakeholder programs, necessarily
enlarges the federalism debate by expanding it to include both more

113. Although the subject is too large to explore in this Article, this transformation in
environmental governance raises great challenges for a system of review that increasingly
focuses on “final” agency decisions. There is a risk that courts will either become irrelevant
(because the flux of agency actions evades the requirements for review) or obstructive (because
they review specific decisions in isolation without considering the broader modular context).
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114
levels of government and a wider group of stakeholders. This
literature focuses in particular on regional and local solutions, and on
the important role that can be played by key stakeholders, especially
members of the affected local communities who live near and use the
resource in question.
The tools debate has evolved as well. Though it originally took
the form of a pitched battle over whether assigning “pollution rights”
115
is legitimate, fair, and even moral, it seems that both sides have
softened in recent years. To us the right question now is not whether
to use markets or prescriptive rules, but when and where to use which
tools, and in what combination to procure a sufficient environmental
benefit at an acceptable cost. And regardless of the tool chosen, it
seems increasingly clear that careful attention to design on the front
end and monitoring on the back end will both be crucial.116 Market
proponents have, it seems, succeeded in legitimizing their favored
policy instrument—cap and trade programs are here to stay. But
proponents of prescriptive regulation have not lost entirely either.
The traditional standard-setting and permitting process continues to
be the backbone of environmental regulation. Our modular approach
builds on recent trends in this debate, in which the task for regulators

114. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1807
(2002) (arguing that the election of a regional legislature would be likely to “generate
negotiations over, and support for, a regional agenda,” including in the context of
environmental issues); Karkkainen, supra note 6, at 217–18 (identifying the emergence of
vertical and horizontal coordination across governments in the Chesapeake Bay and other
initiatives in order to overcome the absence of a preexisting regional authority); id. at 234–35
(claiming that the legal literature has tended to be dismissive of collaborative ecosystem
management but admonishing lawyers and legal scholars to “get over it” because “something is
happening here, something very big, and something quite unconventional by the standards of
the now familiar past”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering in the Age of
Collaboration, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 555, 555 (2002) (identifying new challenges to environmental
lawyers presented by the emergence of regional and local collaborative environmental decision
making); Sarah B. Van de Wetering & Robert W. Adler, New Directions in Western Water Law:
Conflict or Collaboration?, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 15, 16 (2000) (exploring
possible directions for water law in the West based on collaborative decision-making
opportunities). See generally Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25
ENVTL. L. 973 (1995) (discussing ecosystem-based management in the context of watersheds).
115. See Drury, supra note 57, at 269–72 (discussing the system of “polluter pays” arising out
of Superfund); Michael J. Sandel, It’s Immoral to Buy the Right to Pollute, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
1997, at A23 (arguing that “turning pollution into a commodity to be bought and sold removes
the moral stigma that is properly associated with it”).
116. See generally MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, LESSONS
FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., forthcoming
2005) (reflecting the evolution of the tools debate as described here).

101805 01_FREEMANFARBER.DOC

2005]

12/12/2005 3:09 PM

MODULAR ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

837

is to design the right array of tools for particular problems in specific
contexts.
And finally, there are trends in administrative law that point in
the direction of a more modular conception of the agency, a
conception in which the agency is not a lone monolith, but is
embedded in a network of relationships with other agencies—
117
relationships that must be coordinated, managed, and steered. To
do this, agencies will sometimes act in traditionally authoritative and
formal ways, and sometimes in less formal and more negotiated ways.
And all of this will occur under conditions of radical uncertainty,
which call for a spirit of provisionalism.
II. CALFED: A CASE STUDY IN MODULARITY
A. The CalFed Story
Before offering a more theoretical discussion of modularity, we
find it useful to provide an example that illustrates many of its
features. For this we turn to a process called CalFed, a multiagency
regional effort to overcome the longstanding conflict over the
immensely valuable water resources in the Bay-Delta area in
Northern California.
1. The Delta. A few facts will help to convey the value of this
water source. The Bay-Delta area, where the San Francisco Bay
meets the two biggest rivers in California, is home to seven hundred
and fifty different plant and animal species, which thrive in its unique
blend of fresh and salt water.118 The Delta also provides 40 percent of
the state’s drinking water supplies and produces seven million acrefeet of water to irrigate approximately 45 percent of the state’s crops,
some of the most productive agricultural land in the world.119 In
117. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344–45 (2004) (explaining how the
governance model incorporates local initiative and central control).
118. CAL. BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 10, available at
http://calwater.ca.gov/AboutCalfed/AnnualReport2004/Annual_Report_2004.pdf.
119. See Rieke, supra note 97, at 344; Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 4. Our account of
the CalFed process draws heavily on Nawi & Brandt’s informative article, and on another
account by one of the key participants, Elizabeth “Betsy” Rieke, who served as Assistant
Secretary for Water and Science in the Department of Interior (DOI) for two important years
during the CalFed negotiations and who is universally credited with having shepherded the
process along. See Rieke, supra note 97, at 341 (arguing, among other things, that the Clean
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addition, densely populated and dry southern Californian cities
depend heavily on the water supply pumped from this region. The
120
121
Delta has been called the “hub” and the “heart valve” of
California’s complicated water distribution system. From this area,
two pumping systems, the Central Valley Project (CVP), which is
federally controlled, and the State Water Project (SWP), which is
state controlled, deliver water to agricultural and urban communities.
By the time the CalFed process began in the early nineties, the
health of the Bay-Delta ecosystem had been declining for years under
the stress of the area’s dual roles: providing habitat for a variety of
species, some endangered, and producing a crucial water supply for
122
the famously thirsty state. Several species of fish, including Chinook
salmon and steelhead trout, were in decline or endangered; water
supplies were increasingly unreliable; water quality was below
drinking water standards; and the Delta levee system had significant
vulnerabilities to flooding.123 For years, the key warring
constituencies—environmentalists,
urban
water
users,
and
agricultural water users—had fought to obtain a greater share of the
resource.124 Despite their collective interest in the health of the
resource, one or the other stakeholder had managed to block every
initiative aimed at resolving competing demands in a constructive
way.125 The conflict came to a head over whether the state would
comply with federal demands that it adopt water quality standards
pursuant to the Clean Water Act (CWA) in order to ensure sufficient
freshwater for vulnerable fish populations protected under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA). The standards would have imposed
salinity and flow limits on the Delta, which in turn would have

Water Act (CWA) and Endangered Species Act (ESA) can be made more effective even
without statutory changes). Our analysis also draws heavily on interviews with Patrick Wright,
the Former Director of the Bay-Delta Authority, and on his unpublished personal notes
analyzing CalFed, which he was kind enough to share with us. Notes of Patrick Wright
[hereinafter Wright Notes] (unpublished document, on file with the Duke Law Journal). For
several helpful conversations, we also thank Mary Nichols, Director of the Institute of the
Environment at UCLA, who served as Secretary of Resources in Governor Gray Davis’s
administration during a crucial period in the CalFed process.
120. Rieke, supra note 97, at 343.
121. Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 4.
122. Id. at 4–7.
123. Id. at 5.
124. Rieke, supra note 97, at 342.
125. Id.
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reduced the amount of water that could be diverted for urban and
126
agricultural uses.
In addition, for years there had been conflict over the amount of
water diverted from the north to the south of the state. Southern
farmers and cities proposed building a peripheral canal to divert
water around the Bay Delta instead of through it, which northerners
saw as simply an effort to export more water. In 1982 a statewide
referendum on the proposal was defeated with significant northern
127
opposition.
2. Regulatory Fracture.
This longstanding conflict was
exacerbated by a fractured regulatory environment in which nearly
two dozen federal and state agencies shared regulatory or
management responsibility for some aspect of the Bay-Delta system.
And they continue to share these responsibilities. For example, the
State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) sets statewide water
quality standards, but the standards must be approved by the federal
EPA pursuant to the CWA.128 The state Department of Water
Resources (DWR) manages the state water conveyance system (the
SWP), whereas the USBR has authority over the federal system (the
CVP). This means that the federal and state government each control
the water rights for water conveyed through their respective facilities.
The state also contains a complex water delivery system controlled by
powerful water districts like the Metropolitan Water District in Los
Angeles, which purchase and allocate water locally.
In addition, the California Department of Fish and Game (DFG)
is responsible for administering the state’s endangered species
126. Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 5–6.
127. See Rieke, supra note 97, at 346 (“Northeners saw the canal not as an improvement but
as a means to move ever-increasing amounts of water from north to south, to the detriment of
both northern economies and the health of the Bay-Delta.”).
128. It is at least arguable that the federal government does not possess regulatory authority
over salinity standards under the CWA, because these water quality standards related to flow
levels necessary to sustain endangered fish, and not pollutants that are normally regulated by
the EPA under the CWA. During the pre-CalFed conflict, the EPA sought to exert its authority
and argued publicly that it was not limited to pollutant-specific parameters, even though
privately agency officials thought they might lose in court. See id. at 354–55 (noting how agency
officials “tentatively concluded that the authority to reallocate water supplies from California
water users to the environment has vested not in EPA but in the State Board”). At the time, the
federal government sought to use its leverage, both under the CWA and under the listing
provisions of the ESA, to press California to take the lead in crafting a solution to the Delta
conflict. Interview with Patrick Wright, Former Director, California Bay-Delta Authority
[hereinafter Wright Interview] 1–2 (July 12, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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legislation, while the FWS in the Department of Interior (DOI) and
the National Marine Fisheries Service in the Department of
Commerce (DOC) share responsibility for implementing the federal
ESA. And finally, COE has some authority over wetlands under the
Clean Water Act and also implements flood control projects that
affect the Delta.129
Before the CalFed process, there was no governmental
mechanism for coordinating activities across these agencies, or for
including stakeholders in Delta-related decision making in an ongoing
way. For the most part, agencies were reactive and defensive,
blocking the initiatives of their competitor agencies and trying to
protect their own constituencies.130 The federal-state relationship
reached a low in the early 1990s when then-Governor Pete Wilson
refused to allow the State Water Board to set water quality standards
for the Bay Delta (as required by the Clean Water Act), arguing that
the federal government was interfering with the state’s prerogative to
allocate water resources by listing species on a piecemeal basis under
the ESA. Again, listings would have required pumping reductions at
both the CVP and the SWP in order to protect the fish, which would
have limited water diversions for agricultural and residential use. The
Governor claimed, partly in response to political imperatives,131 that
federal enforcement of the ESA was wreaking havoc with the state’s
water supply. As a result, the conflict reached a stalemate.132
3. The Origins of CalFed. The first step toward a more
elaborate multiagency effort to better manage this resource began
with a federal interagency agreement. In 1993, after two years of
negotiation, representatives of EPA, NMFS, FWS, and USBR signed
an “Agreement of Coordination on California Bay/Delta Issues” that

129. Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 9.
130. See Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 1.
Stakeholders were in gridlock for two decades because the agricultural, urban and
environmental stakeholders could block each other but neither had enough clout to
get their agenda enacted. The environmentalists could block new dams for twenty
years but the existing dams were still killing the fish, and there was nothing they could
do but invoke the Endangered Species Act.
131. Rieke describes policy insiders as suggesting that Governor Wilson was bowing to
pressure from the agricultural sector, whose support he needed for his 1994 reelection
campaign. Rieke, supra note 97, at 347.
132. See id. at 346–48 (stating that it was not until December 15, 1994, that “peace ha[d]
broken out in California’s long-running water wars”).
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committed the agencies to an ecosystem-based, and therefore more
comprehensive, approach to the bundle of issues in the Delta.
In the abstract, an agreement like this sounds unremarkable.
However, at the time and in the context, it represented a dramatic
133
departure from business as usual. Until CalFed, the SWRCB was
the primary institution for resolving water-related conflicts in the
state. The Board is a quasi-judicial independent agency that makes
many of its policy decisions based on evidence submitted by parties.134
Adjudicatory proceedings before the Board tend to exacerbate
adversarial relationships among the parties. In this context, there is
no tradition of parties working together to solve problems, nor is
there any incentive for them to do so. Following the Agreement, the
federal agencies—which now called themselves “Club-Fed”—began
to act collectively, holding joint briefings and press conferences and
participating together, as a united front, in state level workshops and
hearings.135
The Agreement’s most remarkable feature was its coordinated
approach. The agencies agreed to identify collectively decisions that
would impact the Bay Delta, to coordinate the timetables of those
decisions, and to convey clearly the collective impact they would have
136
on the system. They agreed to cooperate, moreover, on specific
regulatory initiatives. For the first time, they published an integrated
137
set of regulatory proposals in the Federal Register. To appreciate
133. Wright Interview, supra note 128, 1–2.
134. See United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 112–13 (1986)
(stating that the Board operates in a quasi-legislative capacity for establishing water quality
standards and in a quasi-judicial capacity for determining water rights); Norman K. Johnson &
Charles T. DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution of Western Water Law in Response to Changing
Economic and Public Interest Demands, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 347, 379 (1989) (“The
California Water Resources Control Board is an independent quasi-judicial body whose
regulatory authority includes jurisdiction over the State Water Project and all other
appropriators.”); California Environmental Protection Agency, State Water Resources Control
Board, Procedures Governing Adjudicative Proceedings before the State Water Resources
Control Board and California Regional Water Quality Control Boards 1 (Oct. 2, 1998) (“An
adjudicative proceeding is a hearing to receive evidence for determination of facts pursuant to
which the [Board] formulates and issues a decision. . . . Rulemaking and information
proceedings . . . are not adjudicative proceedings and are subject to different procedures.”),
available at http://www.waterrights.ca.gov/WRINFO/docs/procedures_govern_adjudicative_
proceedings.pdf.
135. Rieke, supra note 97, at 361.
136. Id.
137. Water Quality Standards for Surface Waters of the Sacramento River, San Joaquin
River, and San Francisco Bay and Delta of the State of California, 60 Fed. Reg. 4,664 (Jan. 24,
1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
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the difficulty of doing this, imagine the different time lines and
political pressures under which agencies normally operate.
Regulatory priorities are usually affected by a host of conditions,
including court-imposed deadlines, congressional oversight, and
political direction from executive branch appointees. These
influences, together with the different statutory mandates and
budgetary constraints that shape agency behavior, can lead agencies
to approach interconnected problems in a rather uncoordinated way.
Yet in this case, the four agencies committed to work together. Betsy
Rieke, the assistant secretary of Interior most responsible for the
negotiations, claims that each of the federal agencies “took
responsibility for solving the whole problem we jointly faced, not just
138
their agency’s portion of the problem.”
What difference did this make? Traditionally, the EPA sets
water quality standards (either on its own or by approving state
standards), whereas wildlife agencies independently list endangered
species and designate their critical habitat. The problem with this
divided approach is that species survival and recovery can depend on
water quality, including not only pollutants discharged from point
sources but also salinity and flow criteria. Here, the EPA might never
have coordinated with FWS had they not been facing the prospect of
litigation over whether the CWA authorized them to set these salinity
standards. Given that likelihood, however, the EPA approached FWS
“with the idea of establishing a set of salinity standards that would
serve as both the EPA promulgated standards under the CWA, and
as the critical habitat designation under the ESA.”139 Under the new
interagency agreement, the four agencies decided, for the first time,
140
to issue regulations simultaneously. Again, this may seem like a
small step, but the logistics of doing so are quite significant.
Moreover, the wildlife agencies were at the time under court-ordered
deadlines to list species. Delaying the listings required them to take
both a legal and political risk.141

138. Rieke, supra note 97, at 360.
139. E-mail from Patrick Wright, Former Director of the California Bay-Delta Authority, to
Jody Freeman, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School [hereinafter Wright E-mail] 5 (Oct. 20,
2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
140. Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 1.
141. By all accounts the political leadership of Betsy Rieke, an Assistant Secretary of
Interior, was crucial in convincing the agencies to sacrifice their own short-term interests and
coordinate efforts. Id. at 1–2. See Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 14 (referring to Rieke as
“the mother of CalFed”).
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The next step toward what would ultimately be the larger CalFed
Program was a 1994 Accord among federal and state agencies and
crucial stakeholders, reached just before an EPA deadline for
imposing water quality standards on the state. In 1992, Governor
Wilson had formed a State Water Policy Council from a collection of
state agencies with authority over the Delta.142 This Council,
representing the state, and Club-Fed, representing the united front of
the four key federal agencies, signed the 1994 framework agreement
and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that established a plan
to cooperate for three years on two key issues: establishing new water
quality standards, coordinating water delivery from the state, and
federal water projects to ensure sufficient freshwater for the fish.143
The agreement also institutionalized a long-term planning entity,
which ultimately became the CalFed Bay-Delta Program. The entity
was charged with initiating a comprehensive planning process for the
Bay Delta, to be overseen by state and federal water officials and key
stakeholders.
4. CalFed’s Three Phases. Over the ensuing five years, a dozen
federal and state agencies, together with stakeholder groups,
negotiated a comprehensive agreement regarding the conflicts in the
Bay Delta.144 The process was divided into three stages. During
Phase I, concluded in 1996, the agencies and stakeholders, helped by
CalFed staff, defined the issues confronting the Bay; developed initial
principles; and devised early versions of solutions.145 After public
comment and agency review, the initial scope of the negotiations

142. Catherine Hudzik, Evaluating the Effectiveness of Collaboration in Water Resources
Planning in California: A Case Study of CalFed 34 (2003) (unpublished M. L. Arch. thesis,
University of California at Berkeley), available at http://www-iurd.ced.berkeley.edu/
pub/abstract_ wp200306.htm.
143. Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 14. The Accord came about because of a number of
factors: the political leadership of people like Assistant Secretary Rieke; the willingness of
interest groups, frustrated with gridlock, to try a collaborative approach; looming deadlines for
ESA listings; and progress negotiating contentious scientific issues related to water quality,
which laid the basis for further consensus. Id. at 4–5.
144. The key agencies on the federal side were the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), FWS, USBR, the COE, and the DOI. On the state side they were:
DWR, DFG, the SWRCB (State Water Resources Control Board), and the California
Environmental Protection Agency (CalEPA). A number of other federal and state agencies
played lesser roles. However, eighteen agencies (both cabinet and subcabinet level) did sign the
MOU in 2000. CALFED BAY-DELTA PROG., Programmatic Record of Decision 1 (Aug. 28,
2000), available at http://calwater.ca.gov/Archives/GeneralArchive/rod/ROD.pdf.
145. Id. at 15.
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broadened to include a wide range of Delta-related issues, which
were then grouped into seven categories: ecosystem restoration;
watershed management; water quality improvements; water transfers;
water storage; levee system integrity; and water use efficiency
146
measures.
During Phase II, the CalFed and agency staffs prepared a
comprehensive programmatic environmental impact statement (EIS),
147
as required by both federal and state law. The agencies consulted
with stakeholders through the Bay-Delta Advisory Council (BDAC),
a body created to provide public input into the CalFed agencies’
decision making.148 In addition, stakeholders continued to consult with
agency officials informally, through numerous meetings around the
state. The EIS process helped agencies plan the specific actions that
would be necessary to implement the Record of Decision (ROD)—
the collection of commitments that the agencies would make to
address the multitude of issues in the Bay Delta. As Phase II ended,
Gray Davis replaced Pete Wilson as Governor of California. In the
background of this transition, negotiations continued, but the
Department of Interior’s curtailment of pumping from the SWP and
CVP, triggered by court orders, threatened to derail the process. At
this point, the key players from the state and federal agencies met
privately for several months to come to agreement on central key
issues.149
The result, finally reached in 2000, was the ROD—a single
coordinated plan for addressing the full complement of water
management and allocation issues in the Bay Delta. All twenty-three
state and federal CalFed agencies signed a MOU regarding
implementation of the ROD in August 2000. Phase III, now
underway, involves implementing the ROD.

146. Id.
147. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2000)
(requiring agencies to issue environmental impact statements); California Environmental
Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21,002 (West 1996 & Supp. 2005) (forbidding public
agencies from approving projects that do not include means to mitigate environmental effects
caused by that project).
148. The BDAC was formally chartered as an advisory body and is subject to the
accountability requirements under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Federal Advisory
Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92–463, § 3(2)(C), 86 Stat. 770, 770 (1972), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app. § 3(2)(C)(2000).
149. Patrick Wright recounts this history. Patrick Wright, Fixing the Delta: The CalFed BayDelta Program and Water Policy Under the Davis Administration, GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 331,
337 (2001); Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 15–16.
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5. The CalFed ROD. The CalFed ROD adopts an integrated
approach to simultaneously address all of the issues and interests that
have an impact on the Delta. This is a dramatic departure from the
historical pattern, in which parties would simply fight for more of the
150
resource, and progress would be made sequentially, if at all. The
commitment to integration and coordination of agency activity is
expressed not merely in the abstract, but in concrete plans, some of
which will be described below. Aside from integration and
coordination, the most important animating principle of the CalFed
ROD is balanced implementation: in principle, as soon as, or soon
after, progress is made on one program objective, progress must also
be made on the others.151 The goal is to ensure that no single priority
dominates decision making. Needless to say, balanced
implementation is crucial to maintaining stakeholder support for the
process.
For each of the seven categories, the ROD adopts specific
measures. For example, it commits CalFed agencies to expand storage
capacity at existing reservoirs and to increase pumping, which
addresses the needs of agricultural and residential consumers. The
agencies also agree to restore the Delta ecosystem through increased
flow and fish passage improvements, which addresses the concerns of
environmentalists. In a similar effort at balance, the ROD requires
agencies to invest in treatment technologies to improve water quality
and also to fund improvements to shore up the integrity of Delta
levees.152 These examples illustrate the ROD’s comprehensiveness.
In addition to its substantive commitments, the ROD also creates
new cooperative institutions to undertake coordinated joint decision
making. It establishes a process for implementation under which one
or more federal and one or more state agencies will share
responsibility for leading implementation of each program element.
This has prompted internal changes within the participating agencies,
which have hired program staff to support them in their planning,
coordination, monitoring, reporting, and public outreach. The MOU
on implementing the ROD also established a “Policy Group” of
representatives from all 23 agencies. That group would become the
ongoing vehicle for discussing priorities, work plans, and budgets to
ensure that implementation proceeded in a coordinated fashion.
150. Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 17.
151. Id. at 22.
152. Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 18–21.
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Members were to review agency decisions for consistency with the
ROD and make specific recommendations back to the agencies.
Another key principle of the ROD is a commitment to the use of
independent and credible science as a basis for decision making.
Among other things, the ROD provides for appointment of a Lead
Scientist and an Independent Science Board to integrate science into
153
all aspects of the Program. This approach to science was meant to
overcome a history of adversarialism among stakeholders, in which
science was used “more for its combat potential than for its analytical
qualities.”154 In the early stages of the CalFed process, each side would
advance the science that supported its position, or simply sit back and
attack the other side’s science as biased. Even agency scientists had
come to be viewed as advocates for one position or another. As a
result, credibility on all sides was extremely weak. According to
Wright, “to put it bluntly, no one in the environmental community
has ever trusted the information generated by the water agencies
(DWR and USBR), and no one in the water community trusts the
data or conclusions of the fishery agencies.”155 Thus the main function
of the Independent Science Board would be to develop credible
sources of information that would inspire confidence among both
agencies and stakeholders.
The CalFed ROD also establishes a detailed process for
soliciting and implementing stakeholder input. As noted above, it
156
institutionalizes the BDAC, which provides an opportunity for a
wide variety of stakeholders to participate in the implementation
process. Participating groups include environmental organizations,
Native American Tribes, farmers’ associations, and agricultural and
urban water agencies. Though different stakeholders have exerted
more or less influence at different times in the CalFed process,
collectively, they have been a consistent presence.157 At key moments,
stakeholders have stepped up to break logjams and generate policy
158
solutions. In some cases they have even supplied necessary funding.
153. Id. at 21.
154. Id. at 26.
155. E-mail from Patrick Wright to Jody Freeman [hereinafter Wright E-mail] (July 14,
2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
156. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2000).
157. As Nawi & Brandt put it, “Stakeholders have stood squarely in the middle of both the
conflict and the resolution.” Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 23.
158. For example, to overcome an impasse in the negotiation of the 1994 Accord among the
four federal agencies, an environmental group compromised on a water quality standard
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Mary Nichols, the former Secretary of Resources in the Davis
administration, described the dynamic between BDAC and the
agencies in these terms:
At the last meeting of that group, we had presentations from
members of the advisory committee to the agencies instead of the
other way around. So it’s no longer the advisory committee
stakeholders sitting back with their arms folded critiquing what the
agencies are doing. It’s the advisory committee members who have
been doing a lot of work between meetings coming to the agencies
and telling agencies what they think ought to be done. It’s a totally
159
different dynamic, very healthy.

6. The Environmental Water Account. There are a number of
specific examples of stakeholder contributions to policy, but none as
significant as their role in the development of the Environmental
Water Account (EWA). At first glance, the EWA is a quantity of
water set aside specifically to compensate water users when their
allocation must be reduced to protect endangered species.160 Though
the concept sounds simple, the EWA is perhaps the most interesting
policy innovation to come from CalFed. It merits a thorough
description not only because it represents a new approach to
managing the Bay-Delta water supply, but because it resulted from an
unusually collaborative process.
The EWA is potentially much more than a compensatory water
account. Its purpose is to maximize both efficiency and flexibility in
managing the water supply so that, in the end, more gets done with
less water in response to superior information about where and when
it is needed most. This requires operational decisions in what is,
essentially, real time, and it depends on the ability to effectively
gather and process good data about the likely effects of operational
161
changes in water management and delivery. Ideally, improved water

proposal, and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California provided $10 million per
year for three years for ecosystem restoration. Id.
159. See id. at 25 (quoting Mary Nichols, former California Secretary of Resources).
160. Of course, environmentalists do not believe this is properly viewed as compensation,
because they do not think the other users were legally entitled to their existing entitlement. The
question of what ought to be the appropriate baseline entitlement has been a contentious issue
throughout the CalFed process.
161. Alf W. Brandt, An Environmental Water Account: The California Experience, 5 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 426, 427–28 (2002). With the EWA, says Wright:
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management could allow operators to go beyond what the traditional
regulatory regime would envision. For example, they might be able to
do more than merely ensure endangered species “survival,” which is
the minimum required under the ESA. They could instead provide
for species recovery, and even improve the aquatic environment for
other species that are not yet listed.162
Prior to the development of the EWA, the practice was for the
wildlife agencies, pursuant to their authority under the ESA, to set
seasonal limits on the amount of water that could be diverted for
urban and agricultural uses. These limits were set according to
biological opinions that determined the amount of water necessary to
support protected species. The impact on the water supply of such
limits could be dramatic: if too much water was being pumped out of
the Delta, the pumps would need to be shut down, which could wreak
havoc with agricultural and urban water supplies. But shutting the
pumps down in this way is hardly an ideal approach to supporting the
fish, a problem the EWA was designed to address. As Brandt
explains,
[s]etting seasonal pumping restrictions by biological opinion under
the ESA generally does not allow for a response to constantly
changing hydrologic and fishery conditions. Only when project
operations exceed ESA take limits do the fishery agencies seek
additional pumping reductions, and, at that point, the reductions are
often substantial, and are too late to prevent the excess [killing of
fish]. With an EWA as collateral, the fishery agencies can call for
early and moderate pumping reductions that minimize both the take
of listed species and the need for subsequent, substantial pumping
163
reductions.

Ideally then, water allocation would proceed flexibly in response
to the changing needs of fisheries and the ecosystem as a whole,
instead of in response to the specific regulatory requirements issued

You have a block of water waiting and if the fish are coming in March, you spend half
the assets in March. People are actually tracking the fish as they come down. Before
CalFed, pumps might be shut down in the middle of growing season with serious and
sudden repercussions, and not necessarily in response to the real needs of the fishery.
Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 4. Doing this with maximum effectiveness requires
enormous amounts of data about, for example, “endangered fish in the Delta and upstream
tributaries, hydrology, and project operations.” Hudzik, supra note 142, at 41.
162. Brandt, supra note 161, at 434.
163. Id. at 434.
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164
by fish and wildlife agencies, as was historically the case. To
accomplish this, the EWA requires close coordination between socalled “project” or “water” agencies like USBR and DWR, which are
responsible for acquiring, storing, and delivering water to users, and
so-called “management” or “fisheries” agencies like FWS and DFG,
which are responsible for protecting endangered fish. Traditionally,
these agencies would never be enlisted in allocating water together.
Yet the potential benefits of pooling their expertise are significant. As
Nichols puts it,

By getting the right people from the federal and state water agencies
and fisheries agencies together in one room, CalFed was able to get
them to talk to each other about what each of them really needs.
The great breakthrough was when they realized that they didn’t all
need the same amount of water all the time. By taking water from
the reservoirs only when it’s actually needed to irrigate crops, and
leaving water in the rivers when the fish are actually there, it turns
out that the same total volume of water can be allocated based on
real time information, and each drop can be used much more
efficiently. The engineers and biologists started talking about the
time value of water. They came up with this new approach because
people who don’t normally interact got together to try to solve a
problem. You can’t do this by setting a standard. The conventional
165
regulatory process can’t do this.

The success of the EWA depends on two things: the
development of water assets (i.e., “growing” the water supply by
acquiring water from existing water holders or from more efficient
use of water projects) and the management of that supply
simultaneously for environmental, agricultural, and urban needs. The
conflicting demands on the Bay-Delta water supply had historically
made doing this virtually impossible.
The events that led to the EWA merit recounting because they
perfectly illustrate the collaborative and adaptive learning process—
and the institutional innovation to which it can lead—that we think of
as modular.166 When the federal-state Accord was signed in 1994, it

164. Id. at 433.
165. E-mail from Mary Nichols, Secretary of California Resources Agency, to Jody Freeman
(July 13, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). In this setting, “time value” refers to the
time-bound nature of water uses, rather than to economic discounting.
166. Our account relies heavily on the detailed account of the Ops Group and the EWA by
Catherine Hudzik. Hudzik, supra note 142, at 37–54.
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created the CalFed Operations Coordination Group (Ops Group),
consisting of the project agencies responsible for managing pumping
from the SWP and CVP and the management agencies responsible
for protecting fish and wildlife. The Ops Group was charged with
implementing the new water quality standards, which meant
coordinating water operations to ensure protection of the fish.
Although these agencies had already begun to engage in informal
consultation, the creation of the Ops Group formalized their
relationship. They began to meet monthly, to use the same
information, and to make real-time operational decisions—for both
water supply and environmental protection—together.167
The Ops Group consisted of high-level agency staff and some
key stakeholders from environmental groups and local Water
168
Districts. It was assisted by two subgroups that fed it information
and data. One was the Data Assessment Team, which consisted of
agency staff from the management and operational agencies, plus
stakeholder representatives. The Team met weekly, analyzed
technical data and made recommendations to the Ops Group about
modifying project operations. The second was the so-called “No
Name” Group, which met on an as-needed basis. This group served as
an informal conduit for stakeholder input to the agencies and for
agencies to in turn funnel information to stakeholders.169 According to
Connick and Professor Innes, “The idea was that information on
fisheries, water quality and flows could be evaluated quickly using the
distributed intelligence of the diverse agency and stakeholder
members.”170
The Ops Group encountered some obstacles, in part because of
ongoing litigation and ESA listings that put limitations on what it

167. Id. at 40.
168. The environmental stakeholders included the Bay Institute, Environmental Defense,
and the Natural Heritage Institute. The Metropolitan Water District was the key water user
involved. Id. at 38.
169. Id. at 41.
170. Sarah Connick & Judith E. Innes, Outcomes of Collaborative Water Policy Making:
Applying Complexity Thinking to Evaluation, 46 J. ENVTL. PLANNING & MGMT. 177, 189 (2003).
Using up-to-the-minute monitoring data, these groups managed the situation on a
day-to-day basis. The resource managers made key decisions at the lowest levels
possible, elevated unresolved issues quickly and kept all the agencies and
stakeholders informed. The decision making was quick and effective, and the process
provided a much more nuanced response than the agencies could have provided
working independently with inflexible guidelines.
Id. at 190.
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could do operationally. And not all of the potentially relevant
stakeholders participated regularly. Some lacked the expertise to do
so, and others did not buy into the process. By the late nineties the
group seemed to be at an impasse over the essential conflict: how to
adequately protect the fish without depleting the water supply for
other uses. And this was a time of crisis. The Delta pumps were shut
down because of ESA listings right in the middle of growing season,
which caused a political firestorm of statewide headlines and
legislative hearings.171 It was in this context that the EWA emerged.
The idea was initially envisioned at a high-level meeting of key
CalFed players by David Fullerton of the Metropolitan Water
District. What happened next merits quoting at length:
In this room were all the chiefs of all the water agencies and the
fisheries agencies. Then he [Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of Interior
under the Clinton Administration] looked at Mike Spear, the
regional head of the Fish and Wildlife Service, because the biggest
issue was Delta Smelt at the time, and Tim Quinn [of the
Metropolitan Water District], the biggest gun in the water supply
side, and he said, “Do you two guys represent the rest of these
guys?” They looked around and said yeah . . . and he said, “Okay,
I’ll tell you what I’m gonna do.” He looked at Mike and Tim and
said, “There’s a room at the side over there, and you two guys are
gonna go in there. I’m gonna give you 20 minutes, and you’re gonna
come out of there and tell us whether we have an impasse and we
ought to quit, or you’ve got a way to solve this and you think we’ve
got a process, a way to solve it. You can take anybody in there you
want to, but you’re going to come out and tell us whether we quit
now and just fight.” . . . One of them’s got the Endangered Species
Act on their side, the other side’s got 2,500,000 people drinking—
172
and they did, they went off.

What Quinn and Spear proposed, after being sent off to confer by
Secretary Babbitt, was the EWA. The Ops Group and its subgroups
then developed the concept in over a year of meetings.
The EWA is not the only example of CalFed’s institutional
innovation. The program has spawned what might be called
“submodular” approaches as implementation of the ROD has
proceeded. One good example is the South Delta Fish Facilities
Forum (SDFFF), which is comprised of representatives from the
171.
172.

Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 2–3.
Hudzik, supra note 142, at 45.
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water and fishery agencies, as well as nonagency stakeholders. The
SDFFF formed to develop a policy alternative to the extremely
expensive fish screening and testing facilities that had been proposed
by the fisheries agencies as part of the ROD. (The agencies had
proposed to spend $180 million on a test facility to assess the
effectiveness of screening technology. The screens needed to be in
place before more water could be pumped out of the Delta because
the increased pumping threatened fish populations.) The agencies
initially took offense at the idea that stakeholders could question
their judgments. But the stakeholders proposed a detailed plan to
study, test, and evaluate alternative technologies and practices that
would provide adequate fish protection at a lower cost. Ultimately,
173
the agencies agreed to participate.
At times, stakeholders have all but supplanted the agencies. For
example, the ROD called for developing a water quality plan, but
none of the responsible agencies, including the EPA, the SWRCB
and the state Department of Health Services (DHS), was eager to
take a leadership role. Instead, they remained preoccupied with their
narrow statutory mandates, which focus on only a small part of the
larger water quality problem. For example, the SWRCB’s priority is
source control of water pollution. The Board establishes water quality
standards, oversees point source regulation and creates programs to
control nonpoint source runoff. By contrast, DHS and the EPA set
treatment standards for the water coming from taps. Each of these
agencies alone can normally address only part of the larger water
quality problem, but the CalFed process provided an opportunity to
adopt a more integrated comprehensive approach. According to
Wright, “no one had assumed responsibility, or was even thinking
about, how to protect water quality from source to tap in an estuarine
174
system, or considered the trade-offs involved.”
The Drinking Water Subcommittee of the BDPAC emerged to
fill this void. It proposed an innovative strategy to set ambient water
quality targets as either traditional concentration limits or in a
manner that would achieve an “equivalent level of public health
175
[ELPH] protection.” The strategy calls for improving water quality

173. Wright E-mail, supra note 155, at 2; see South Delta Fish Facilities Forum Charge and
Background Document (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (explaining SDFFF’s mission in
detail).
174. Wright E-mail, supra note 155, at 3.
175. Id.
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in the tributary waters entering the Delta by adopting water
management measures that will reduce seawater intrusion, improving
local and regional infrastructure and treatment technology, and
establishing regional water quality exchanges—all of which is
176
designed to ensure improved water quality at the tap. This
approach, which allows managers to prioritize among the different
measures and make water quality improvements in the most costeffective way, was adopted into the ROD. As with the EWA,
stakeholders were crucial to developing a solution when the
responsible agencies could or would not do so. Though the agencies
participated, the subcommittee took the lead.177
It is difficult to convey the novelty and ambition of the CalFed
ROD with such a short summary and so few examples. The document
is remarkable not only for being so broad in scope but for
178
approaching implementation in such an integrated fashion. This
may be the ROD’s greatest innovation—transforming how decisions
regarding the Delta are to be made in the future. The adopted
approach built on what the four federal agencies (Club-Fed) had
begun in their 1993 Accord: agencies that were accustomed to acting
independently, establishing their own priorities, and working on their
own timelines were now formally committed to jointly coordinating

176. CAL. BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, WATER QUALITY PROGRAM MULTI-YEAR PROGRAM
PLAN (YEARS 6–9) 5–6 (July 2005), available at http://calwater.ca.gov/ProgramPlans_2006/
Water_Quality_ Final_Draft.pdf.
177.
So for salts, for example, the most cost effective approach might be to relocate
agricultural drains and the intakes of the urban agencies that draw supplies from the
Delta. But for selenium, it might be to emphasize agricultural drainage management.
The key is to look at each option from source to tap. But because no individual
agency has the mandate to take this more global approach, stakeholders are
providing the leadership and direction through the work of the subcommittee.
E-mail from Patrick Wright to Jody Freeman (May 31, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
178. There is evidence of such joint activity both within the substantive plan and in the many
joint documents incorporated into the ROD. These included
Biological Opinions issued contemporaneously by NMFS and FWS pursuant to
Section 7 of the ESA. As a joint federal-state document, it incorporates findings and a
certification under the California Environmental Quality Act, as well as the approval
by the CDFG [California Department of Fish and Game] of CalFed’s Multiple
Species Conservation Program. The ROD also includes a programmatic consistency
determination under the Coastal Zone Management Act; agreements addressing
sections 401 and 404 of the Clean Water Act; operation of the Environmental Water
Account, and overall Program implementation; and a conservation agreement
regarding the Multiple Species Conservation Strategy.
Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 21.
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their regulatory, permitting, planning, and funding decisions. The
explicit purpose of this coordination is to enable these agencies to
achieve not only their own narrow statutory mandates but to
accomplish comprehensive projectwide goals that none could achieve
on their own.
7. Institutional Innovation. CalFed also embodies innovation in
institutional form. It began as a loose network of agencies and
stakeholders and evolved into a comprehensive and coordinated
multiagency effort with commitments formalized in documents like
the ROD and the MOU. The ROD anticipated that these
commitments would be implemented through a combination of
traditional and nontraditional regulatory strategies by the individual
agencies using their preexisting authority, with input from
stakeholders.
As mentioned, the participants initially created the CalFed
Policy Group to assist with implementation. It was co-chaired by the
DOI Assistant Secretary for Water and Science and the California
Resources Agency Secretary, and it included the heads of the CalFed
agencies. As the process developed, however, proposals began to
emerge suggesting the creation of a new regional or joint state-federal
governance structure. This occurred in response to a general sense
that implementing the ROD would require a new institutional
arrangement.
Settling on the precise governance structure, however, was
contentious.179 At this point, many stakeholders favored a new
government agency, created by legislation, in which they would be
entitled to play an active role. The agencies themselves did not want
their authority usurped, but each generally acknowledged the need
for a coordinating entity that would maintain a commitment to the
“core” CalFed values—interagency coordination, balanced
implementation, and independent science. This was especially
necessary to prevent individual agencies from reneging on their
commitments. Some stakeholders had hoped to create a new entity
with cross-cutting authority precisely because they feared that
agencies would resist coordination. Other stakeholders with strong
working relationships with particular agencies (e.g., water contractors
and DWR) feared that a new entity would undermine the power of

179.

Wright Notes, supra note 119, at 1–3.
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“their” agency (indeed, their advocate) in the CalFed process. And
lawyers for both state and federal agencies resisted creating a truly
new joint federal-state agency because of concerns about the
constitutionality and legality of federal and state entities having a say
in each other’s activities. This, of course, demonstrates how existing
limitations can constrain the options for institutional development.
And yet, these constraints did not foreclose every creative
option. The agencies and stakeholders agreed to create the Bay-Delta
Authority (BDA), which was charged with playing a coordinating and
supervisory role over all of the CalFed agencies. The BDA would not
intrude on the “turf” of any of the agencies, impinge on their budgets,
or usurp their regulatory power. Structuring the BDA in this way
would be a risk. Without regulatory power, it could not force action
but instead would need to persuade the agencies to take its advice. It
would have to manage a variety of stakeholders and agencies in a
highly contentious and politicized environment, without its own
constituency of support; if it got into political trouble, who would
come to its defense? And handling so many different players without
losing credibility would be challenging. Perhaps developing good
relationships with some stakeholders or agencies might undermine
the BDA’s influence with others. Perhaps its rather informal and
experimental mission would make it appear weak or ineffectual.
Perhaps it would be seen by some as a useless bureaucratic overlay.
Its two primary tasks—to supervise and coordinate—could
conceivably come into conflict.
Yet the BDA structure had some obvious benefits. First, and
importantly, it was a pragmatic option simply because of its small
institutional footprint. No agency had to yield its budgetary authority
or shrink its regulatory power. Second, it was seen as a priority to
create a coordinating entity in an environment characterized by an
almost total lack of coordination. The BDA might accomplish a great
deal simply by being an honest broker, a source of information, and a
procurer of science. It could educate agencies about each other’s
activities, remind them of their commitments, prod them to act or
explain their inaction, and provide a forum to connect agencies to
stakeholders to whom those agencies might otherwise not be
favorably disposed. Moreover, the BDA could help to generate and
disseminate credible and relevant scientific data that, because of its
independence, would be difficult for the agencies to ignore. Perhaps
most importantly, the BDA would uniquely take a projectwide
perspective. It would have its own independent staff, which would
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come to develop its own culture. Unlike the agencies, the BDA would
be unburdened by a historical constituency or client. As a result, it
would be free to represent CalFed and its programmatic goals.
In 2002, California passed legislation formally establishing the
California BDA as a state entity under the California Resources
Agency and institutionalizing its role in CalFed.180 In its current form,
the BDA includes twenty-four members: six representatives of state
agencies; six (nonvoting) representatives from federal agencies;181 five
public members from different regions of the state; two legislative
appointees; and a representative from the public advisory committee
(which had been renamed the Bay-Delta Public Advisory Council
and formally chartered under the Federal Advisory Committee
Act).182 There are also four nonvoting state members: the Chair and
Vice Chair of the appropriate legislative committees in both the
Assembly and the Senate. The BDA appointments are high level. On
the federal side, they include the Secretary of the Interior; on the
state side, the Secretary of Resources. The Authority has approval
power over Annual Workplans and activities of the agencies, and it
works with the Governor’s Office of Finance to coordinate agency
spending—an indirect but effective way to influence the traditional
budgetary independence of the agencies.183 The Authority’s official
role is to oversee the dozen or more state and federal agencies that
will implement the ROD by helping to coordinate and integrate their
activities. It has been charged with providing for balanced
implementation, tracking and assessing Program progress, and, by

180. California Bay-Delta Authority Act, CAL. WATER CODE, Div. 26.4, §§ 79,400–79,476
(West 2004). On January 1, 2003, the Authority assumed responsibility for overseeing
implementation of the Bay-Delta program. In addition, the Authority includes four ex-officio
members, two each from the Senate and the House. The Bay-Delta Act calls for the Authority
to sunset on January 1, 2006, unless federal legislation has been enacted authorizing the
participation of federal agencies in the Authority (who now cannot formally participate).
181. Recently, Congress passed legislation formally authorizing the participation of the
federal agencies on the Authority. Water Supply, Reliability, & Environmental Improvement
Act, Pub. L. No. 108–361, 118 Stat. 1681 (2004).
182. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92–463, § 3(2)(C), 86 Stat. 770, 770
(1972), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2)(C) (2000). The Public Advisory Committee is treated as
a state advisory committee as well.
183. See Wright Notes, supra note 119, at 7 (discussing the important role of the
Department of Finance in maintaining balance in spending). Under the new federal authorizing
legislation, OMB could play a similar role. Water Supply, Reliability & Environmental
Improvement Act § 106.
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directing the independent science board to review all program
184
elements, ensuring that agencies use credible science.
Remarkably, until this formal institutionalization of the BDA,
none of the CalFed activities had been authorized by legislation.
CalFed had evolved as “essentially a creature of inter-agency
agreements and budget allocations, grounded in its unique ability to
185
perform an essential role in addressing the Bay-Delta.” Now,
however, it would become “official.”
8. How to Account for CalFed. What, in the end, explains
CalFed’s emergence? Rieke’s analysis of the 1994 Agreement, which
first institutionalized the CalFed Program, suggests two key factors: a
favorable stakeholder environment in which parties not only wanted
to reach agreement, but had the expertise, resources, and
relationships necessary to contribute to it; and a federal strategy
designed to leverage the state into developing a water quality plan.
Clearly, without the prospect of mutual gains, the stakeholders would
not have come to agreement. The ESA and CWA were critical in this
regard because their requirements helped to create a crisislike
situation in which it became clearer than ever that a long term plan
was necessary. By the midnineties, it was apparent to every
stakeholder that, although they could keep blocking one another,
without a more collaborative process they would never really advance
their long-term interests.186 The system was clearly broken, and there
were feelings of exasperation on all sides. This created an opportunity
for something new.
Negotiations were helped along, as Rieke says, by stakeholders
that brought both resources and expertise to the table. Indeed, a few
local water agencies were as knowledgeable and powerful, in some

184. Authority members are assisted by a fulltime staff, which is headed by a Director. Nawi
& Brandt, supra note 39, at 7.
185. Id. at 28. The BDPAC consists of nine subcommittees on topics ranging from Delta
Levees and Habitat to Environmental Justice. Members are drawn from a wide variety of
stakeholder groups including environmental organizations, water districts, Indian tribes, farm
groups, and fisherman’s associations. See CAL. BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, supra note 118, at 51–52
(explaining the role of the BDPAC).
186. For example, the ESA is a powerful tool for environmentalists because “listed” species
trigger a variety of protections including reductions in pumping, see, e.g., Endangered Species
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4) (requiring agency consultation to ensure that agencies’ actions are
not likely to jeopardize listed species), but the statute is ultimately too narrow to address the
larger water management issues presented by the Delta. See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a)(4).
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187
respects, as state and federal entities. In addition, California’s
business community used its clout and knowledge of water issues to
help keep the process moving. And environmental groups had
sufficient legal and technical resources to “get to the table, remain at
the table, and bring independent proposals to the discussions,” which
is not always the case in conflicts like this.188
It is important to remember that it took time for these
historically adversarial relationships to evolve. The CalFed Program
benefited from years of informal discussions among key stakeholders,
which helped to inch them forward and position them for reaching a
formal agreement. By the time they negotiated the 1994 Accord
establishing the Bay-Delta Program, these groups were building on
earlier discussions dating to the eighties.189 Although these earlier
discussions had not produced a plan for the Delta, they had helped
stakeholders to understand better their mutual interests and identify
some initial principles for addressing management of the Delta. These
earlier discussions provided the “foundation of technical information,
alternatives and relationships” for ultimate agreement.190 As things
progressed, stakeholders became more willing to break old alliances
and form new ones.191 For example, urban and rural water users (not
usually allies) formed a coalition, in part to balance the pressure from
192
environmental groups.

187. See Rieke, supra note 97, at 351 (describing the Metropolitan Water District in
Southern California, one of the state’s biggest wholesalers of water, as having an annual
operating budget nearly as large as the federal Bureau of Reclamation’s entire budget for the
American West).
188. Id.
189. Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 11. These discussions came to be known as the
“Three Way Process.” They began after the Peripheral Canal referendum was defeated by
voters and after the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the state’s water quality standards.
The discussions first began between urban and agricultural users. Urban users also opened
discussions with environmentalists. Id.
190. Rieke, supra note 97, at 352.
191. Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 11 (recounting how local agencies like the
Metropolitan Water District began to work closely with other urban areas like San Francisco,
weakening their ties to agricultural users who also received their water through the state
pumping system that diverted it from the north).
192. Moreover, many stakeholders took risks. For example, the environmental community
yielded on some aspects of water quality standards at a crucial moment. A representative from
the agricultural alliance departed from his constituency’s traditional opposition to water quality
standards and persuaded irrigation districts to work together with an urban coalition. Rieke,
supra note 97, at 351.
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In addition, by 1993, federal agencies had themselves begun to
cooperate on Bay-Delta issues, which laid the groundwork for later
cooperation between the federal and state governments the next year.
During this period, the federal government leveraged its legal
authority under the CWA and the ESA to force the state to take
primary responsibility for devising a plan. Without those legal levers,
the Wilson administration may never have set water quality
standards, which had become the crucial sticking point.
Along with the strong sense that the system was broken, the
promise of increased funding was crucial to brokering the 1994
Agreement. As Nichols put it,
[Secretary] Babbitt was able to get the Wilson Administration and
the ag[ricultural] and urban water agencies to stay at the table by
insisting, contrary to all expectations, that the [Clinton]
Administration was willing to request huge funds in new California
water storage projects, even including dams, if everybody could
193
agree on a whole package.

This was pivotal because there had been no new money for USBR or
COE projects in the West for many years.
The prospect of funding was perhaps even more important to the
development of the ROD six years later. During this time,
stakeholders cooperated to support passage of two water-related
bond measures that together raised $6 billion for water and waterrelated open space projects in the state, of which CalFed was
194
allocated a substantial share. The ROD was adopted at a time when
both the state and federal budget surpluses were at record levels,
which was critical to generating support for the program. A final

193. E-mail from Mary Nichols, former California Secretary of Resources (Oct. 10, 2004)
(on file with Duke Law Journal). Nichols recounts that “Congress simply hadn’t had the money
to throw around and environmentalists had joined with Eastern and Midwestern states to define
all western water projects as bad pork.” Id.
194. CalFed supporters were instrumental in passing Propositions 50, 204 and 13, which
produced respectively $4 billion, $1 billion and $1.97 billion, for a total of $6.97 billion. Nichols
describes the bond effort this way:
The Governor wanted to rebuild California’s water infrastructure and the only way to
get something on the ballot the first year he was in office was to work with The
Nature Conservancy, the Southern California urban interests, and more enlightened
water buffalos, so they crafted a bond measure that basically requires a [CalFed]-type
approach to funding projects—multi-purpose, “green” water projects rise to the top
and get funded quickly, everything else gets studied and has to meet a “beneficiary
pays” test. . . . Remember, in California the saying is water runs uphill to money.
Id.
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ingredient for success, which cannot be overstated, is leadership. By
all accounts, Rieke and her team at Interior, and a variety of
important local players like Tim Quinn at the MWD, were crucial to
maintaining momentum in the face of repeated setbacks. As the
Directors of the Bay-Delta Authority for the last decade, Lester
Snow and Patrick Wright played key roles in maintaining that
195
momentum. Thus, though it may be hard to reproduce, CalFed’s
success is not accidental. It is the product of a potent combination: the
favorable stakeholder environment and federal hammer identified by
Rieke, along with a significant amount of money and very talented
leadership.
B. Evaluating CalFed
1. A Favorable View. Our portrayal of CalFed suggests that it
has already achieved a unique level of both procedural and
substantive innovation simply by coming into being. The process by
which it emerged illustrates how interagency coordination coupled
with stakeholder participation (lubricated by funding, of course) can
lead to more comprehensive planning and reshape a zero-sum
struggle into a more multifaceted problem-focused exercise. And it
provides a useful example of how informal agreements among actors
with preexisting regulatory authority, together with an overlay of new
governance structures, can help to overcome some of the limits
inherent in a relatively rigid statutory and bureaucratic regime.
Without leaving a large institutional footprint, these new governance
structures can potentially have a meaningful long-term impact by
shepherding agencies that have been historically entrenched in their
independence toward greater coordination and collaboration. Finally,
CalFed demonstrates how new policy ideas—like the EWA, the
SDFFF, and the water quality strategy—can emerge from
information-rich, joint problem-solving efforts in which parties that
are normally opposed to each other channel their conflict
constructively toward generating solutions and alternatives to an
unsustainable status quo.
The BDA, while not perfect, has clearly enjoyed some success in
coordinating the activities of the CalFed agencies. In a sense, the
195. Although beyond the scope of this Article, it would be useful to investigate whether the
presence of this strong leadership was sheer coincidence, or whether it was produced by
processes that could be replicated elsewhere.
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Authority operates like a building contractor: it determines which
projects—ecosystem
restoration
water
supply
or
levee
reinforcement?—must go first, and tries to link schedules to keep
progress on track. The Authority crucially provides a forum in which
implementing agencies can meet. Indeed, deputy directors from the
agencies meet every other week to discuss their upcoming regulatory
agenda and to ensure their efforts are in synch. Although this process
does not guarantee perfect coordination, it would be impossible to
achieve any coordination at all in its absence. And this kind of forum
196
simply did not exist before CalFed.
CalFed has also succeeded in delivering concrete benefits to
every constituency it serves. The Program has funded groundwater,
recycling, and water use efficiency projects that have produced, in just
a few years, the water supply benefits of two or three good-sized
dams at a fraction of the cost. And it has done so, most significantly,
197
without any opposition. CalFed’s ecosystem restoration efforts can
be fairly credited with at least some contribution to helping restore
salmon runs, which are now healthier. The Program has spent over
half a billion dollars on ecosystem restoration, making it arguably the
most ambitious such project in the world and laying the foundation
for future improvements. Though they may take many years to
materialize, the future health of the Delta requires investment now.198
Over $3 billion have been spent implementing the range of goals in
the ROD: ecosystem restoration, water supply, and water quality
projects. Perhaps most importantly, since the inception of CalFed,
there have been no pump shutdowns. This stability has been
particularly important to southern California, which draws about 40
percent of its supplies from the Delta and which, until the winter of
2005, had been experiencing one of the worst droughts of the century.
The benefit of this stability to the state in terms of averted crop

196.
197.
198.

Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 5.
CAL. BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, supra note 118, at 8.
Id. See also Tom Dunne, Integrating Creativity, Science, and Responsibility, SCIENCE IN
ACTION: NEWS FROM THE CALFED BAY-DELTA SCIENCE PROGRAM, June 2003, at 22,
available at http://www.science.calwater.ca.gov/pdf/SIA_cv_rivers_060103.pdf. Professor Dunne
observes that:
CalFed is the most creative, most diverse, most likely to be productive, large-scale
river restoration program anywhere in the world . . . . This is a giant research
experiment, all the way from the policymaker down to the person dumping gravel
into the river. Nobody’s ever done “restoration” on this scale before. . . . [I]t is hard,
unprecedented, and is going to require patience.
Id.
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damage and other lost revenue, and a healthy bond rating, is
measurable in the hundreds of millions of dollars. While no
constituency has received all of its demands, the benefits to each one
have been substantial. It seems unthinkable, for example, that
ecosystem restoration could have occurred on the scale it has without
this collaborative multi-stakeholder approach—why would water
contractors, who have been historically resistant to every effort to list
species under the ESA, ever have agreed to support it?
Implementing the CalFed ROD in a balanced manner has been,
without question, a constant challenge. At different moments, one
stakeholder group or another has felt that its interests were getting
insufficient attention, as when environmentalists object that pumping
out of the Delta is increasing per commitments in the ROD but
without sufficient progress on water quality standards or ecosystem
199
restoration. Overcoming such conflicts requires updated agreements
and timetables and a recommitment to the promised balanced
implementation. To address this, in 2004 the Authority adopted a
Delta Improvements Package (DIP) that includes a plan for
increasing water exports while simultaneously making progress on
ecosystem and water quality efforts. The DIP serves two purposes:
further clarifying what specific measures are necessary to fulfill the
ROD’s goals in the Delta and formally recommitting participants to
those goals as time passes.200 And stakeholders generated many of the
201
proposals in the package, just as they helped to develop the EWA.
The DIP is notable as well because it resulted in more
coordinated activity between the agencies. In the absence of the DIP,
the resource agencies (DWR and USBR) would be seeking to
increase pumping from the Delta to satisfy their contractors, which
might adversely affect both ecosystem restoration and water quality.
199. Interview with Christopher Stevens, Counsel for Bay-Delta Authority (June 30, 2004)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal).
200. Wright points out that it is extremely useful when dealing with reluctant agencies to be
able to point to a signed document and say, “You agreed to do this.” Wright Notes, supra note
119.
201. Wright E-mail, supra note 155, at 1–2.
[The DIP] is the best example of . . . how the ROD’s general goals and commitments
get translated into specific action plans that require stakeholder buy-in, how the
stakeholders themselves developed many of its key elements, and how the Program
transformed what was heavily criticized as an insider deal among just a couple of
agencies and stakeholder groups into a public transparent process. This started as a
stakeholder-driven process, but was transformed into an Authority and agency-driven
process.
Id.
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The key challenge facing the BDA was to ensure that greater
pumping would not undermine the program’s other goals. Without
the CalFed process, DWR and USBR would have proceeded on their
own, by producing lengthy environmental impact statements to
202
explain and defend the effects of more pumping. Then they would
have negotiated mitigation with the fish and wildlife agencies.203 The
two agencies would have proceeded in a linear and isolated way,
regardless of what other agencies were planning to do, even if those
agencies were preparing to take steps in the same area at the same
time, to address matters like ecosystem health. Because of the CalFed
process and the DIP specifically, these agencies instead adopted an
integrated approach to planning that established explicit linkages
between issues that had to be addressed on a mutually agreeable
timeline. So, for example, DWR and USBR agreed not to increase
pumping until a plan was put in place by the Regional Water Quality
Control Board to ensure that all Delta water quality standards would
be met.204 Sequencing like this would simply not have happened prior
to CalFed.
The BDA developed Annual Program Plans as another
mechanism for giving additional substance to the ROD. These Plans
contain the accomplishments, schedules, priorities, and projected
expenditures for every element of the program.205 They update the
schedules that were set out in the ROD, explain which projects are
delayed and why, and account for money spent or not spent. They
serve as a feedback mechanism for both the BDA and the agencies,
one that forces the agencies to revisit the principle of balanced
implementation at regular intervals. The Program plans also help to
make the CalFed process more transparent because they are
submitted to public advisory subcommittees for review. This review
provides an opportunity for regular stakeholder input, which in turn
202. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21100(a) (“All lead agencies shall prepare, or cause to
be prepared by contract, and certify the completion of, an environmental impact report on any
project which they propose to carry out or approve that may have a significant effect on the
environment.”).
203. Wright E-mail, supra note 139, at 7.
204. Id.
205. Some of the workplans are developed by the implementing agencies themselves, some
are written by Authority staff, and others are stakeholder driven. “Not surprisingly,” says
Wright, “the agency driven plans tend to be those related to traditional agency programs,
whereas the stakeholder-driven plans tend to be those that are more innovative and crosscutting, or where there is no clear lead agency (for example, water quality).” Wright E-mail,
supra note 155, at 3.
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generates important feedback that the Authority appointees can then
use to pressure reluctant agencies to move forward. The annual
planning process really functions as an accountability mechanism
because it requires the implementing agencies to provide
206
explanations for their actions or failures to act.
The ROD’s commitment to balanced implementation has also
led to an entirely different approach to grant funding by the CalFed
agencies. Traditionally, each agency funded the projects it favored,
consistent with its (narrow) statutory agenda. For example, in the
context of managing the same ecosystem, the state fish and wildlife
agencies and each of the federal fish and wildlife agencies would
follow their own established processes, separately setting priorities
and distributing money. Stakeholders aggressively lobbied agency
officials. Agencies independently ranked proposals and made funding
decisions without interagency consultation.
By contrast, under several CalFed Program elements, agencies
have now consolidated their grant funding and coordinated
expenditures of federal and state money in a single process. For
example, in the ecosystem restoration program, nonprofits,
universities, local watershed groups, and all other applicants no
longer send their applications to an individual agency staffer. Instead,
grant-seekers participate in a year-long process that is increasingly
207
Internet-based, highly competitive, transparent, and very selective.
In lieu of multiple requests for proposals (RFP), the agencies solicit
only one. And independent science panels now review the
applications, which adds rigor to the process.208 This new approach to
funding improves the quality of applications and helps eliminate pork
barrel funding.209 Like all aspects of the Program, interagency
coordination over funding is an ongoing challenge. Some agency
employees resist it because it reduces their independence and control.
And legislatures sometimes earmark pots of money to reduce agency

206. In 2004, several of the plans were not recommended for approval by the BDPAC
subcommittees, which meant that they went back to the staff for revision. According to Wright,
this is another example of how stakeholders strongly influence program implementation. Id.
207. According to Wright, only 10 percent of a half billion dollars worth of proposals were
originally funded. Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 5.
208. For example, the science panels will not approve funding proposals that lack detailed
conceptual models demonstrating linkages to program objectives and commitments to
monitoring and assessment. Id.
209. Interview with Patrick Wright, Former Director, California Bay-Delta Authority
[hereinafter Wright Interview] 3 (Feb. 24, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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discretion. Nevertheless, CalFed can credibly claim to have
transformed the allocation of funding for water resources grants in
the state.
The Science Program also appears to be a largely successful
response to a previously adversarial approach to science, one that
appeared to entrench positions rather than inform decision making.210
CalFed seems to be the only initiative of its kind in the nation with a
governance structure that includes a Lead Scientist and an
Independent Science Board reporting directly to the appointed
members of the BDA, rather than to, say, the staff director. The
Science Program helps lend the BDA credibility in the scientific
community. The first science chief, Sam Luoma, was, in the words of
one participant, “utterly committed to creating an agency that would
both learn and incorporate what it learned into management. The
systems he set up for outside review, and his attempts to bring rigor to
agency processes, have been commendable and have had real
impacts.”211 Panels of independent scientists from universities or
research institutions help to evaluate every aspect of the CalFed
Program. And thus far the Science Program seems to have escaped he
politicization that has come to characterize federal environmental
212
regulation in recent years. As a result, it retains unusually high
credibility with stakeholders. This is because CalFed’s Science
Program is specifically designed not to determine the right answer
“but rather to focus on areas of uncertainty . . . and to discuss and
explain them.”213
The Authority plays an important role, then, in bolstering the use
of science to illuminate areas of agreement as well as disagreement.
And this occurs, as frequently as possible, early in the decision
making process before agency commitments have crystallized. For
example, BDA staff members conduct science workshops to help

210. We wish to thank Professor Holly Doremus for helping to focus our attention on this
aspect of CalFed. See E-mail from Holly Doremus, Professor of Law, University of California,
Davis, to Daniel A. Farber, Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley [hereinafter
Doremus E-mail] 2 (Sept. 16, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (noting the importance
of the science program).
211. Id. at 2.
212. On February 18, 2004, a group of top U.S. scientists, including numerous Nobel
laureates, published a report and an open letter accusing the Bush administration of suppressing
and distorting science for political gain. James Glanz, Scientists Say Administration Distorts
Facts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2004, at A18.
213. Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39.
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stakeholders vet scientific data in a neutral forum before regulatory
decisions have been made. In one instance, when the federal FWS
appeared headed toward listing an endangered species and the state
DFG opposed it, the staff arranged a technical workshop on the data
214
itself, rather than on whether listing or not listing was a good idea.
This helped to illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of the data on
which the agencies planned to rely, and it did so in a highly public
setting.215
For all of these reasons, CalFed deserves a significant amount of
credit. The challenges before it were, and still are, immense.
Everything about the natural and political environment in which the
BDA operates is precarious: the Delta is a dynamic system, agencies
remain wary of each other and guard their power jealously, and
stakeholder groups remain fiercely committed to their interests. Yet
CalFed has managed to generate an impressive amount of both
procedural and substantive policy innovation in a relatively short
time. It provides a useful illustration of many of the features of our
concept of modularity.
2. A Critical View. Nevertheless, CalFed is very much a work in
216
progress. The ROD, after five years, has only been partially
implemented. Critics might charge that the CalFed experiment is less
successful and revolutionary than its supporters think. The history of
CalFed arguably shows only that if the stresses are high enough, if
budgets are in surplus, and if there are entrepreneurial people in
leadership positions, it is possible to develop new, creative institutions
that cross jurisdictional and functional lines. Conditions such as these
will coalesce only rarely, one could say. Moreover, critics might claim
that CalFed’s largely procedural innovations go only part of the
distance to the ideal of modularity, because modular institutions must

214. Wright Notes, supra note 119, at 11.
215. There are other examples as well. When a Delta storage project proposed a feasibility
study for building a reservoir, the Authority conducted an independent scientific review that
raised serious questions about its feasibility. When water managers proposed increasing
pumping from the Delta, and fisheries agencies responded that they ought to build state of the
art fishscreens at a cost of $200 million, the Authority launched a process to explore less
expensive options. To do this, the Authority took advantage of expertise in local water districts
and convinced the wildlife agencies that they could use the help. See supra note 173 and
accompanying text.
216. We thank Professor Doremus for voicing many of the concerns we discuss in this
section.
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improve environmental outcomes in measurable ways. CalFed will
not be a real success story, one might argue, until there is evidence
that endangered fish species are in fact doing better than they would
have without the Program, the water supply for cities and farmers is
both larger and more reliable than in the past, the delta levee system
demonstrably improved, and drinking water safer than ever for
human consumption.
Critics might also resist the notion that the CalFed process really
helped stakeholders reconsider their positions. One could say that, on
the contrary, the legal regime had already established the
stakeholders’ expectations. For example, the ESA and CWA had
created entitlements on the environmental side, whereas irrigation
contracts and municipal water needs established entitlements on the
extractive side. In this view, CalFed did not strike a new balance
among stakeholders or encourage them to reconsider their demands
so much as it tried to implement the balance of power among them
that had already been struck largely because of background statutes.
Seen in this way, even CalFed’s procedural innovations seem less
impressive. Critics might argue as well that CalFed has not really
reduced conflict—certainly not if the absence of litigation is the
appropriate criterion. Stakeholders still resort to lawsuits over
217
important CalFed-related decisions.
How do we respond to criticisms such as these? First, as noted
above, CalFed has delivered concrete benefits to every constituency it
serves, including improvements in water storage capacity, water
reliability, ecosystem restoration, and drinking water quality. And
218
this has amounted to billions of dollars in real benefits. In addition,
CalFed’s planning process is based on the notion that investing in the
future is worthwhile: many of the Program’s benefits require more
than a few years to come to fruition. For example, ecosystem
restoration is a complicated and long-term process that cannot be
evaluated within political cycles of two or four years. There will
undoubtedly be fits and starts and ups and downs in the ecosystem
restoration process. This is simply the nature of the enterprise.

217. Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 4–5. Litigation is still occurring—over both the
environmental impact statement prepared for the EWA and over whether the splittail, smelt, or
sturgeon ought to be on the endangered list. Doremus E-mail, supra note 210, at 1.
218. See CAL. BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, supra note 118, at 5 (“Nearly 80 percent of the $2.9
billion invested in CalFed programs in the first four years has gone to efforts that contribute to
multiple program objectives.”).
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Ecosystems are extremely complex and our knowledge of them
dramatically incomplete. Salmon runs have been restored in the Bay
Delta in recent years, but other species, such as the Delta smelt, have
fared less well. In both cases, CalFed deserves neither all of the credit
219
nor all of the blame. In truth, the reasons why one species of fish
improves while another declines are still unclear, even to the best
scientists. Still, this kind of uncertainty calls for more, not less,
commitment to studying and experimenting with restoration.
Second, whether CalFed had a meaningful effect on stakeholder
perspectives—whether it re-shaped their expectations or simply
mediated entrenched positions—is somewhat in the eye of the
beholder. CalFed did, however, force participants to adopt a more
comprehensive view. The operative question for at least some
participants shifted from, “What are we alone entitled to take from
this water resource?” to “What do we need the Bay Delta to provide
for us collectively?” The answer to the new, larger question was
daunting: ecosystem restoration and flood control (improving the
integrity of the levee system); improved water quality (reducing toxic
contamination and excess nutrients) and a more balanced allocation
of water resources for residential, agricultural, and wildlife uses. The
point is not that CalFed led participants to abandon long-held
interests, but rather that it broadened the basis of discussion and
forced stakeholders or agencies with only one perspective to take
seriously the perspectives of others. This may not have changed the
underlying conflict, but conceivably it changed how people imagined
and talked about solutions. At a minimum, it led for the first time to
integrated and coordinated planning. And while this kind of
innovation can sound procedural, it has real effects on the ground
once agencies begin to implement their agreements.
It is undeniable, however, that the existing legal levers can limit
the ability to think about problems in creative ways. As noted in Part
I, agency cultures develop pursuant to statutory mandates. They are
“sticky” and resistant to change. As Wright says, “even when agencies
219. As Professor Doremus puts it:
The delta smelt might come off the [endangered species] list, but if it does it will be
because it has always been a tough fish to understand, not because [CalFed] has made
conditions noticeably better. (Same story for the splittail, which had a very brief
tenure on the protected list.) There are attempts to say that the [CalFed] program
automatically makes the fish better off (I think the FWS may be taking this tack in
the smelt status review), but that isn’t backed up with either empirical facts or
regulatory authority.
Doremus E-mail, supra note 210, at 1.
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are given a flexible, new tool like EWA, they have great difficulty
overcoming their instinct to apply that tool in the traditional,
220
prescriptive way.” By some accounts, for example, the regulatory
and operational agencies still focus on pumping operations at the
CVP and SWP as the most important reason why the fish are failing
when in fact their role in the decline of the fish populations is
221
unclear, and habitat factors undoubtedly make an important
contribution to the problem. Yet the pumps remain the focus because
the regulatory agencies see them as their only mechanism for
controlling the system. Manipulating the pumps is familiar, and both
agencies and stakeholders have grown used to the occasional
shutdown. Some observers believe that the EWA may have had a
perverse effect in this regard by intensifying the focus on pumping,
which diverts attention from other factors that may be affecting the
fish.222
In addition, EWA managers appear to be fairly risk averse and
continue to hoard the water, expending it only when they are strongly
convinced the fish will benefit. And, as we reflected in our
description, the dominant view of the EWA is that its purpose is to
compensate, even though it has the potential to do more. For
example, with the right incentives, managers could be encouraged to
be more experimental in allocation decisions, using the water to learn
more about the system. This strongly suggests that one measure of
success for the process as it moves forward will be the extent to which
220. Wright E-mail, supra note 139, at 2.
221. Environmentalists charge that record levels of pumping are responsible for the decline
of several species of fish, including smelt and bass. Yet CalFed’s defenders say that no one really
knows what is causing the fish to decline and note that the Program has over the same period
achieved success in restoring salmon populations. See Bettina Boxall, Water Accord Said to Be
in Peril, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, at B1 (discussing the ongoing debate); Editorial, Delta Fish
Decline Foretells State Water Woes, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, May 8, 2005, at F4 (noting that “no
one seems to know why the Delta open-water fish seem to be disappearing”).
222.
They don’t want it known (if in fact it’s true) that killing fish at the pumps isn’t what
is causing population declines because they fear losing that one handle and not being
able to replace it with anything else. The operational agencies have learned to live
with occasional pumping restrictions, are getting better at predicting when those
restrictions will come (through CalFed and their cooperation with the fish agencies),
and with the EWA have a way to make their clients the water users whole when they
must impose those restrictions. In that sense, perhaps CalFed has actually had a
perverse effect if our goal is to learn about the system and protect the environment.
Everyone can live with the focus at the pumps, except quite possibly the fish. We
need to do a better job of structuring institutions that will force a response to the
problem, rather than just to the levers.
Doremus E-mail, supra note 210, at 2–3.
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it can adopt incentives for moving away from the traditional legal
levers, so that the focus is on learning what fish need, rather than
what the agencies are used to doing. Nevertheless, despite this
continuing challenge, the existing legal regime was successfully
supplemented, finessed, or circumvented at several junctures in the
CalFed process. Although CalFed has not succeeded in overcoming
the background legal regime, it appears to have pushed beyond some
of its limitations.
The most difficult problem, not surprisingly, may be maintaining
stakeholder support for the Program over time. While the threat of
litigation, if used wisely, can help to prompt the CalFed agencies to
maintain their momentum, that threat can also be destructive. In fact,
efforts on the part of some stakeholders to circumvent CalFed
through litigation has exerted a drag on progress. In some instances,
there has been, in addition, a “wait until November” attitude among
some who think that developments in state or national politics will
223
favor their interests. Yet, the process has kept going not because
most agencies and most stakeholders are deeply committed to it, but
because there are sufficient numbers of moderates in each of the
relevant communities who are.224 The ongoing challenge is to maintain
and build on this broad-based coalition to provide ballast against
those (on all sides) who think they can do better in the conventional
regulatory and judicial process.225
All of this requires commitment over sustained periods of time,
which can lead to stakeholder fatigue.226 Both stakeholders and
agencies must stay motivated over a period of years, not months,
through different budget and political cycles, and as personnel in both
the agencies and the interest groups change. This weighs especially
heavily on stakeholders with fewer resources. A shared governance
approach like this may give a disproportionate advantage to

223. Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 4.
224. Wright Notes, supra note 119, at 5.
225. As one example, many in the environmental community still believe that they could do
better litigating under the ESA. They argue that CalFed has focused on plans that will increase
storage and exports of water at the expense of ecosystem restoration. The counterargument is
that the ESA simply cannot accomplish what environmentalists seek and that CalFed has
supplied hundreds of millions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of acre-feet of water more
than any regulatory/litigation strategy could ever produce. In any event, it would be surprising
to hear stakeholders brimming with satisfaction, because they continue to believe that during
the implementation phase it is in their strategic interest to remain unsatisfied.
226. Wright Interview, supra note 139, at 3.
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stakeholders with the resources not only to keep up, but to hire their
own technical staff to work with the agencies in developing options
227
and recommendations. And some agencies, like USBR, have closer
“client” relationships with their stakeholders which can help those
stakeholders stay involved; environmental interests may not enjoy the
same advantage.228 Finally, there may be a tradeoff between
transparency and speed: more open, deliberative processes like this
can be slower than traditional top-down approaches and can try the
patience.
That the Program is dependent on continued support from
moderate stakeholders is both a strength and weakness. On the one
hand, large policy leaps may be less likely in a context in which the
center must hold. As a result, perhaps more radical, and arguably
superior, solutions never materialize, or when they do, they might
quickly be ruled out. For example, in the ecosystem restoration
program, the Authority has largely abandoned land acquisitions and
chosen instead to procure easements because opposition to purchases
is so strong among local governments and agricultural interests.229 At
the same time, however, the checks and balances among the
stakeholders and agencies, and between the state legislature and
Congress, have been absolutely critical to the program’s success.
Without consistent pressure from all sides forcing the players through
the CalFed process, the Program’s stability would be threatened.
Until recently, no major stakeholders had a viable alternative to
CalFed. Although some groups have pursued litigation on individual
issues, for the most part, they have been unable to do complete end-

227. Id. According to Wright, the environmental and public interest groups have a hard time
even keeping track of the program’s activities, and thus tend to be much more reactive. “It’s
also their culture,” he says, “to expect that the agencies will do their jobs according to the
traditional model even without their involvement.” Id.
228. In the case of CalFed, the issue is compounded by the historically close relationship
between USBR and DWR and their contractors: “Because they view their contractors as their
primary customers, they meet frequently to share information and shape policy. This
relationship generally does not exist between the fisheries agencies and the environmental
community.” Id. The relative ability of the water users to influence the process erupted into the
media in the fall of 2004, when environmental groups complained that they were being shut out
of deals brokered between the users and the agencies. See, e.g., Boxall, supra note 221
(describing the controversy); Stuart Leavenworth, Major Shift Mapped for Delta Water,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 26, 2004, at A1 (quoting an environmentalist reacting to being shut
out of recent talks as stating that “[i]t is clear that major agencies are acting outside of CalFed”).
229. Wright Interview, supra note 139, at 3.
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runs around CalFed through state or federal administrative or
230
legislative action.
As this Article goes to press, however, the consensus support for
CalFed has begun to weaken, exposing its political vulnerability.
CalFed has always enjoyed very strong state and federal support: the
Wilson and Davis administrations in California provided leadership in
the face of stakeholder opposition, and the Clinton administration
signaled its consistent support for the Program through the active
participation of Secretary Babbitt, who regularly attended high-level
meetings and helped to broker impasses. Yet times have changed.
The Bush administration has resisted cooperative efforts with the
231
state for reasons that are not entirely clear. For example, although
Congress recently passed legislation authorizing federal agency
representatives to vote at BDA meetings (giving them authorization
they previously lacked, which had limited their effectiveness), the
Bush appointees from these agencies only rarely attend Authority
meetings. The relative indifference of the Bush administration to
CalFed, compared to its predecessor, is plain to participants.232
At the same time, the new Governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger,
does not appear to be as committed to CalFed as previous
233
Governors. His administration has never thrown its weight behind
CalFed as a Program or the BDA as a governance structure. The
reasons for this are a matter of speculation. The Schwarzenegger
administration seems, as a general matter, to disfavor independent
boards and commissions like the BDA—the Governor called in 2004
for a massive state re-organization, called the California Performance
Review, to eliminate most of these independent entities and integrate
their functions into existing executive agencies.234 The BDA is even

230. Id.
231. It appears that the administration prefers to settle disputes with water contractors
privately, through litigation, without engaging a multistakeholder process. See Interview with
Patrick Wright [hereinafter Wright Interview] (July 19, 2005) (describing the relative
infrequency with which federal agency officials attend Authority meetings).
232. See id. (citing the lack of federal leadership and noting that it’s “not a coincidence that
under [President] Clinton there was [a] strong presence from [Secretary] Babbitt”).
233. See E-mail from Paula Daniels, Regional Member of the Bay-Delta Authority, to Jody
Freeman [hereinafter Daniels E-mail] (July 28, 2005) (noting the general lack of leadership and
support from the Governor’s office felt by members of the BDA) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
234. See Jody Freeman, Editorial, Schwarzenegger’s Power Grab: Reform Proposal would
Hand Many Key Decisions to the Governor’s Appointees, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2004, at B11
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more unusual in its governance structure and mission than the
majority of California’s independent agencies, so it is possible that the
Schwarzenegger administration is simply flexing its executive muscle
and wishes to integrate the BDA’s functions into an executive agency
like the DWR. It is also possible that the administration, which
inherited the BDA and had no political stake in its creation, simply
does not know what to make of it.
It is in this context—the context of a relative leadership
vacuum—that in recent months the Program has come in for a
scathing round of criticism. Despite substantial investment in species
recovery, environmentalists have charged that not enough is being
done to protect endangered species and insist pumping should slow
235
until the species recover. Water users, meanwhile, complain that no
new reservoirs have been built and push for a commitment to
increase pumping capacity, even though CalFed-funded water
conservation projects have yielded the same benefits as two or three
good-sized dams at a fraction of the cost. None of these criticisms and
demands is especially new, but in the past they have been met with
strong resistance from both the state and the federal governments.
Individual CalFed agencies knew that they could not circumvent the
CalFed process and strike private deals with stakeholders without
being brought up short. At critical moments, attempts by one or the
other interest group to do such end-runs would be met with a firm
message that the process to use—the only process—was CalFed.236
Support from the Schwarzenegger administration and the
California legislature is particularly necessary in late 2005, as CalFed
begins to run out of money. It was extremely fortunate that the
CalFed ROD was adopted at a time when both the state and federal
237
budget surpluses were at an all time high. CalFed supporters
managed to pass three water-related bond measures for CalFed in the
first four years of the program,238 which generated almost $3 billion in

(describing the California Performance Review and criticizing the governor’s attempt to take
control of independent agencies).
235. See supra note 221.
236. Interview with Mary Nichols (July 19, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
237. Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 3. The CalFed agencies have spent roughly three
billion dollars in the first four years following the adoption of the ROD. CAL. BAY-DELTA
PROGRAM, supra note 118, at 5. That money may not have been available if the timing had been
different.
238. Of the $6 billion raised for water projects in the state from Propositions 50, 204, and 13,
CalFed was allocated approximately $2 billion. The program has thus far spent $400 million
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funding for CalFed. Most of that funding has already been spent, as
noted, on program implementation: groundwater, recycling, and
other water conservation projects designed to shore up water supply
reliability; ecosystem restoration projects; and water quality
improvements. Yet the bond money has nearly run out and there is
now significant disagreement over how, and at what level, to continue
239
to fund the Program.
In late 2004, the BDA proposed a ten-year, $8 billion financing
plan. The plan calls for a combination of state and federal monies as
well as user fees, which are designed to ensure that the farmers and
cities that benefit from increased water supply reliability pay their fair
share of the program’s costs. Such fees would help to ensure the
future financial stability of CalFed in the face of a state budget
240
crisis. To succeed, however, the finance plan would require the
political backing of both the state legislature and the Governor, which
241
has not been forthcoming. Governor Schwarzenegger had originally
promised to support the BDA’s plan but ultimately reneged and
242
instead called for CalFed to be audited and scaled back. The
Governor’s decision sent a powerful message to the Authority, most
of whose public appointees were not even consulted,243 that its role
from Proposition 50, $385 million from Proposition 204, and $440 million from Proposition 13,
for a total of approximately $1.2 billion. As a result, just under $1 billion remains from these
bond funds. CAL. BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, supra note 118, at 56. See supra note 194 for a
description of the bond effort.
239. See Jody Freeman, Why is Arnold Afraid of the Water?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, at
M1 (describing the Bay-Delta Authority’s proposal to impose user fees on farmers and cities to
finance the plan, and describing the Governor’s resistance to user fees).
240. The Authority’s financial plan, including user fees, had been painstakingly negotiated
among all the stakeholders. User fees are contentious but they were envisioned in the original
ROD. See Wright Interview, supra note 231 (discussing the negotiation of the finance plan).
241. See Freeman, supra note 239 (describing Governor Schwarzenegger’s decision to
renege on a commitment to support user fees and the legislature’s decision to attack the BayDelta Authority’s plan); see also Bruce Babbitt & Douglas Wheeler, The Fluid State of Liquid
Politics, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2005, at B13 (explaining the contentiousness over user fees and
providing a rationale for cost sharing among users and the public).
242. See Freeman, supra note 239 (“The governor was expected in May [2005] to issue his
proposals for user fees and defend the water-sharing program. Instead, Schwarzenegger
further delayed his proposals and called for the program to be audited and scaled back.”); Dana
Nichols & Hank Shaw, Departure Called ‘Serious Blow,’ STOCKTON RECORD, May 26, 2005
(citing Governor Schwarzenegger’s “plan to review all of CALFED’s efforts and come up with a
new, 10-year plan for the program by Nov. 1[, 2005]”); GOVERNOR’S BUDGET 2005–06, 3940
WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD (Jan. 10, 2005) (citing decreased funding for CalFed as
a “Major Program Change”), at http://govbud.dof.ca.gov/StateAgencyBudgets/3890/3940/
department.html (last modified Jan. 7, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
243. Daniels E-mail, supra note 233.
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244
would be further reduced. Authority Staff Director Patrick Wright
and Chief Scientist Johnnie Moore resigned.245 For their part,
legislators attacked the finance plan as totally unrealistic—citing the
Governor’s lack of support—and threatened to cut funding to CalFed
to “life support levels,” declining the opportunity to act
independently to approve user fees legislatively.246 Neither the
Governor nor the legislature appears to be willing to support user
fees, which have long been contentious, because they are vulnerable
to being viewed as a “tax.”
These recent events have made clear that some of the potential
strengths of the BDA have turned out to be weaknesses as well. The
BDA has no powerful client constituency to defend it, but virtually
every agency and stakeholder has reasons to oppose it. How does one
defend an entity that no one has heard of, that operates by jawboning
and cajoling, on grounds that it does things like “make better science
available” and “improve a complex planning process” when people
are pointing to dead fish in the Delta? Its dual charges—to coordinate
agency action but also to supervise the agencies and hold them
accountable—may be incompatible. In the coming months, the BDA
may be restructured to address this kind of problem, or simply
eliminated in favor of allowing the DWR to absorb CalFed. The
Governor asked the state’s Little Hoover Commission to study the

244. Some state officials and water contractors have been suggesting that DWR take over
most of CalFed’s operations. To the delight of the water contractors who stand to gain from this
move, DWR staff are currently overseeing the Authority staff and the Independent Science
Program. Subsuming CalFed into an existing agency such as DWR is likely to undermine some
of its best features: independence, innovation, transparency, and flexibility. DWR has always
been an agency that serves its water user clients. It is hard to imagine that the agency can
manage the SWP, which pumps and delivers water to its client users, and simultaneously
manage the water supply for the wide variety of other goals and interests that are part of the
CalFed program. Conflicts among the narrow perspectives of the agencies were the driving
force behind CalFed’s creation in the first place.
245. Nichols & Shaw, supra note 242; Press Release, State of California Resources Agency,
CalFed Director Patrick Wright Reassigned to Resources Agency (May 25, 2005), available at
http://calwater.ca.gov/Newsroom/NewsReleases_2005/Resources_Agency_Wright_Grindstaff_
Announcement_5-25-05.pdf.
246. Mike Taugher, Despite Spending Billions, CalFed Can’t Fix Delta, CONTRA COSTA
TIMES, May 1, 2005, at F4. See Miller Demands Answers on Delta, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, May
7, 2005, at A1 (noting that the BDA released an $8 billon 10-year plan); Hank Shaw, Closing
down CalFed; Funding for Delta Water Project Likely to Get Yanked, STOCKTON RECORD,
April 20, 2005 (quoting State Senator Sheila Kuehl as saying, “CALFED is doomed to a pretty
thin gruel for funding this year”).
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program and make recommendations, a process that is ongoing as this
247
article goes to press.
Still, despite these developments, the CalFed story contains the
seeds of a truly different approach to complex environmental and
natural resource management problems. CalFed suggests at least the
possibility of overcoming the traditional fractured regime. The
challenge, as with all aspects of such a complex process, is to see
down the road to what will be necessary at each stage of
implementation, and to build alliances strong enough to overcome
inevitable resistance from one quarter or another. It may not be
possible to insulate experiments like CalFed from political and
economic swings for long enough to see what they can accomplish.
Recent events only underscore how fragile these efforts are. Yet
despite its imperfections, and regardless of its future, CalFed has
already provided a powerful illustration of what we think of as
modular environmental regulation.
III. TOWARD A THEORY OF MODULARITY
In this Part, drawing on our CalFed case study, we distill our
modular theory into its basic building blocks. We also draw on
promising analogies of modularity from other contexts. In the final
Part, we consider some obstacles to the more general emergence and
proliferation of modular environmental regulation.
A. The Constituent Parts of Modularity
A key aspect of modularity is flexibility and coordination, both
within and across agencies and among levels of government. In
addition, modularity envisions that these agency parts and subparts
will interact with a host of private actors. Further, modularity requires
that institutional form follow function wherever possible, meaning
that the goal of the modular enterprise is first to diagnose problems
and second to devise solutions and match institutions capable of
implementing them. Modularity also features agreement-based
regulation in addition to more traditional regulatory tools. It also
depends upon and promotes social learning. Modularity requires, in
addition, adaptive processes capable of generating and incorporating

247. Letter from Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger to California’s Little Hoover
Commission (Jan. 6, 2005), available at http://cpr.ca.gov/pdf/lhc_letter.pdf.
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new information. Finally, modularity demands multiple avenues for
stakeholder participation. All of this is well illustrated by CalFed.
1. Overcoming Regulatory Fracture Through Coordination. By
laying the basis for greater interagency coordination, modular
structures help to overcome the fractured assignment of regulatory
power that generally characterizes environmental regulation and
natural resource management. As we have argued, the current
structure of cooperative federalism and the narrow focus of agencies
that have an impact on environmental resources impedes attempts to
engage in integrated environmental planning and implementation.
The diffusion of authority across agencies at all levels of government
can result in a vacuum of leadership for larger, systemwide
problems.248 In the CalFed example, the EPA focuses on water
quality, fish and wildlife agencies focus on species protection, and
water agencies deal with supply. There are also procedural aspects of
the administrative process that can impede collaboration. For
example, in Rieke’s view, the federal primacy and relatively closed
nature of the ESA consultation process, which has no public
participation component, makes stakeholders feel excluded and
allows states to argue that federal agencies improperly interfere with
state resource management prerogatives.249 Rieke also recounts how
other, more generic aspects of the administrative process can polarize
stakeholders. For example, prior to CalFed, the federal government
had traditionally conducted oversight of state water quality standards
primarily through rulemaking, which does not lend itself to
cooperative engagement with states and stakeholders across multiple

248. These divisions make it difficult to respond to complex environmental problems. This is
especially true if the environmental problem itself crosses jurisdictional boundaries (e.g.,
between states), but even when it does not, divided authority over a single resource can lead to
enormous coordination problems. Things become yet more complicated where the
environmental problem involves more than one medium, or when a single resource, such as
water, has multiple environmental effects. Moreover, as we have argued, the interactive and
second order effects of environmental harms can be very difficult to control with media-specific
approaches. Frequently, attempts to remediate one environmental problem simply result in
substitution or transfer of a different problem to another medium, as when scrubbers remove
toxic air pollutants only to create a toxic sludge by-product, which must be deposited on land; or
when fuel additives designed to produce cleaner burning fuel contaminate drinking water
supplies, as with MTBE. See generally Paul Weiland & Robert Vos, Reforming EPA’s
Organizational Structure: Establishing an Adaptable Agency through Ecostate Regions, 42 NAT.
RESOURCES. J. 91 (2002) (proposing a more flexible agency approach for the EPA).
249. Rieke, supra note 97, at 357–58; see Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536 (2000) (explaining the consultation process).
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250
issues. In describing the rulemaking process, Rieke echoes others
who criticize rulemaking: “Each side stakes out a public position that
it tends to defend against all criticism. Both the state and the
regulated community feel excluded from meaningful participation in
the policy formulation process.”251
Interagency coordination can come from transforming a conflict
into a set of questions about a problem. For example, instead of
separating water allocation from water quality issues and assigning
them to different agencies, the CalFed process bundled these matters
together, which helped to shift things from a zero-sum conflict to a set
of problems that required an integrated and coordinated approach.
This is what we mean by adopting a “problem-shed” focus. Instead of
circumscribing their reach geographically (i.e., by focusing on what
each agency could physically control) and observing jurisdictional
boundaries (i.e., by focusing on what each agency was legally
authorized to control), agencies and stakeholders began to think
more comprehensively about the collection of problems and activities
that contributed to the inability of the Bay Delta to perform its
desired functions. Former Resources Secretary Nichols describes the
shift in terms of framing: “It focused on who is doing what with the
water. The wrong question is, ‘Can we regulate them’? The right
question is, ‘Who is contributing to the problem’? And we worry
about what to do later.”252
Similarly, instead of looking at each agency’s narrow statutory
mandate (e.g., at the federal level, the EPA regulates water quality,
whereas DOI and DOC manage endangered species protection),
CalFed adopted a broader approach: “You say to each agency, even if
this isn’t your responsibility historically, you too should participate in
the decision.”253 The purpose of this exercise was to explore the
capacity of the Bay-Delta system, determine the range of demands
placed on it, and then devise a plan for satisfying those demands.
Ideally, such an inquiry would proceed without initial regard for
traditional jurisdictional or legal limitations. And to some extent, for

250. Rieke, supra note 97, at 357.
251. Id. This is by now a familiar criticism of traditional agency rulemaking procedures. See
Freeman, supra note 6, at 3 (pointing out the shortcomings of the traditional notice and
comment process); see also Harter, supra note 51, at 7 (proposing negotiations between affected
parties in lieu of formalized rulemaking procedures).
252. Nichols Interview, supra note 165.
253. Id.
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some periods during the CalFed negotiations, these appear to have
been pushed to the background. Of course the default legal regime
still affected the participants’ perception of their entitlements. It
seems fair to say that the nature of the undertaking changed with
CalFed. No longer could each stakeholder maintain its single-issue
focus. Neither could agencies ignore aspects of the Delta on the
theory that it was some other agency’s problem.
2. Form Following Function. Modularity requires that form
follow function. We mean this as both a logical interconnection and
an evolutionary one. This is exemplified in the CalFed process. The
first federal attempt to adopt a more integrated regulatory approach
to Delta issues resulted in an institutional overlay that took the form
of Club-Fed, the four-agency commitment to coordinate regulatory
activities. This evolved organically and iteratively in response to
failures of the background regime embodied in the statutes:
There was no comprehensive procedural framework agreed upon in
advance and designed to be implemented in a step-by-step manner.
Rather, the components of the overlay emerged on an ad hoc basis.
Whenever it was clear that the existing mechanisms were
inadequate, a new component was devised to address the unresolved
254
problems.

This same step-by-step institutional innovation developed during
negotiation of the ROD, which ultimately resulted in creating the
Policy Group, which in turn expanded and became formally
institutionalized as the Bay-Delta Authority. The CalFed process had
generated a new governance structure, but this occurred only after
the components of a comprehensive plan made the need for that
structure clear. The BDA was designed neither to replace agencies
nor to merge them. It was not created to compete with them for
funding or intrude too heavily upon their budgetary authority.
Instead, the BDA was to add value primarily by coordinating and
facilitating action while taking the long and systemwide view.
Although the BDA was not given control of member agencies’
budgets, in practice, the requirement that the program’s
implementation activities be balanced among the various program
objectives arguably established a significant constraint on the

254.

Rieke, supra note 97, at 358–59.
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255
agencies’ traditional independence. This requirement conceivably
allows the BDA to point out that some programs are significantly
underfunded compared to others, which could influence funding
256
allocations in the following year. With sufficiently expert staff to
make recommendations credible, sufficiently high-level appointments
to lend them authority, and carefully tended public input to ensure
responsiveness and accountability, institutions like the BDA
represent a promising innovation.
CalFed offers the best example of form following function in
environmental and natural resource management contexts that we
have come across. There are other examples of governance structures
emerging in a seemingly similar way (the Chesapeake Bay Program
comes to mind), but none with which we are familiar have managed
to do this while also accomplishing the other things we have
identified: interagency coordination, agreement-based regulation,
social learning, adaptation, and extensive stakeholder participation.
Most of the initiatives with which CalFed might be compared involve
one or two of these features, and most remain driven by one key (and
usually federal) agency.257

255. See supra notes 179–83 and accompanying text.
256. For example, in Years 1–4 of CalFed, ecosystem restoration projects received $653
million and water conservation recycling projects received $486 million. In contrast, levee
restoration projects received just $83 million and drinking water projects received just $93
million. CAL. BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, supra note 118, at 56.
257. While we cannot do a comprehensive comparison here, many other programs, such as
the Great Lakes National Program and the Everglades Restoration Program, appear to be
multiagency efforts but are in fact driven largely by a single agency. See Stephen S. Light et al.,
The Everglades: Evolution of Management in a Turbulent Ecosystem, in BARRIERS & BRIDGES
TO THE RENEWAL OF ECOSYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS 103, 114 (Lance H. Gunderson et al.
eds., 1995) (“The federal operations or participation in water management in the Everglades
has been historically entrusted to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers . . . .”); THE
COMPREHENSIVE EVERGLADES RESTORATION PLAN, THE DEVELOPMENT TEAM (stating that
“[d]evelopment of the [Everglades] Plan . . . was led by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Jacksonville District [while] many other federal, state, tribal and local agencies were active
partners” in its development), at http://www.evergladesplan.org/about/rest_plan.cfm (updated
June 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, GREAT
LAKES REGIONAL COLLABORATION: FACT SHEET ON THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS
IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION (identifying the EPA as the lead agency in the Great Lakes
National Program), at http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/collaboration/taskforce/factsheet.html (last
updated March 22, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Of those initiatives that do
feature a greater degree of interagency coordination, none appears to cover the multiple
objectives that CalFed does. For example, they may focus on ecosystems without dealing with
water supply and reliability.
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3. Agreement-Based Regulation.
A modular structure’s
authority is derived from the participants, and it can only operate on
the basis of their agreement. Throughout the CalFed process,
agreements, both formal and informal, appear more prevalent than
rules, limits, and prohibitions. Not that rules are unimportant. As
agencies turn to implementation, they rely on their traditional
regulatory authority and will of course employ the conventional tools
of regulation. But these are not the focus of discussion initially.
Because modularity amounts to a movement toward agreement-based
regulation and management, it shifts the regulatory spotlight to a host
of instruments that do not generally attract much attention in either
administrative or environmental law. These include RODs, MOUs
and Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs), Annual Work Plans, and
even things called “Packages,” which serve to memorialize
commitments. The range of potentially useful agreement-based
instruments is quite broad. In addition to those used in the CalFed
example, one could imagine bilateral interagency agreements,
interstate compacts, and multistate or regional resolutions.
How general or specific should these agreements be? Who ought
to sign them? What are the accountability mechanisms for ensuring
that commitments are kept? How should they be updated over
time?258 These are the kinds of questions modularity situates at the
center of environmental regulation and resource management. Again,
the focus on agreement does not preclude a further and equally
important set of questions about which tools to use for
implementation. Indeed, it lays the groundwork for this second stage.
One can imagine, for example, an ecosystem restoration plan
depending in part on traditional standard setting for point sources of
water pollution, in part on creating an effluent trading program to
help reduce nonpoint source pollution, and in part on a cooperative
effort among agencies to divert water in real time in response to the
demonstrated needs of competing users.
Sometimes, moreover, a “regulatory” or “management” solution
will emerge that seems unfamiliar. What, after all, is the EWA? It
operates like a bank account of water, on which customers can draw,

258. As we saw with CalFed, agreements require regular updating to recommit participants
to their agreements and to allow for greater specificity as things change over time. See supra
note 200 and accompanying text. We imagine a kind of “iterative agreement regime,” in which
existing agreements provide enough stability for work to move forward, but where, over time,
they become stale.
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yet there is a baseline amount of water that the CalFed agencies have
agreed to set aside for fish. And these minimum amounts are based,
in part, upon what statutes and regulations would have required in
259
the traditional process. The EWA depends, therefore, on the
background legal regime for its baseline. Yet ultimate allocations will
depend on competing needs in circumstances that are quite dynamic.
This is not a conventional prescriptive tool, nor is it a functioning
market-based instrument.260
Interestingly, there is not an Administrative Procedure Act
“agency decision” to be found here: no rulemaking, no adjudication.
Instead, we find a collection of expert agency staff from different
(historically opposed) agencies, receiving input from different
(historically opposed) nongovernmental stakeholders, who are
themselves neither elected nor appointed, exercising discretion in real
time based on imperfect and regularly updated data, all answering to
a coordinating “Authority” comprised of federal and state officials
together with “public” appointees, which is counseled by a public
advisory body but which has no independent regulatory power! This
is not what we are used to in administrative and environmental law.
This is modularity.
We would expect, in an agreement-based system, to see a mix of
implementation tools that are as flexible and problem-derived as the
initial agreements on project goals. But the choice of tools flows from
the identification of the key principles, which take the form of mutual
promises. In the context of negotiating a comprehensive agreement,
the idea of an abstract preference for “market” versus “prescriptive”
tools seems both premature and nonsensical. Implementation might
involve traditional rulemaking and permitting, but also, conceivably,
market trading schemes and information-forcing mechanisms, all
deployed in an organized way to implement different aspects of a
comprehensive plan. Although dimensions of the plan might
ultimately be promulgated as traditional regulations, other aspects
may take the form of quasi-contractual and relatively informal
instruments. Similarly, participants in modular systems need to think
creatively about funding. They may draw on a variety of financing

259. Brandt, supra note 161, at 439.
260. An economist might propose a market mechanism as an alternative, but we doubt that
such a market would be feasible because the rapidly shifting information base would make
stable entitlements difficult to create. It would also be difficult to distribute initial entitlements
to environmental participants.
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tools, including federal and state appropriations, user fees, taxes, self261
supporting bonds (which California uses to help support CalFed), or
perhaps in some cases, power revenues.
Modular regulation relies, therefore, on a broad range of both
regulatory tools and funding mechanisms to supplement the more
traditional regulatory tools with which we are relatively familiar. And
implementing these tools will require parties to negotiate agreements
that look as much “contractual” as they are regulatory. As we saw
with CalFed, these agreements have the advantage of flexibility. They
can be modified more easily than rules. Yet this flexibility also
presents a challenge because agreements must be updated on a
regular basis. The revision process can serve important functions,
however. It can remind parties of their commitments, force them to
account for their actions, and incorporate new priorities and
information as it develops over time.
4. Facilitating Social Learning. Modularity facilitates learning
and incorporates useful information into decision making processes.
Advocates of “adaptive management” routinely call for this kind of
information-rich process.262 Yet it can be difficult to find good
examples of it, in part because contemporary environmental
regulation and natural resource management have been shaped by a
legal regime that too often promotes the careful hoarding of
information and fails to build in mechanisms for environmental
agencies to learn from their actions.
Modularity both depends upon and promotes “social learning,”
which usually arises in more deliberative or collaborative processes in
which participants with different perspectives interact, exchange
information and arguments, and become open to the reformulation of
263
goals and/or strategies. When we say “become open,” we do not
mean anything magical, only that in settings like this, the presentation
of data and argument can lead people to change their minds,
especially when the alternative to working together is highly

261. See Connick & Innes, supra note 170, at 185 (noting that “otherwise opposing
stakeholders jointly developed and publicly supported two major statewide ballot initiatives to
raise nearly $3 billion for environmental restoration, water quality improvement, water use
efficiency and water supply facilities”).
262. E.g., KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLITICS
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 8–9 (1993).
263. On the concept of social learning, see Daniel Fiorino, Rethinking Environmental
Regulation: Perspectives on Law and Governance, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 459–64 (1999).
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undesirable (e.g., continued stalemate or very costly adversarial
options with high uncertainty as to outcome). This approach departs
significantly from the adjudicative model that has long dominated
environmental regulation and natural resource management. It moves
away, that is, from a system focused on resolving which party is right,
in favor of a deliberative model focused on determining what to do
and how best to do it.
In settings conducive to social learning, the participants might
interact in a number of ways—direct and indirect, formal and
informal—and “not just in the highly structured ways associated with
264
conventional rule-making.” The purpose here is to move beyond a
more traditional understanding of agency process, one in which
interest groups submit their views to an agency charged with receiving
them—a process that suggests unidirectional information
transmission with little opportunity for substantive and flexible give
and take, and in which all of the participants see the agency as
retaining exclusive ownership over the key matters to be decided.
To encourage the social learning that is necessary for modularity,
participants must maximize opportunities for both sharing and
developing information together.265 Conceivably this information
would include not only technical and scientific data, but also
information about industrial processes or agency practices, along with
background information about assumptions, interests, and
perspectives. Under the proper circumstances, changes in viewpoint
within such groups can occur “mainly as a result of processes much
more like the deliberative model than like the groupthink model
emphasizing social conformity.”266 The best group decisions seem to
result when the parties are operating under “flexible rigidity,” with
267
high thresholds for acceptable outcomes. Ideally, such an approach
substitutes a problem orientation for the traditional focus on
competition, while at the same time giving participants “a relatively
268
high minimum outcome they should be willing to settle for.”
Stringent prescriptive regulations can play an important shadow role

264. Id. at 460.
265. Fiorino, supra note 263, at 460; see also Freeman & Langbein, supra note 7, at 62
(discussing learning as one of the most frequently reported benefits of regulatory negotiation).
266. Steven Kelman, Adversary and Cooperationist Institutions for Conflict Resolution in
Public Policymaking, 11 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 178, 193 (1992).
267. Id. at 194.
268. Id.

101805 01_FREEMANFARBER.DOC

2005]

12/12/2005 3:09 PM

MODULAR ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

885

269
by establishing a compelling need for problem solving, as the ESA
listing process and the CWA requirements for water quality standards
did in the CalFed process. Approaches that facilitate social learning
increase the chances that agencies and stakeholders will devise
innovative solutions that none of them individually would have
conceived, let alone implemented. Although we recognize that this
kind of exchange, interaction, and information production could
conceivably occur in a traditional regulatory process such as notice
and comment rulemaking, we think it fair to say that what we
describe here would be the exception rather than the rule in the
traditional context. Modular approaches, by contrast, are selfconsciously designed to foster the kind of information-rich, highly
interactive joint exercise we have in mind.270
Empirical evidence suggests that such interactions can have
positive effects. They can promote a disposition to cooperate, lead to
new ways of thinking, contribute to the development of new group
271
norms, improve once-adversarial relationships, and help to build
272
trust. These positive benefits are likely to accrue, we propose, in
situations where parties are encouraged to share the data on which
their judgments are based and defend those judgments directly to
each other.273 Again, we hasten to add a caveat: participants in
longstanding environmental and natural resource conflicts will not
lightly abandon their traditional interests. The point is simply that
well-designed and effectively managed processes can encourage social
learning through joint ownership of a problem, information sharing,

269. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979) (“We see the primary function of
contemporary divorce law not as imposing order from above, but rather as providing a
framework within which divorcing couples can themselves determine postdissolution rights and
responsibilities.”).
270. See Kelman, supra note 266, 186–87 (explaining the phenomenon of social learning).
271. See id. at 185–86 (identifying how institutions that foster cooperation “encourag[e]
participants to value and respect others”).
272. See Connick & Innes, supra note 170, at 180 (referring to collaborative policymaking
and arguing that agreements can be important as markers but that “[w]hat are less ephemeral
are the relationships, practices, norms and behaviours that emerge and persist”).
273. See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 13 (1987) (arguing that
consensual decision making produces public policy that will “avoid stalemate, reduce the need
for litigation, and restore the credibility of government”); Lawrence Susskind & Merrick
Hoben, Making Regional Policy Dialogues Work: A Credo for Metro-Scale Consensus Building,
22 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 123, 127–30 (2004) (explaining how a modular approach is
optimal in addressing a hypothetical intermunicipal conflict).
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and focused articulation of rationales. In so doing, they can increase
the prospects for generating useful information. Whether that
information is in fact incorporated into decision making requires
another step, of course, but that it be generated in the first instance is
necessary.
The EWA illustrates how process design can be so closely linked
to substantive policy development that the line between the two
seems to blur. First, recall that the EWA only surfaced once federal
and state officials, and other stakeholders with relevant expertise,
began to focus together on how to meet all of the Delta’s competing
needs at a time of crisis. Although some of the building blocks of the
EWA were already in place before CalFed—agency coordination on
the Accord standards and the beginnings of shared expertise—water
operators could not run the pumps in a “real time way” because they
were bound to meet the prescriptive standards set under the ESA.
This, and the preoccupation of the stakeholders with competition
over the resource, made it difficult for an alternative like the EWA to
take shape as a policy. It only surfaced, and then developed into an
option that could be implemented, when key players were asked
under pressure to find new ways to cooperate.
The EWA was developed through a yearlong process—begun
even earlier by the Ops Group—that required intense cooperation
between the water agencies and the fisheries agencies, but it
depended to a significant extent on other stakeholders like the
powerful Metropolitan Water District and knowledgeable
representatives from the environmental community. Together, the
participants created technical teams to build and run water supply
models of water delivery for multiple purposes. These modeling
games depended on “real data on hydrology, project operations, and
fish populations from past years, to experiment with different ways of
managing the system” and represented “a turning point.”274 Quoting
from an interview published in Estuary magazine, Hudzik recounts
how one CalFed staff member described the process:
It’s like playing three-dimensional chess all day long. When we get
out of the gaming room, we’re all brain dead. But the work that
follows the game is even more important. For every eight hours of
gaming it takes another 12 hours to figure out if we did any good.

274. Hudzik, supra note 142, at 47. Hudzik’s article provides a comprehensive analysis of the
EWA. Id. at 45–51.
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Did we do better than a standard? Did we make more water? Did
275
we use it more efficiently? How many fish did we lose?

According to Wright, this was an innovation that could only have
been accomplished by challenging the monopoly on expertise claimed
by agencies like USBR and DWR, agencies that had historically been
reluctant to try to satisfy multiple demands and which, as a result,
lacked credibility in the environmental community. Yet water
districts with no such prior commitments or political baggage
emerged to offer stakeholders independent expertise on modeling.276
Similarly, on the environmental side, fish and wildlife agencies were
no longer the sole experts—the environmental and university
communities
had
become
equally
sophisticated.
This
“democratization of expertise” proved indispensable to devising the
EWA.277
The modeling games gave the engineers and scientists who
conducted them “an understanding of the water system as a whole
that went well beyond the understanding each of them had brought to
278
the process as individuals.”
Perhaps most striking, the EWA requires a close working
alliance among agencies that have been adversaries throughout the
Bay-Delta conflict. The two groups of agencies have very different
cultures and represent very different constituencies—constituencies
that generally prefer to sue each other rather than cooperate.
Running the EWA now requires that water project managers from
DWR and USBR (typically trained as engineers) and wildlife officials
from FWS and DFG (typically trained as biologists) work together to
operate the two water storage and conveyance facility networks in the
state. This alliance could produce a great deal of productive learning.
Engineers will learn more about listed fish species’ sensitivities.
Biologists will learn more about minimizing water project yield
costs. All will need to learn how to develop the EWA through
project reoperation [increased yield from operational adjustments
during periods when fish do not need water], taking advantage of
periods when the projects have minimal effect on fish and project
yield can grow. This deepening relationship between the ESA

275. Id. at 47–48 (internal quotation marks omitted).
276. Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 2.
277. See generally WONDOLLECK & YAFFEE, supra note 6 (providing case studies of
collaborative efforts).
278. Hudzik, supra note 142, at 48.
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Agencies and the Project Agencies offers one of the most important,
279
yet unstated, benefits from the EWA’s development.

The EWA illustrates the extent to which policy innovation can
be deeply dependent on process design. Modular structures are based
on this understanding. In addition, the example demonstrates that
something unexpected and productive can arise from a conflict-ridden
situation when incentives are realigned to promote social learning.
Remarkably, this can happen even when many of the background
legal constraints continue to exert a countervailing force on the
modular structure.
The learning process in modular initiatives may not look familiar,
and it may not work in an entirely linear or predictable way. An
example from the climate change context helps illustrate the way in
which a seemingly inchoate process can nevertheless be productive:
“Scientists may start with something they learned about the smoke
from volcanoes, put it alongside telescopic observations of Venus,
notice the chemistry of smog in Los Angeles, and plug it all into a
280
computer calculation about clouds.” This process “doesn’t look like
an exploring team moving into new territory. It looks more like a
crowd of people scurrying about, some huddling together to exchange
notes, others straining to hear a distant voice or shouting criticism
across the hubbub.”281 Our concept of modular regulation
contemplates somewhat more structure but shares this sense of
improvised interconnectivities.
5. Adaptation. Modular structures are designed to be adaptive,
meaning they must be flexible enough to absorb new information as it
develops.282 Because knowledge of environmental problems is so
dramatically incomplete, and because environmental systems are so
283
dynamic, regulatory and management institutions cannot be static.
The challenge is to ensure that the modular structure is responsive
and nimble enough to engage in dynamic learning, while being stable
enough to function effectively. We can break this into three
subproblems: (1) maintaining the necessary collection of information

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Brandt, supra note 161, at 448.
SPENCER WEART, THE DISCOVERY OF GLOBAL WARMING 193–94 (2003).
Id. at 194.
For a definition of adaptive management, see Karkkainen, supra note 6, at 202–04.
FARBER, supra note 6, at 179.
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by components of the modular system, (2) obtaining the needed flow
of information among components of the modular system, and (3)
keeping the organization flexible enough to respond to changing
information.
Consider the challenge posed by CalFed. Even with over twenty
expert government agencies and a wide variety of experienced
stakeholders participating in the process, the dearth of knowledge
about virtually every aspect of the Bay-Delta system is striking. What,
for example, is really responsible for the failing fish populations in the
Delta? The CalFed process cries out for scientific and technical
information. This, we believe, is a key aspect of modularity: modular
systems create institutions and structures aimed at generating and
using timely, high quality information while avoiding “battles of the
experts” that seek a single right answer. As Sam Luoma, CalFed’s
first Lead Scientist, saw it, the advocacy approach to science that
informed the pre-CalFed dispute was not very good at helping
decision makers address the gray areas “where the science is
uncertain and the decision-makers’ need for objective information is
284
the greatest.”
The Science Program helps to facilitate information collection
and processing, which has been a recurrent problem in environmental
regulation and natural resource management. This is enormously
expensive and time consuming, and it often lacks a constituency.
Indeed, interest groups sometimes would prefer to avoid the
collection of new information that might contradict their own
positions. By providing timely, useful, and highly credible
information, modular structures can help to foster a constituency of
“information consumers” in the form of other agencies and
stakeholders. This new constituency can then maintain a demand for
continued information collection. Again, the BDA’s role in
promoting the use of science across the agencies in every aspect of the
CalFed implementation process is instructive.
Even when the relevant information has been collected,
however, it may not reach the people who really need it, either
because of organizational reluctance to receive or share it, or both.
Even when information flows freely, the system may be too inflexible
to adapt to it, as when a change in direction would require not just a
new agreement but a new rulemaking process. Ideally, modular

284.

Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 26.
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processes provide mechanisms by which information can be directly
fed into the system, as the EWA example illustrates with its approach
to allocating water assets on an as-needed basis. This attitude toward
information generation and consumption departs significantly from
the approach that now dominates environmental law and natural
resource management, an approach exemplified by statutes like the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which requires agencies
to disclose impacts or collect data without necessarily requiring that
agencies put the data to productive use.285
Processes like CalFed can also spawn what we call
“submodularity,” a variety of smaller scale teams or components that
might address pieces of particular problems. These might take the
form of subcommittees of stakeholders and agencies, as occurs in
CalFed. Submodular structures like the BDPAC committees helped
to generate the DIP, the alternative strategy for fish screens and the
novel approach to water quality standards. Still more submodular
processes might emerge in CalFed over time. For example, if a
particular watershed within the larger Bay-Delta ecosystem is
identified as needing a restoration plan, a team can be assembled
specifically for that purpose, using staff from a variety of state,
federal, and local agencies, as well representatives from stakeholder
groups with relevant expertise. Indeed, submodular structures already
seem to be proliferating in CalFed. For example, regional and local
entities are increasingly exercising primary responsibility for
implementing the key actions in the ROD (e.g., in developing
watershed plans or integrated water management plans), which frees
the CalFed agencies to remain focused on systemwide
improvements.286 The agencies can also increase local knowledge of,
and support for, programmatic goals by providing financial and
technical assistance to submodular units. Indeed, Wright reports that
where CalFed is seen as a source of funding and technical assistance
for these efforts, local support for CalFed is stronger.287
Notice that these submodular structures do not permanently
rearrange existing bureaucracies. Instead, they are provisional units

285. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 905 (noting that critics
“bemoan the length and cost of the NEPA process [and] the spottiness and low overall quality
of the information it generates”).
286. Wright Notes, supra note 119, at 10.
287. Id.
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focused on a specific task. If they involve local participation, they may
be especially adept at responding to the needs and perspectives at the
county, district, or municipal level. And they may have the benefit of
transmitting that more local experience to higher-ups who may be less
familiar with how watersheds function locally. Ideally, submodular
structures provide the vehicle for information to flow in an organized
288
way throughout the larger modular system.
Submodularity may also enhance flexibility. Being able to
assemble problem-solving teams from particular agencies and
stakeholder groups offers a way to meet new challenges without
creating a rigid bureaucratic structure. The ability of modular and
submodular components to combine in different ways provides a way
of matching the right team with each problem. Modularity also helps
address another barrier to agency flexibility, which is simply the
inevitable fact that some agency officials are likely to be resistant to
change. Those officials may be valuable, and their lack of flexibility
289
may even be beneficial in tasks requiring central coordination. In
any event, agency employees will necessarily vary in their problemsolving orientation and ability to adapt to new circumstances.
Submodularity allows the most flexible individuals to be matched
with problem-solving tasks requiring flexibility, leaving their more
rigid colleagues to handle important but more routine tasks.290 These
personnel issues may seem petty compared with the grand issues of
regulatory or management reform, but in the end, the ability to
effectively use personnel is key to the success of any system and
especially critical when organizations are expected to adapt to
changing circumstances.
As we have suggested, modularity is meant to convey this kind of
institutional provisionalism. Without wishing to eliminate traditional
bureaucracies, we propose that their component parts can be
reconfigured into relatively larger and smaller structures for
particular purposes. This requires thinking about agencies in terms of
what they have to offer rather than how they usually act. Agencies
represent a collection of different expertise, perspectives, and tools.

288. The “No-Name” group played something akin to this role in supplying information to
the Ops Group and disseminating it back to stakeholders. Connick & Innes, supra note 170, at
189–90.
289. MALCOLM K. SPARROW, THE REGULATORY CRAFT: CONTROLLING RISKS, SOLVING
PROBLEMS, AND MANAGING COMPLIANCE 234 (2000).
290. Id. at 233–34.
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To reconfigure agencies effectively, of course, requires adopting a
problem solving orientation, in which the “trick is to define the
problem in the most natural and insightful terms, resisting the
temptation to force problems into the mold of existing programs or
291
bureaucratic structures.”
Far from addressing every aspect of a complex problem at the
same time, then, a modular approach requires careful delineation of
the matters that are most closely related and capable of being
addressed simultaneously or through coordinated action, both in the
short and longer term. Although this can sound abstract, it is in fact
rather intuitive and sensible. Think of a building contractor planning
and coordinating the many steps of construction in the context of
imperfect information: demolition, drywall, wiring, plumbing, and the
like. Some things must come before others; some must happen
simultaneously; a few are so interdependent that they must be
coordinated every step of the way. Some aspects of construction must
be done immediately, though others can be deferred into the future.
Unlikely things happen. And of course someone must keep paying
the bills. A successful modular system will match components and
subcomponents (teams and groups) with a defined set of tasks that
represent only part of the larger problem. In doing so, the
construction of the problems themselves will likely change. This is the
hallmark of an adaptive system: new information and experience
should help decision makers reconceptualize the challenges they face.
CalFed illustrates that this kind of adaptation can take place when, as
Nichols put it, you put the right people together in a room.
A related concern is the ability of modular structures to remain
flexible and responsive as new facts and circumstances arise, while
providing enough transparency to ensure that discretion is exercised
in an accountable manner. This is, of course, an exceedingly delicate
balance to strike. Traditionally in environmental law, as in
administrative law generally, we add procedures to constrain
discretion out of concern that too much flexibility will allow
administrators to operate irrationally or to act out of purely political
motives. Yet a modular approach requires at least some flexibility—
the process would grind to a halt if every agency decision were

291. Id. at 147. For example: “Ecosystem management structures (watershed-based
committees) can tackle ecosystem-shaped problems, but they are the wrong apparatus for
solving industry problems that straddle multiple watershed areas or for addressing household
threats.” Id.
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obligated to go through a cumbersome and relatively formal process.
Modular structures are characterized by at least as much informality
as the traditional administrative process (which has considerable
informality built into it despite the strictures of the Administrative
Procedure Act), and likely significantly more. Witness the
proliferation of informal instruments in CalFed, including the MOAs,
“packages” that require written commitments, and annual workplans
mentioned earlier. Certainly, these kinds of instruments might permit
a broader range of discretion than would rules and orders. And they
are easier to modify than regulations or enabling legislation.
Indeed, CalFed is a good example of how regulatory tools can
become more flexible over time, allowing decision makers more
discretion. Again, the EWA provides an example:
Before the Accord, . . . virtually all flow standards were expressed as
mean monthly instream flows. Compliance is easy to measure, but
otherwise this approach is not very effective in protecting fish that
may migrate at different times in different years. We now have a
more flexible set of tools, including the EWA . . ., and we even allow
some standards to be relaxed to bank the water later for fish. . . .
Under the old approach, the agencies simply monitored compliance
with the standards and updated them (usually as a result of
litigation) every decade or so through the adversarial process
established by the State Water Resources Control Board. The
agencies can now do experiments with these blocks of water and
change how they allocate supplies on a daily, monthly, or annual
basis, without going through any kind of formal regulatory process,
and in doing so, immediately take advantage of the scientific work
292
underway.

Of course, operational flexibility and informal regulatory tools,
as administrative and environmental law scholars well know, both
pose significant downside risks. The environmental community
involved in the CalFed process may worry that the much touted
“flexibility” of the collaborative process will really amount to a
consistent preference for, say, farmers over fish, when it comes to
allocating water. They might suspect that the regulatory baselines
292. Wright E-mail, supra note 139, at 6–7 (emphasis in original). Wright explains that “in
the first year of the EWA, the agencies allocated some of their EWA supplies to protect
migrating winter-run salmon.” Id. at 7. Then in later years, the scientific data showed little
evidence that pumping is a major concern for the winter-run, so the agencies allocated their
supplies to the Delta smelt instead. Id. Wright cites this as a good example of real-time
management made possible by the flexibility of the regulatory tools. Id.
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over which they have litigated so fervently will be undermined or
deferred until later in a highly discretionary and relatively invisible
293
process that is not as easy to monitor as lawsuits.
Such concerns are perfectly legitimate and they sound an
important note of caution. Ultimately, modular enterprises will
depend heavily on the capacity of the institutional framework to
deliver on its commitments or to offer credible explanations of why
progress may be slower than expected. This is the only way to build
trust. Still, in a multistakeholder environment where resources are
scarce and valuable, parties will always have reason to complain.
Even when they benefit, it will be simply against their long-term
interest in gaining even more to claim they have received enough.
The key, as Wright points out, is to hold the moderate center
together. Of course, it matters who the decision makers are in such
systems. If decision making becomes highly politicized, with wild
swings in orientation as administrations change, stakeholders will
conclude that the “balance” promised them will never materialize.
The institutional framework must provide some assurance of stability
for stakeholders to buy into it. This is why insulating decision makers
from political winds, to at least some extent, is crucial. The BDA’s
unique structure as an independent agency with a stakeholder
advisory group offers one example of an effort to avoid total
dominance by either the executive or the legislative branch, or by any
single agency.
6. Public Participation/Accountability.
Modular structures
require multiple avenues, formal and informal, for broad stakeholder
participation. Ideally, this not only improves the quality of decision
making but also to help provide accountability. The key difference
between participation in a modular process and the public
participation provided by traditional administrative process lies in the
diversity of roles that stakeholders can play; in a modular process
they both generate policy ideas and perform an accountability
function.
As we have already noted, stakeholder participation in the
CalFed process has been both highly varied and highly valuable. Like

293. For example, the commitments offered in the DIP, which promises greater flexibility in
Delta export pumping to make it easier to meet the program’s multiple objectives, could
conceivably result in excess pumping to the detriment of the fish. Id. The DIP commitments
have no legal force behind them. Id.
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most features of CalFed, the format of stakeholder participation has
evolved over time, but it has always proceeded simultaneously along
multiple tracks. The BDPAC is the most formalized avenue for
stakeholder input both to the Authority and the implementing
agencies, but there are numerous other channels. In some instances,
as with the EWA, stakeholders participate fairly directly in the sort of
operational decision making that is normally thought to be the
exclusive domain of agencies. Modular structures are characterized
by this kind of deep and broad stakeholder participation.
Indeed, sometimes stakeholder participation leads to real policy
shifts and new ideas, as we have seen not only with the development
and operation of the EWA but with the DIP and the ELPH strategy
as well. These examples demonstrate that stakeholder expertise can
be enormously valuable, as can their relative independence. Federal
and state agencies have no monopoly on the scientific and
technological knowledge required to address complex environmental
problems. This is not because average citizens living in local
watersheds necessarily have engineering degrees. The expertise in
which we are most interested likely resides in sophisticated local
institutions or interest groups with training, experience, and track
records. Perhaps surprisingly, it is not just that agencies can help to
mediate disputes among historically warring stakeholders but that
stakeholder involvement can help to overcome impasses between
historically opposed agencies.
Nevertheless, the inspirational stories of breakthroughs due to
stakeholder initiative are frequently enough balanced by more
depressing accounts of breakdowns, or of less than noble
participation—as when stakeholders remain active solely to protect
their interests, threatening all the while to do an end-run around the
process via litigation—to give us pause.294 And the problems are not
always caused by stakeholders. There can be instances in which
decision makers consult stakeholder groups in a pro forma way
simply to maintain the appearance of public consultation. Such
behavior can be expected to occur in collaborative processes that
depend on negotiation and compromise. The hope is that they can be
minimized.
Despite these shortcomings, the CalFed process represents an
improvement over the two most traditional mechanisms of public

294.

Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 4–5.
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involvement in agency decision making: the notice and comment
process for rulemaking and the EIS planning process under NEPA
and CEQA. These mechanisms provide only relatively infrequent and
superficial opportunities for consultation. In these processes the
agency (usually a single one) retains “ownership” over decision
making, and has relatively few, and often highly structured,
opportunities to hear from knowledgeable players. Moreover,
stakeholder participation will be most intense at peak-level moments,
as when a rule is proposed or an EIS is issued, rather than throughout
the life of planning and implementation. Stakeholders may find it
especially valuable to have an opportunity to influence decisions
made by agencies that are traditionally opposed to their interests. The
interagency processes and stakeholder fora in the CalFed process
afford opportunities for environmentalists to make some headway
with USBR, and for water contractors to have some impact on FWS.
B. Modular Analogs
We have tried to give the concept of modularity sufficient
content in the environmental context to enable someone to discern
whether a particular initiative can credibly claim to be modular. To
further illustrate what we have in mind, we draw in this section on
modular analogs that arise in fields far-removed from environmental
regulation.
In the computer industry, for example, modularity “means
organizing complements (products that work with one another) to
interoperate through public, nondiscriminatory, and well-understood
interfaces.”295 This might involve “[a]n open architecture [which] can
facilitate innovation in individual components” and allow “rapid trial296
Flexibility and the capacity to facilitate
and-error learning.”
learning are key features of a modular structure in this context.
Despite the obvious differences between the two settings,
designing software and designing organizations to tackle
environmental problems share some challenges. For example, both
settings call for systems capable of processing large amounts of
information and performing complex tasks. Both settings also raise

295. Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access
Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 85, 95 (2004).
296. Id. at 95; see also id. at 92 (noting that a modular structure “facilitated innovation in
ways that had not been matched with an integrated structure”).
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issues of transparency (needed by the software engineers for error
correction and later modification of software; needed by
environmental regulators for both error correction and public
accountability), and both must pay careful attention to linkages
between components to ensure they function without discord. Even
more concretely than in the environmental context, modularity in
software design refers to the extent to which an entity “can be broken
down into smaller components, or modules, that can be
independently and asynchronously produced before they are
297
assembled into a whole.” This captures the notion of building,
unbuilding, and rebuilding that we referred to earlier.298 Modularity
makes possible, among other things, the design of public source
software by multiple individuals, allowing scattered individuals to
rival the product of the world’s largest corporation.299
One of modularity’s key features is the coordination of existing
agencies for particular purposes, without necessarily creating
cumbersome new bureaucracies. Recall that the role of the BDA is to
facilitate and encourage this coordination. A modular system thus
300
facilitates the pooling of expertise from many different entities.
Transaction cost economics supplies a useful analog for this aspect of
modularity. Consider, for example, the so-called “make/buy” decision
that business enterprises confront when choosing whether to
outsource work to a network of suppliers rather than acquiring those
suppliers and integrating all operations within a single organization.301
According to transaction cost economists, there are limits to how
much activity a single organization can effectively control. For that

297. Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J.
369, 435 (2002).
298. In software design, for example, “[T]ransparent modularity permits code to be
modified; it permits one part to be substituted for another. The code then is open; the code is
modular; chunks could be moved and substituted for something else; many forks, or ways that
the code could develop, are possible.” Lawrence Lessig, Open Code and Open Societies: Value
of Internet Governance, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1405, 1415 (1999).
299. See Benkler, supra note 297, at 434–36 (describing how modularity plays a key role in
the efficiency of large-scale collaborations); Lessig, supra note 298, at 1410 (noting that some
believe Linux to be “the single greatest threat” to Microsoft).
300. See Sabel et al., supra note 6, at 14–15 (identifying pooling as a means of consolidating
data to develop more effective regulatory practices).
301. For an overview of the elements that factor into such decisions, see Benkler, supra note
297, at 400–23.
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reason, it is more efficient to cooperate with other firms rather than
302
to perform everything in-house.
Eventually, diseconomies of scope and scale catch up with any
organization. This is as true in the regulatory sphere as in business.
Thus, it is possible to discern the outlines of a transaction cost
approach to modularity. Overcoming diseconomies of scale and scope
can be an important function of regulatory modularity. Where
agencies have different areas of specialization, configuring them for
particular purposes can take advantage of the economy of scale
resulting from their respective strengths. It might be quite difficult
and costly, by contrast, for a new bureaucratic entity to develop the
relevant expertise on its own. And, of course, there is the political
impracticability of eliminating agencies that have become entrenched.
A modular approach offers an avenue for reform that is less
wrenching and more pragmatic.
Yet another example of modularity can be found in the
international context, in which states come together to create
differently configured “regimes” (essentially, formal or informal rule
303
systems) for solving particular problems. Nation states naturally
have different values and interests, and relatively more or less power,
yet they frequently coordinate their activities. They do this in myriad
ways: by signing treaties, building international institutions, entering

302. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 117 (1975) (“The distinctive powers of internal organization are
impaired and transactional diseconomies are incurred as firm size and the degree of vertical
integration are progressively extended.”).
303. For examples of such regimes, see the World Trade Organization, the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, and the World Intellectual
Property Organization. International law scholars are just beginning to identify and analyze the
relationships between these different sets of rules. See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The
TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29
YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 6–7 (2004) (analyzing the reasons for and relevance of international regimes
in the context of international intellectual property law); Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The
Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, INT’L ORG. 277, 279–81 (2004) (defining a regime
in the singular as a core international agreement administered by a discrete organization and
extending the analysis to “regime complexes,” in which interrelated and overlapping regimes
require broad rules to allow navigation of conflicting legal rules, thereby enabling
argumentation over interpretation and forum shopping among regime institutions). See
generally Andrew T. Guzman, International Antitrust and the WTO: The Lesson from
Intellectual Property, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 933 (2003) (proposing a process of developing an
international antitrust regime based on lessons learned from the development of international
intellectual property regimes because of the shared characteristics of the two fields).
On the conflict between different regimes, see generally Theme Statement: Conflict and
Coordination Across International Regimes, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 325 (2003).
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informal agreements, and engaging in episodic ad hoc cooperation. In
addition to agreements among states, moreover, international
cooperation and coordination can arise less formally, through
networks of regulators or other substate actors such as
304
nongovernmental organizations.
The implicit suggestion of this perspective on international
relations is that states and their subparts build and then participate in
a wide variety of arrangements for different purposes. One can
imagine regimes, therefore, as an example of the kind of institutional
provisionalism that we think of as modular. These processes allow
states and networks of actors across states to maintain officially their
separate identities and voices, while acting in concert in a wide variety
of ways to advance their interests. It is intriguing to see the
supposedly hierarchical world of domestic regulation evolving in a
direction reminiscent of modern international relations. The
components of the modular structure in each setting provide access
points—voice opportunities—for a wide variety of groups and
perspectives. As in the international arena, there is tremendous
heterogeneity among interest groups in the domestic sphere. A more
hierarchical organizational form would provide fewer opportunities
for this kind of cross-cutting input.
While incomplete, these examples are suggestive, we hope, as
analogs and metaphors. They highlight some additional benefits of
modularity that supplement our own case study: the idea that
modular structures may increase structural transparency and
flexibility, help to overcome diseconomies of scope and scale, and be
better able than hierarchical structures to accommodate diverse
voices. Of course, we recognize that this vision remains a normative
ideal. Real world modular structures may go some of this distance,
but they still face serious obstacles. We turn to these in the next
section.

304. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 1997, at
183–97; see also MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1 (1998) (describing the emergence of
“transnational advocacy networks” consisting of state and nonstate actors).
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IV. OBSTACLES TO MODULARITY
A. Resistant Agencies
One of the greatest obstacles to modularity, as noted, is the
traditionally narrow mandates, missions, and organizational
structures of regulatory and management agencies.305 Many agencies
resist coordinating their activities with other agencies, even when they
might agree that coordination would be beneficial because they face
few incentives to do so. This is the product not only of statutory
mandates, but also of oversight by the three branches. Congress tends
not only to authorize but to fund agencies on an individual basis. For
their part, courts have little opportunity to encourage interagency
coordination; their main function is to ensure that individual agencies
do not abuse the discretion afforded them by Congress. And
although, of all the branches, the executive branch may have the
biggest interest in interagency coordination,306 it nevertheless remains
elusive.307 Agencies tend to reflexively resist sharing their authority or

305. This point, and many others like those we make in the rest of this section, were made
(it has been pointed out to us) in an impressive CEQ Report commissioned by the Clinton
administration but never acted upon. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTYFIVE YEARS 7 (1997), available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/media/pdf/nepa25fn.pdf. Ten years
ago, the Clinton administration was already thinking along the lines of interagency teams,
stakeholder partnerships, and cross-cutting budgets—the building blocks for the kind of
modularity we advocate here. The EPA also published a path-breaking work during the same
period through its watershed planning and ecosystem restoration programs, which have led to
increased agency coordination on a watershed basis. See Karkkainen, supra note 6, at 191–92
(citing EPA efforts to replicate nationally programs like the Chesapeake Bay Program, which
use a “watershed approach”).
306. See Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 1, 11–12 (1994) (arguing that only the President, and not Congress, has the
incentive to coordinate across agencies); see also id. at 18–19 (discussing how presidents can
centralize control over policy decision by imposing managerial rules, using the Office of
Management and Budget, and establishing structures).
307. For example, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, both the President and
Congress have instituted a variety of reforms aimed at increasing interagency coordination over
national security, including the creation of an entirely new agency: the Department of
Homeland Security. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 101–103, 116
Stat. 2135, 2142–45 (codified at 6 U.S.C.A. §§ 111–113 (Supp. 2004)). However, interagency
coordination is still weak. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-323, U.S. PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY: INTERAGENCY COORDINATION EFFORTS HAMPERED BY THE LACK OF A
NATIONAL COMMUNICATION STRATEGY 2–5 (2005) (describing the need for greater
interagency coordination for national security), at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05323.pdf (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
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constraining their flexibility in any way that might compromise their
independence and power. Agencies may also erect obstacles to too
much public involvement—many agency staff likely think the
traditional public comment period works just fine and have no wish to
cede decision making power to outsiders. And finally, agencies are
especially reluctant to yield any of their budgeting authority. They
can be expected to push for funding for their narrow priorities rather
than for what’s best for the program as a whole, if it would diminish
their share.308
Moreover, the extent to which agency culture can be a significant
impediment to change cannot be overstated. One of the lessons of the
CalFed process is that each agency brings different notions of their
roles and different cultures to the table. Some agencies are motivated
to improve the quality of their decision making to accomplish their
statutory mandates, whereas others are more oriented to assisting
their clients even when doing so conflicts with a larger notion of the
“public interest.” Some agencies have track records of being more
open and transparent in decision making, whereas others have
legacies of being closed. And finally, agency staff tend to have
relatively narrow job classifications and areas of expertise. Relatively
few of them can be expected to have been exposed to dispute
resolution and collaborative processes.
It is difficult to convey how challenging interagency coordination
can be, even with committed, strong leadership and a set of key
players willing to risk political capital with their constituencies.309
Agency cooperation requires resources in the form of personnel and
money. Insufficient resources is said to be the most common cause of
failure in cooperative efforts.310 Yet securing sufficient funding is
easier said than done. As we saw with CalFed, modular approaches to
regulation and management will require a substantial commitment of
resources, sometimes in the billions of dollars, which is especially
difficult to raise in times of budget shortfall.

308. See Nawi & Brandt, supra note 39, at 32 (“[A]gencies in general in any area of
government are resistant to sharing their authorities and to any actions or structures that could
constrain their independence or normal decision-making process.”).
309. As one scholar remarks: “Agencies cooperate? Of course not! As one of my colleagues
quipped when I told her I was writing a book about interagency cooperation, ‘Short book,
huh?’” EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER: THE PRACTICE AND
THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP 4 (1998).
310. Id. at 163. “Nothing coordinates like cash,” says one scholar. See id. at 191.
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Beyond being expensive, modular structures present unique
problems because they require programmatic funding across issues
and agencies. As we noted earlier, the legislative process is neither
311
organized nor accustomed to funding on this cross-cutting basis. In a
recent effort to secure federal authorization for CalFed, the
program’s advocates sought precisely this kind of funding in the form
of a “block grant” intended to cut across agencies, with the idea that
budgeting decisions among them would be guided by general
principles like “balanced implementation.”312 This would leave agency
administrators (presumably advised by the BDA) with the freedom to
steer funds to those aspects of the larger CalFed Program that needed
it first or most. The effort to secure such funding failed, however. In
the end, Congress authorized CalFed but required that the legislation
describe all of the specific projects and programs in the CalFed ROD.
As Wright says, key members of Congress needed to assure
themselves that the program was balanced. They were not prepared
to leave those judgments to agencies, guided by the BDA.313 Although
this is hardly surprising from a traditional oversight perspective, it
reduces the flexibility to adjust the balance of funding as conditions
change.314
Thus, modular processes not only require substantial resources,
they may well require a different approach to funding entirely. The
federal budget process stymies efforts at cross-cut budgeting at every
turn, not just in the appropriations process. For example, now that the
federal authorization bill has passed, OMB has developed an

311. See Wright E-mail, supra note 139, at 6 (stating that attracting support for CalFed in
Congress is difficult because members must be convinced to accept the plan as a whole, rather
than picking and choosing elements they want to support). We suspect that fragmentation
among oversight committees for different agencies could be another contributing factor.
312. Wright Notes, supra note 119, at 4.
313. Id.
314. Wright recalls the fateful meeting between Senators Feinstein (D-CA) and Kyl (R-AZ)
on the CalFed bill this way: “At one point Kyl turned to me and said, ‘Sorry, I understand that
you have an innovative program out there, and that balance is important but I’m a traditional
guy, and I need to see things done the traditional way.’” Wright Interview, supra note 128, at 1.
Convincing members of Congress to fund on a more programmatic basis is especially
challenging when members had no significant role in shaping CalFed from the start. And the
fact that CalFed depends on a multiple agency strategy for implementation also complicates the
process of seeking support in Congress. Instead of focusing lobbying efforts on one agency (e.g.,
the Department of Interior, which funded CalFed in the initial stages) the Program must
continue to seek funding from many different agencies, which means many different
congressional committees will need to be persuaded of its merits. Wright Notes, supra note 119,
at 4.
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interagency cross-cut budget that shows all expenditures related to
315
CalFed. This helps to convey to legislators what CalFed as a whole
requires, and it could help to coordinate what the agencies need
relative to one another on an ongoing basis. Still, OMB produces the
interagency budget after agencies submit their requests. There is no
interagency process on the front end, at the planning stage when it is
needed most. As Wright says, “There is still no adequate mechanism
for a truly interagency approach. The agencies involved not only
don’t share their budget requests that go to OMB, they are prohibited
from sharing them—and they have separate OMB examiners—
because all budgeting is done on an agency by agency basis.”316
Beyond funding modular efforts, Congress and state legislatures
can help to stimulate modularity by creating legislative triggers or
default rules that force stakeholders to cooperate. We saw this in the
CalFed process. Strict legal mandates, like ESA-driven limits on
pumping, or water quality standards under the CWA, can trigger a
sense of crisis that prompts agencies to overcome traditional ways of
doing business. Little concentrates the efforts of an agency as much as
the prospect of an ESA injunction or the anticipation of pump
shutdowns in the Delta during growing season. Litigation may
function as a useful background threat, as long as it is not used so
indiscriminately as to derail the process entirely. One study suggests
that the perceived threat of litigation is one of the two most important
317
factors determining levels of interagency cooperation.
The other important factor in promoting cooperation is the
influence of professionals across agencies who share both a common
318
To the extent that
perspective and a professional network.

315. See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CALFED FY 1998–2006 BUDGET CROSSCUT
METHODOLOGY (2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/pdf/
ap_cd_rom/calfed_methods.pdf; OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CALFED-RELATED FED.
FUNDING (2005) (showing federal funding by CalFed category and by agency), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/pdf/ap_cd_rom/calfed.pdf.
316. Wright E-mail, supra note 139, at 6; see also COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
supra note 305, at 7 (citing interagency coordination as key to successful collaboration).
317. THOMAS, supra note 31, at 258–59. Managers particularly feared the loss of autonomy
that an injunction would cause. Id. at 263.
318. Id. at 261. Professor Thomas argues that the influence of ecologists was due in large
part to their united viewpoint:
Their influence resulted not from their absolute numbers or line authority within the
agencies, but rather from their consensual knowledge. The management principles of
conservation biology offered synergistic possibilities for joint gains that spread
throughout the larger epistemic community of ecologists, and were gradually
understood and accepted by line managers and field staff as well.
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legislators, in structuring agencies, and agency staff themselves in
coordinating with one another, can promote these connections, they
319
In addition,
can help to lay a foundation for modularity.
cooperation may work best with agencies whose line managers enjoy
significant discretion and are not tied down by complicated standard
operating procedures.320 Again, there is a lesson for legislatures:
narrowly circumscribed statutory delegations may frustrate
cooperative problem solving, even as they serve to constrain agency
discretion.
B. Accountability
As with any governmental decision-making structure, we expect
modular systems to be accountable. But this begs the question,
Accountable to whom? And what is evidence of sufficient
accountability? We resist characterizing the accountability challenge
in this context as a simple version of a principal-agent problem.321
That characterization can be appropriate in some instances, but it
seems too formal and simplistic for the environmental and natural
resource contexts with which we are concerned. For example, the
traditional principal-agent formulation assumes the existence of a
principal with well-defined preferences. Yet this fails utterly to
capture the dynamic in a multiagency, multistakeholder,
intergovernmental process like CalFed. In these situations, there are
likely to be numerous principals across different levels of government
with a variety of sometimes competing preferences. We expect that a
modular system such as this will raise the same concerns about
accountability that arise in any networklike arrangement of decision
makers in which power is diffused.322

Id. As Thomas explains: “In California, agency ecologists had been cooperating for years—
within professional networks, across agency boundaries—trying to develop plans and gather
agency resources to implement these plans.” Id. at 265. According to Thomas’s study, the Park
Service did not cooperate well because it was on good terms with environmental groups and
was, therefore, not worried about being sued. Id. at 267.
319. Professor Thomas’s study also revealed that the rotation of personnel could present a
serious barrier to cooperation, which depends on long-term working relationships. These are
unlikely to develop in agencies where “success” often leads to transfer. Id. at 271–73.
320. Id. at 274–75.
321. This is not to say that application of the economic concept of agency slack is not useful;
only that it provides only a partial understanding. For a thoughtful application of this
framework in an analogous setting of private firms, see generally Michael J. Trebilcock &
Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1422 (2003).
322. Professor Richard Stewart has summarized some of the concerns as follows:
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Yet modular arrangements can be surprisingly “accountabilityrich.” Recall that in CalFed each agency remains intact. This means
that as agencies take steps to implement the program, they must, at a
minimum, adhere to the normal procedural rules that would apply to
them, including federal or state APA requirements. And, as always,
each of these agencies is accountable to multiple principals: they must
obey their statutory mandates, respond to legislative oversight,
adhere to judicial decisions, and conform to the priorities of their
executive branch principals. Nothing in the CalFed process supplants
these traditional checks. Rather, the process supplements them with
additional accountability measures.
In a modular structure, the agencies must also respond to one
another and to stakeholders they have brought into the process. In
this sense, accountability in modular structures—at least those
characterized by a significant amount of interagency coordination,
intergovernmental cooperation, and stakeholder participation—is
horizontal. This means that although decision makers are
hierarchically located in relation to a variety of traditional principals,
they are also horizontally placed in relation to both sister agencies
and other important constituencies. The CalFed example illustrates
how horizontal accountability might work. Recall that as part of
agreeing to the DIP, agencies with historically competing interests
agreed to link their actions: DWR and USBR’s plans for pumping
water from the Delta for their clients would be linked to the fish and
wildlife agencies’ planning process for protecting endangered fish.
And similar linkages were established through the creation of the
EWA, which requires traditionally warring agencies and stakeholders
to make decisions together. In this situation, the implementing
agencies must respond more often and to more players than they

The network is not a legally accountable entity. In some cases, the network process
will eventually result in formal legal arrangements involving governmental
authorities, memoranda of understanding, licenses for regulated entities, even formal
regulations. These can be reviewed by courts for excess of power . . . . There may,
however, be many participating governmental entities, from different levels of
government, subject to review in different courts. . . . [I]t is hard to see how the
interest representation model, which relies on formal legal procedures for
decisionmaking, can be successfully applied to network arrangements. Successfully
subjecting network decisionmaking to a system of regulatory analysis review on the
OMB model is also quite problematic.
Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 452
(2003). As to Stewart’s final point about OMB oversight, our view is that economic analysis
(where appropriate) should be part of the initial decision-making process, not an add-on
imposed by an external reviewer.
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323
would in a traditional principal-agent relationship. And with so
many parties constantly talking to one another, it is harder for any
party to dominate the process, or to get away with something by
going off secretly on its own. Although the accountability to
principles in the traditional APA model can theoretically work to
block bad rules or projects if they are sufficiently large and visible,
the CalFed modular structure actually introduces additional
mechanisms of control that may be more likely to constrain action in
practice. And beyond providing a check on bad behavior, the
interpenetration afforded by horizontal relationships can help to
change longstanding cultures and attitudes.
In addition to horizontal and vertical accountability, modular
systems can create additional layers of accountability in the form of
new institutions. In CalFed, the group of implementing agencies must
answer to the BDA. One might think the BDA is bound to be a weak
institutional player because it possesses neither budgetary nor
rulemaking power; indeed, it wasn’t even legislatively authorized until
2003. Yet by all accounts the Authority has been quite effective at
promoting coordination. We suspect this is at least in part because it
is specifically charged with overseeing the entire program and has no
single constituency. Without a historical client base, the Authority is
the only entity that is entirely free to pursue balanced implementation
in earnest. The BDA has also taken advantage of nontraditional
oversight tools. For example, notwithstanding its lack of direct
budgetary power, the Authority has worked with the Governor’s
Office of Finance to try to ensure that programwide state spending is
balanced among objectives.324 And even without the power to directly
alter the agencies’ legislative mandates (as Congress or a state
legislature might), the BDA can affect the agencies’ implementation
of their statutory mandates by engaging in a less direct form of
oversight: making recommendations; rejecting proposals; and
requiring explanations and plans on a regular basis.
Nevertheless, there remain reasons to be concerned about
whether modular systems will, in practice, produce sufficient
accountability. First, the plural accountability described above has a
downside: there may be so many vertical and horizontal checks in
place that observers will not know who is ultimately responsible for

323. Note that the Bay-Delta Authority influences programwide budgeting, however,
through the Office of Finance. Wright Notes, supra note 119, at 7.
324. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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what. In other words, if accountability is too diffuse, it may not be
meaningful. In addition, the relative informality of modular tools
(e.g., agreements, packages, plans) may come to displace more
traditional, visible, and formal agency procedures. In the worst-case
scenario, so-called modular approaches may serve—as some
environmentalists fear about CalFed—as a front for unrestricted
discretion by bureaucrats.
Selecting the participants in a modular structure also presents
potential accountability problems. Modular structures depend on a
delicate balance of agencies and stakeholders. But what determines
which stakeholders should participate? In the CalFed example, the
stakeholders with the most influence either have significant political
power (meaning they have demonstrated the capacity to grind the
system to a halt through litigation), significant expertise (meaning
they are valuable in finding solutions), or both. But few stakeholders
can credibly claim to represent fully the “public interest.” This
concern arises with all collaborative or multistakeholder initiatives. In
theory, virtually any group of stakeholders can be disqualified on the
grounds that it will only pursue its narrow interests or because its
claims to representing a broader public are dubious. This charge can
be leveled equally at private firms, local watershed groups, and
national environmental organizations, none of which is elected by the
general public. Even participation by local governments can raise
problems. To the extent that they achieve a dominant role, local
interests (perhaps captured by industry) might outweigh state or
national interests. Moreover, local government is often fragmented
among multiple municipal governments, whose interests and
incentives may or may not converge with those of the metropolitan
region as a whole, let alone those of the broader public.325 Meanwhile,
higher levels of government are often thought to be disconnected
from the concerns of those most directly impacted by regulatory
actions.
If designed poorly, then, intensive collaboration between
different levels of government and among a variety of agencies and
stakeholders might diminish political accountability. In New York v.
United States,326 a case in which state participation in a federal
environmental program was mandated by federal legislation, Justice
325. For an extensive discussion of this problem and possible solutions, see David Barron,
Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255 (2003).
326. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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O’Connor worried that democratic accountability would suffer
because of the inability of citizens to identify whether it was state or
327
federal officials who had ultimate policy responsibility. Modular
structures are significantly more complex than this simple federalstate scenario, as we have shown, and it is easy to imagine that they
could cause much greater citizen confusion. To put a fine point on it,
if you have a problem concerning the drafting or implementation of
the Bay-Delta ROD, against whom, precisely, should you vote in the
next election?
No governance arrangement can provide perfect accountability,
and measuring modularity against such an ideal would be unfair. But
modular approaches must be designed with these concerns in mind.
So, for example, although it is impossible to specify precisely which
stakeholders ought to participate in each modular regime, it seems
appropriate to establish an expectation of balance: balance in
numbers, across perspectives, and in terms of capacity. And we would
expect modular structures to aim to give voice to a variety of local,
regional, and national interests, providing access for a rich and
diverse set of stakeholders.328 As we have already noted, the various
participants will provide a menu of political and legal accountability
mechanisms. If the system is badly designed, these vertical and
horizontal accountability mechanisms may in effect cancel one
another out, but in a well-constructed system they should reinforce
each other. The fact that some participants have direct electoral
control fosters one form of accountability; the fact that others must be
prepared to defend the reasonableness of their actions in court may
provide another; the ready access of some participants to the media
may provide yet a third. Participants may check and balance one
another in true Madisonian style. Nongovernmental organizations,
local governments, state governments, firms, communities, districts,
and federal agencies have diverging interests. They may, granted,
collude with one another, but they are at least equally likely to act as
fire alarms, alerting legislators and the public to malfunctions of the
regulatory process.
As we have seen, CalFed is highly, if imperfectly, transparent. It
features both formal and informal tracks of stakeholder participation

327. Id. at 168–69.
328. Just as the national government includes representation of state populaces (the
Senate), more localized communities (the House), and the nation as a whole (the president), so
the modular structure can blend constituencies.
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(including the Public Advisory Group and many informal
opportunities for contact with both the Authority members and
agency staff); a rigorous Science Program that independently reviews
each aspect of program implementation; Annual Work Plans
requiring detailed updating by agencies; the DIP, a package of
commitments to renew balanced implementation of the key elements
of the plan; and an Authority created to coordinate agency actions,
which themselves remain subject to the APA and other applicable
administrative law requirements. In the face of such overlapping and
complementary features, it would be misleading to suggest that this
process of checks and balances is “unaccountable.”
CONCLUSION
Modular environmental regulation seeks to overcome regulatory
fracture through inter-agency and inter-stakeholder coordination. It
requires that institutional form follow function, relies on “agreement
based” decision making, facilitates “social learning,” and both
encourages and depends upon an adaptive process in which
information plays a crucial role. Finally, a modular approach
promotes accountability by supplementing traditional procedural
checks with a variety of informal controls and broad stakeholder
participation. The goal of the modular enterprise is to diagnose
problems and design solutions first, and then to devise governance
institutions and regulatory or contractual tools capable of
implementing them. This requires a willingness on the part of
decision makers to free themselves, even if temporarily, from the
narrowness of their own statutory mandates, procedural practices,
and cultural blinders so that they can participate in systemwide
problem-solving. Studies show that there are significant benefits to
adopting a problem-based approach, and innovative agencies often
do this informally.329 Yet they could do so much more frequently.
Participants in modular processes must resist the temptation,
however, to simply fit their definition of the problems to be solved

329. SPARROW, supra note 289, at 132–34. We recognize that the challenge of problem
definition remains. To some extent, this process is intuitive. It makes no sense “[t]rying to force,
through the ecosystem management system, problems that do not coincide with specific
watershed areas (for example, the problem of pesticide-induced arsenic concentrations on golf
courses, or threats to manatees from speeding boats, or radon in homes, or asbestos in
schools).” Id. at 218.
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330
into the mold of existing bureaucratic structures. The CalFed
example at the heart of this article, while falling short of our
theoretical ideal, nevertheless serves as the best example we have
found of a modular approach to environmental regulation. As we
learned through CalFed, the background legal regime exerts a
powerful gravitational pull. It can retard the design of new
institutions and inhibit the development of innovative policy options.
The problem-solving focus we advocate is meant to encourage
participants to look beyond these existing constraints—to finesse and
channel them—even if it is impossible to overcome them entirely.
Modularity is not a panacea, but the alternatives are distinctly
unpromising. One could imagine, for example, the formation of a
collection of new, autonomous legal entities, correctly geared to the
scale of a given environmental problem or geographic area and
designed to replace existing agencies. Unlike a modular structure,
which is subject to all the existing accountability mechanisms of its
members, such new entities would need an entirely new
accountability process. Apart from the potential confusion that could
be caused by a multitude of such special purpose agencies, we believe
that in many cases they would be faced with an unmanageable task
for which they would have to develop their own expertise. The
political, legal, and economic costs of replacing existing bureaucratic
structures with such entities seem overwhelming. An alternative
solution is to consolidate all authority at the highest existing
applicable level of government, which would normally be the federal
government. As with all proposals to centralize environmental
regulation and resource management in the federal government,
however, the chief problem is that federal decision makers are too
remote from local conditions to make the day-to-day judgments
necessary to effectively manage environmental resources.
It remains tempting, though ultimately impractical, to consider
integrating the myriad functions of existing environmental agencies,
whether at the federal or state level. As a thought experiment,
imagine that everything relevant to environmental protection and
natural resource management in the United States could be the
subject of one unified program, coordinated by one agency. In this
hypothetical universe, water quality issues would never be considered
independently of water allocation issues, which would always require

330.

Id. at 147.
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consideration of species conservation and, more generally, ecosystem
health. But addressing ecosystem health would require addressing
agricultural practices and resource extraction methods, along with
tackling air quality that might adversely affect the ecosystem, and so
on, until there would be one holistic, comprehensive agenda for
managing a seemingly unlimited set of interconnected resources that
cross multiple jurisdictions. Presumably, moreover, this hypothetical
“super” agency would need to have regulatory authority over every
policy area that affected the health of the environment—including
transportation policy, energy policy, and land use. Even thinking
about this is exhausting. Assuming it were politically feasible, an
agency that tried to cover this much ground would be technically
overwhelmed and would likely suffocate in its own bureaucracy.
Creating a mega-agency is fraught with problems. Even when all of
the agencies in question are part of the same level of government,
combining them effectively may be much more difficult than one
might think.331
Thus, addressing environmental problems and managing
complex natural resources will necessarily involve multiple agencies
with a variety of expertise and multiple levels of governments with
differing capacities. The need to overcome the fragmentation
inherent in this approach, however, requires looking for opportunities
for integration, coordination, and information-sharing. This is what
the idea of modularity is meant to capture. We also contemplate the
possibility of multiple, overlapping modular structures addressing a
variety of problems. For example, an agency might participate in a
variety of collaborative exercises, each of which might have some
features of modularity: a Habitat Conservation Plan; a basin-based
water quality and resource management program; a regional air
pollution plan; and a multi-party negotiation aimed at regulating an
332
industry sector. This creates the possibility that the agency could
help cross-fertilize between these projects, adapting successful
solutions in one context to problems in other contexts. Overlapping
membership also increases the likelihood of informal cooperation
among the participants in different modular structures. By preserving
the individual units rather than transferring authority to some higher-

331. “[I]f there is one proposition on which consensus among students of public
administration is firm and widespread, it is that reorganization normally produces little of value
at a very high cost in time, energy, and personal anxiety.” BARDACH, supra note 309, at 16.
332. For a description of HCP or XL negotiations, see Freeman, supra note 2, at 191–95.
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level or consolidated entity, the modular structure creates the
possibility of useful synergies.
Given the complex nature of environmental problems and
natural resource management, there is no alternative to adopting a
more modular approach, with its emphasis on collaborative processes
and negotiated solutions. Litigation will always occur, but it is not a
useful, or even viable, method of planning, coordination, and
management. This recognition leads, inexorably, to concerns about
the professional training of those who would lead or work in modular
institutions. What discipline adequately prepares professionals—
equips them with the necessary skills—to both build and participate
in modular structures? Certainly not, we are sad to say, law schools.
Modularity requires a more expansive understanding of the role of
the environmental lawyer than a traditional legal education, with its
ongoing emphasis on litigation and inordinate focus on courts, allows.
In a regime of modular regulation, contests over legality will remain
important, and being adversarial will sometimes be absolutely
necessary. We will be the first to point out that litigation campaigns
by environmental groups are largely responsible for gains in
environmental protection achieved over the last thirty years, for huge
losses averted, and for conservation, such as it is, of our natural
resources. But as in corporate law, much of what lawyers do in the
future, we propose, will be transaction rather than litigation oriented.
Increasingly, the emphasis will be on structuring the governance
arrangements and designing the regulatory tools to implement multiparty agreements, with litigation mostly functioning as a background
threat. Thus, modular regulation will, among other things, place new
demands on law schools to conceptualize these issues as design
problems and to train students to deal with them creatively. In
proposing modular environmental regulation as an alternative worth
pursuing, spelling out its central features, and providing a case study
as concrete illustration, we hope that this Article has taken a first step
in that direction.

